

A TENTATIVE PROBLEMATIC FOR
A PHILOSOPHY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES

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[Reprinted from THE THOMIST, XXV, 4, October, 1962.]

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I. INTRODUCTION

SLIGHT acquaintance with the social sciences and with some of the philosophic discussions concerning problems they raise is sufficient to convince any philosopher that the philosophy of the social sciences is a vast and largely uncharted domain for investigation. However, the inherent importance of the philosophic issues raised by the social sciences and the practical urgency of their implications compel the attention of anyone concerned with ethics as a discipline relevant to social policy. Moreover, the manifold difficulty and relative scarcity of studies in the philosophy of the social sciences render this field uniquely challenging.

How should one begin? It might seem that the necessary first step is to cultivate a broad and deep acquaintance with the elements of all the social sciences and to seek a certain level of competence in one or more of them. Certainly some such undertaking will be essential, since it obviously is impossible to develop an adequate philosophy of the social sciences without a firsthand knowledge of them in themselves. But such study will be endless and pointless if it is not guided by some tentative heuristic structure. Which works should be studied? Which should be passed over as too specialized and too remote from central philosophic issues? In the philosophy of the natural sciences—in the foundations of physics, for example—this problem is not so great, since the material is well organized and the issues are sharp. But in the social sciences there can be considerable doubt even concerning which disciplines or which topics within any discipline are fundamental.

Should one begin, as a good scholar, by surveying the work which has been done in the philosophy of the social sciences?

Certainly, this survey will be necessary, since any attempt to develop a comprehensive philosophy of the social sciences can profit greatly from work already accomplished; moreover, any new undertaking must reckon with previous relevant work, either to integrate its results or to show their inadequacy. Yet such a survey is rendered difficult, not only by the extent of the material, but also and especially by the lack of a clear demarcation of the philosophy of the social sciences. Diversities of philosophic view already have their effect within the social sciences themselves. It would be all too easy to permit available indices and bibliographies to narrow or even to predetermine the outcome of an investigation in the philosophy of the social sciences, since diverse philosophic orientations will locate the investigation in diverse places; either in treatises near the beginning of substantive works in the social sciences, or in special treatises such as those on methodological issues, or at some point within one or more of the established philosophic disciplines, or in a special philosophic inquiry. If a survey of available materials is not to be arbitrarily narrowed, all possible sources should be explored in so far as they are relevant.

“In so far as they are relevant”—there is the difficulty. An investigation must begin somewhere and it must use some criterion of relevance at the outset. In any philosophic investigation we begin from where we are. We need not peer out out through metaphysical peepholes and assume absolute cash-value for the promissory notes of our merely contingent opinions. Quite the contrary. We must become aware of the peepholes we use in order to see around them and we must discount our opinions as we begin questioning what we had assumed without question. The first step toward a comprehensive philosophy of the social sciences is to draw up a tentative list of the problems to be investigated together with the reasons one already can construct on both sides of each issue.

This tentative problematic is a useful *first* step, since it must be followed by serious study of the social sciences themselves

and an adequate survey of philosophic work on issues they raise. No conclusions can be reached without carrying out both of these studies. The list of problems should be *tentative*, since it will be merely heuristic; as the inquiry proceeds it will be modified repeatedly and even completely recast. Like an initial filing system for a new business, it will aid us in our first attempt to sort the materials, but it will be adapted as much as possible to meet the requirements of the materials. When the system breaks down, a new one will have to be established, since we must not cut our business to the measure of our operating procedure. The list also must be a tentative *problematic*, since only questions determine what is relevant to an inquiry. The problematic should include *arguments* one already can construct, since prejudices can be discounted if they are made explicit. Finally, arguments *on both sides* of each issue should be stated, since the questions are still open; the whole of one's opinions relevant to the issues should be stated, for the richest possible alternatives must be developed if the outcome of the investigation is to be at all adequate to its subject matter.

True, one can begin an inquiry without working out a tentative problematic. However, I think it safer to be explicit about the point of departure. Besides, the nearest place to begin looking for philosophic reasons is within one's already-formed opinions; the evident inadequacy of this source for knowledge is at the origin of the curiosity which both leads to further investigation and guides it by determining the greater relevance of a few of the almost infinite materials which could be studied.

No universally valid, tentative problematic is possible. In the nature of the case, this stage of inquiry is personal. Why, then, should it not remain among its author's private papers? Inasmuch as it is a fragment of an inquiry, it should. Nevertheless, I present this fragment for three reasons. First, as an example of the method of tentative problematic, which I have just described. Second, as a proposal of several questions and

arguments, for whatever value they may have. Third, as a stimulant to discussion among those interested from diverse points of view in the philosophy of the social sciences.

I have divided the questions and arguments into four groups: subject matter, method, principles, and purposes. This division, based on Aristotle's division of causality, reflects my own broadly-Aristotelian orientation. Within each section I offer four problems.

II. PROBLEMS CONCERNING SUBJECT MATTER

1. Whether the subject matters of geography and history are such that they can be sciences?

On the one hand, the proper principles for the organization of data in geography and history—namely, space and time—seem to make their subject matters non-scientific, if “science” connotes generality and necessity expressible in laws or law-like statements. Of course, neither geography nor history concerns isolated particulars, for both of them study trends and distributions. These studies, nevertheless, seem to involve mere grouping of data, rather than any generalized interpretation of data; the mathematics used in their organization, which is scientific to be sure, does not serve as a theory from which the data can be derived. Of course, attempts have been made to develop geographical and historical laws, but the purported laws seem to derive from and properly belong to other disciplines—for example, to economics or to political theory. The conditions and properties of social entities insofar as they are in space and time can be subject matter for a general investigation—for instance, philosophic anthropology or philosophy of history—but such investigations seem to rest on metaphysical assumptions. Their results are not subject to confirmation or falsification by any given set of social phenomena. For these reasons, it might seem that geography and history do not have such subject matters that they can be sciences.

On the other hand, physical geography and natural history apart, there is a close relationship between geography and

history and other disciplines which are numbered among the social sciences. One might try to explain this relationship by saying that geography and history are non-scientific disciplines auxiliary to properly scientific social inquiries, or by saying that geography and history are joined with the other social sciences in objectives rather than in subject matter. However, cannot a case be made for calling geography and history "social sciences" in a stricter sense? Space and time, considered in certain ways, it is true, do not establish intelligible order, but only empirical unity. However, in genetic theories space and time in the concrete may enter as conditions of an intelligible order. Considered as conditions or relationships immanent to a moral object—that is, as cultural factors—space and time in the concrete have some intelligible status. The relationship between particular and universal in a logic suited to natural science (or to part of it) may not apply in a logic suited to social science. Quite diverse logics may be necessary, since moral objects seem to be intelligible particulars.

2. Whether the subject matter of economics is such that it can be a *social* science?

On the one hand, economics seems to be the most solidly established and clearly scientific of all the social sciences. Economists claim to use a scientific methodology; clearly, the subject matter with which economists are concerned does not prevent them from making general statements having a certain degree of necessity or a law-like character. Moreover, since economists as such are not interested in natural entities inasmuch as they are natural, but only insofar as they are circumstances or materials conditioning human processes of production, distribution, and consumption, it appears both that economics is a science and that it is a *social* science.

On the other hand, the development by economics of theories requiring idealized models, including models for man—such as the economic man—may cast doubt upon both the scientific knowability and the social character of the subject matter of economics. The concept of efficiency is essential to economics.

This concept presupposes a defined set of goals attainable by multiple but relatively scarce means. Consequently, one might argue that economics is merely a technology for acquiring and distributing scarce resources. According to this view, the history of economics as a rational discipline is merely the history of the emergence of a technique from practical experience at the level of common sense; economics has no more reason to be called "social science" than has any other type of engineering, since all such techniques guide human operation by applying scientific knowledge.

3. Whether the subject matter of psychology is such that it can be a *social science*?

On the one hand, psychology seems to be a natural science rather than a social science. Of course, some problems included in what is conventionally called "psychology" are metaphysical or otherwise philosophical. However, the study of man as such is the study of a natural entity which is prior to society and a condition of it. Even when psychologists examine the abnormalities of diseased individuals and the distinguishing characteristics of psychological types, they are investigating the variability and constancy of the structure and functioning of human beings inasmuch as they are entities of nature. Of course, many social factors have been investigated by psychologists, particularly by those interested in personality and in so-called social psychology. These studies, however, seem to be included in psychology only by a historical accident; properly, they belong to ethics, sociology, political theory, or anthropology.

On the other hand, it seems impossible to consider man as man and yet to study him as a merely natural entity. True, we can study man in this way if we consider him only according to what he has in common with other entities in nature. For example, for a physicist, man as a mass behaves as any other mass. For a biologist, man displays structures and functions common to other higher animals or differing only in detail from theirs. However, a consideration of man in himself requires a

point of departure in his integrated and total behavior insofar as it is observable externally, introspectively, or in both ways. If this requirement is observed, social determinants cannot be ignored; in inquiry into man as man, the natural aspects of human behavior become subordinated to the organization of culture and the integration of individual personality. Since culture is essentially social and personality-integration is unintelligible in abstraction from social conditions, it follows that psychology is a *social* science.

4. Whether there is *one* subject matter for social science?

On the one hand, the very plurality of the social sciences seems to show that there cannot be a single subject matter for all of them. In many cases, the same objects are considered in diverse aspects by two or more of these disciplines. Moreover, there seems to be no general social science of which the rest are specifications. Although the social sciences study a single order of entities—the social-moral order—this community no more indicates unity of subject matter than the community of nature indicates unity of subject matter for the natural sciences. A subject matter is not unified by the connection and unity in any respect whatever of the things considered—if that were the case, only one science would be possible—but by the unity of things considered under a definite and unified point of view. Thus, the social sciences have only an unsystematic unity based on their common concern with a single order of entities.

On the other hand, if we eliminate those treatises in social science which can be distributed among literature, philosophy, technology, and natural science, there remains a definite group of inquiries which seem to have unity of systematic subject matter. The distinctions among the various disciplines seem to be less according to proper points of view than according to their attachment to different adjacent disciplines and the different phenomena within the social-moral order selected for investigation. There cannot be a general social science, then, since there is only one social science, whose parts or treatises are

dispersed among separately institutionalized disciplines. The differences in treatment of the same data by different disciplines arise in either of two ways: (1) the data investigated are not within the primary subject matter of social-scientific consideration, and they can be viewed differently from various problematic points of view; (2) the differences in treatment manifest diverse theoretical positions which happen to be institutionalized as parts of distinct disciplines—for example, pragmatism may be accepted implicitly by the treatment of the family in one discipline while a more empiricist view may be accepted implicitly by the treatment of it in another.

The unitary subject matter of social science may be defined in terms of culture. Culture is the collective totality of all the consequences of human decisions. It includes as its elements: (1) character, habits, and acts; (2) beliefs, attitudes, and customs; (3) everything conventional and symbolic, including all uses of language; (4) positive laws with the rights and obligations arising under them, institutions, and all instances of human conflict and cooperation; (5) all products of human effort, art, and technology. A *culture* is a subset of the class of culture. A culture derives from a specified group of persons or a *community*; it is defined by their joint participation in one or more cultural elements; their culture can be characterized by the probable occurrence of definite cultural elements under specified conditions such that (1) these conditions are present in the community, (2) the probabilities of the occurrence of two or more cultural elements can be correlated, and (3) the pattern of their correlation can be referred to and in some sense explained by the elements which define the community. To say that social science has culture as its common subject matter and that the primary social entities are cultures is not to limit social science to anthropology. Culture as I have defined it includes everything in the social-moral order. The anthropologist, however, is concerned only with cultures that can be defined in terms of some institutional community including spatial-temporal continuity among its determinations.

III. PROBLEMS CONCERNING METHODS

1. Whether experimental method is applicable in the social sciences?

On the one hand, the experimental method seems to be nothing other than the natural way in which the human mind operates. Given a problem, a possible resolution of the problem is suggested, and this suggestion is confirmed when it yields suitable results in practice. The refinement of the experimental method practiced in the natural sciences may not be applicable in the social sciences, but neither is the method precisely the same in diverse applications in the natural sciences. Areas in the social sciences in which experiment is impossible are not strictly scientific; rather, they belong to the formation and execution of concrete policies.

On the other hand, one may argue that the experimental method, properly speaking, is a procedure originating in technology, a variant of which has been developed and used in the natural sciences. True, one can view moral life and politics in the light of a general technology, for example, dialectical materialism. Although such a position is morally unsound, viewed in this way the moral and political order becomes subject to the method of experimentation. In so far as experimental method requires the confirmation of a general hypothesis by the fulfillment of predictions deduced from it, it is not applicable in genuine *social* sciences for two reasons. (1) The subject matter reacts to experiments performed upon it in ways that are unpredictable and irregular. (2) The isolation of part of culture from the remainder of it is impossible and classes of cultural events can never be represented adequately by any of their instances. Moreover, it would be immoral to attempt to use experimental method in social science, since this method subordinates the subject matter to the interest of the scientist as such.

2. Whether there are special instruments and laboratory techniques in the social sciences?

On the one hand, one may argue that special instruments and laboratory techniques are required in the social sciences inasmuch as exact measurements must be taken; precise instruments of measurement must be designed and the measurements must be taken with carefully controlled techniques. These conditions are satisfied in the design of tests or questionnaires, the selection of samples, and the interpretation of statistics, just as they are by the special instruments and laboratory procedures of the natural sciences.

On the other hand, one may reply that calling these methods "scientific procedures" is merely a metaphor. The instruments used in natural sciences are useful for two reasons. (1) They augment our rather weak perceptive powers. (2) They transform qualitative differences into readings on numerical scales. Our perception of social-moral phenomena is not sensitive but total-experiential; it neither needs nor is susceptible of artificial augmentation. The use of survey techniques, tests, and questionnaires is not an improvement on ordinary means of estimating moral-social realities, but is either part of the ordinary means or a surrogate for them, having only the advantage of speed in handling a huge volume of data without a lived experience of every item. Qualitative differences here cannot be transformed into different readings on a numerical scale; although moral-social judgments can be expressed metaphorically by mathematical models, such expressions are not strictly meaningful, since they are never proportionate to what they are intended to represent.

3. Whether it is possible in the social sciences to establish law-like statements from which precise predictions can be made?

On the one hand, it seems impossible in the social sciences to establish law-like statements from which precise predictions can be made. Of course, insofar as the social sciences deal with natural entities, certain laws may be established; insofar as they deal with techniques, certain rules may be set down; insofar as they contain metaphysical speculation, certain meta-

physical statements may be formulated. Properly, however, the social sciences investigate the consequences of human choices, and choices are not determined by the unique insight which formulates the unique object with which they are concerned—they are free. Laws, therefore, cannot be established with respect to them, except in the sense that imperatives made to guide them are called “laws.” Presumably, however, science seeks general, factual, but necessary statements; these cannot be established by a properly *social* discipline.

On the other hand, one can rejoin that this position would require so absolute a freedom that all generalization with respect to culture would become impossible. Yet this proposition is manifestly false, since we learn by experience in the moral-social order, just as we do in the natural order. From a sample, generalizations applicable to similar cases can be made successfully. True, the generalization is only statistical, but it is genuine and it has a certain necessity. Predictions made concerning the actions of a man having a certain character will hold for the most part; of course, his character may develop, but even this development can be taken into account. The demand for total indeterminacy overemphasizes the requirements of determinacy; all that is required for necessity is that probabilities hold within a certain margin of error. Social-moral entities do occur with such necessity; the cases wherein the probabilities do not hold are those in which a conversion process or a cultural revolution occurs. To require absolute indeterminacy would be to suppose that every single act manifests a total and radical conversion; experience does not bear out this supposition.

4. Whether there is an appropriate mode of defining in the social sciences?

On the one hand, one may argue that no mode of defining can be proper to the social sciences, since the various modes of definition are logical, and logic remains the same regardless of subject matter. Certainly, there are definitions in the social sciences different from those given in other disciplines, for they

have a special subject matter to investigate; however, the *modes* of defining are the same.

On the other hand, social-moral entities in some way are constituted through their formulation by man's own deliberation. Hence, these entities have no definitions distinct from their nominal definitions as natural entities do—that is, the conditions required for using a certain word to signify a moral entity are precisely what that entity is. The assumption that logic is the same for any subject matter may be correct for different theoretical sciences. However, thinking concerning moral-social entities is not merely a specialization of theoretical thinking. The understanding of culture requires some personal engagement that the understanding of nature does not, since the whole of culture is relative to deliberation and choice. Moreover, although a certain abstraction is possible so that definite meanings can be given to “just,” “president,” “public works,” and so on, still the affirmation of a concretization of one of these ideals is never twice quite the same. We know by *common* sense what a just act is, but no two just acts have exactly the same realization of justice; nor is this difference only in degree, since it is impossible for “more” and “less” to qualify “just” except metaphorically. The implications of this point include the following: thinking about social-moral entities is a process quite different from thinking about natural entities; the former process requires a logic all its own.

IV. PROBLEMS OF PRINCIPLES

1. Whether there are any principles common to the social sciences and other disciplines?

On the one hand, it seems that the principles of mathematics are common to the social sciences and other disciplines; at least, the leading principles of mathematical logic (although not the principles within any single system) would seem applicable in either domain. Otherwise, the basic notions of unity and plurality, class, relation, and so on, would not apply in the social sciences. This consequence is patently false; moreover, it would imply that the social disciplines not only have a mode

of knowing diverse from the natural sciences, but that they have no mode of knowing at all.

On the other hand, one might reply that two diverse types of propositions are used in the social sciences, just as in the natural sciences. Sometimes, merely hypothetical assertions are made; in such cases, the ordinary rules of logic apply and generalizations can be formulated—at least, to some extent—mathematically. Sometimes, however, the assertions made are unconditional, although only probable with a certain degree of probability. In such cases, the assertions cannot be formulated mathematically; the rules of *ordinary* logic need not apply, and there are no principles strictly common to the social sciences and to other disciplines. Of course, certain verbal formulae can be given analogous meanings in the social disciplines and in the natural sciences; however, insofar as they do not define their subjects in the same way, no principle has the same meaning; common words are equivocal.

2. Whether there are any principles common to all of the social sciences?

On the one hand, if there is community of subject matter then there must be community of principles in the social disciplines. No doubt, there are few principles common to the entire domain; perhaps these few are not even very interesting once they are understood. The notion of culture itself appears to be one common principle. Moreover, although they may not function as principles in the social sciences, the notions of value, choice, norm, character, obligation, and certain generalizations which can be made about them, seem to be principles relevant to all the social sciences.

On the other hand, one might argue that these principles are not principles of social science, but of social philosophy. Let us assume that social science achieves law-like statements verified concerning a common subject matter—culture. Nevertheless, there are no common principles, since existing cultural orders depend on man's diverse opinions and choices. Since opinion evolves and will be either good or bad in a variety

of ways, social-moral entities exist and are defined in ways irreducibly diverse so far as scientific consideration is concerned. Thus, even if the subject matter of the social disciplines is one, there is no principle common to it, but a variety of conflicting principles, having diverse degrees of adequacy, which can be stretched to cover the entire domain.

3. Whether natural law provides principles for the social sciences?

On the one hand, it seems that natural law must give principles to the social sciences; if their subject matter is culture (defined as the consequences of choices), natural law determines their subject matter. True, one cannot always argue from what ought to be to what is in fact; however, in case one is considering a man of perfect good will, such an inference is valid. The ideal case may serve as a *typic* in terms of which other cases can be understood; without a *typic*, all cases remain unintelligible. Thus, natural law seems to provide principles for the social sciences indirectly by providing a rational norm in terms of which existential perversity and degeneracy can be judged and by which actual situations must be understood.

On the other hand, the principles which constitute natural law are imperatives, not statements of fact. As imperatives, these principles are independent at least of the experiences which social scientists study. Nor are the principles of natural law necessary to establish a *typic* in terms of which facts might be understood. The general norms expressed by natural law are inapplicable to particular cases except insofar as each situation is formulated and understood independent of natural law as a moral case, which then can be seen to conform or not to conform to it. The only community between statements of social science and imperatives of natural law, then, is in certain terms which occur in both.

4. Whether any principles in social science are general—that is, univocally applicable to parts of the class of which they are asserted primarily?

On the one hand, some principles must be general or all of

them would be specific. If so, it would be impossible to organize the social disciplines or to find any interrelationships. True, there may not be anything really common in which all the entities studied by the social disciplines participate; however, there must be some intelligible unity expressible in univocal terms.

On the other hand, one can argue that there cannot be any general principles whatever in social science. A general principle presupposes an isolable aspect of a subject matter—that is, a structure intelligible apart from the conditions of its concrete occurrence (a form apart from matter). In social science, however, the subject matter does not involve such a metaphysical constitution that admits of general consideration; to consider the material of culture apart from its status in a social-moral order is to consider something which is established in an altogether different order. The general principles, therefore, lie outside social science itself in philosophy or in the natural sciences. Furthermore, what holds of social entities considered in general does not necessarily hold of them in particular cases; a social entity can exist without having what is essential to it, since evil is a species of moral reality.

V. PROBLEMS OF PURPOSES

1. Whether knowledge in the social sciences can be for its own sake?

On the one hand, inasmuch as social science consists of factual, not normative, principles and conclusions, such knowledge can be sought for its own sake. Detachment from possible practical implications of what is discovered is a necessary condition of unbiased objectivity here just as it is in the natural sciences. The results of human decisions are entities like any other entities; one can be interested in them merely for the sake of knowing them.

On the other hand, one can maintain that knowledge in social science should not be sought and cannot be possessed merely for its own sake. True, a theoretic consideration of moral entity is possible; however, such a consideration is metaphysical, not

social-scientific. Social science cannot be had for its own sake, because it cannot be had at all without a personal involvement of the knower, since without engagement in the values which determine or fail to determine the entities investigated, the inquirer has no means of defining them. Further the entities studied by social science not only can change, they can change unpredictably in response to the very social process of inquiry itself. Moreover, even if social-scientific knowledge could be had merely for its own sake, it should not be sought with purely theoretical interest; the elements of the subject matter are or affect human values which, insofar as they are direct objects of choice, are more important than any possible knowledge about them.

2. Whether knowledge acquired in social science can be applied—that is, used as a social technology or engineering?

On the one hand, it seems that such knowledge cannot be applied in a social technology or engineering, since man is not a material that can be subordinated to the operations and objectives of an art. Since man's fulfillment is not a limited objective, his decisions, which conduce to his end, cannot be guided with efficiency. The knowledge gained by social science only contributes to moral deliberation. Of course, parts of the existing social sciences are natural sciences applicable in techniques, and other parts are purely technical. However, properly social knowledge is neither technical nor applicable in any technique.

On the other hand, not everyone accepts the notion that man's fulfillment is infinite and undefinable. Inasmuch as such a notion is not accepted, men and societies do treat themselves as material susceptible to technical manipulation. In at least some such cases the knowledge gained by social science can be applied as a social engineering—although one might wish to argue that such application is immoral. Perhaps, moreover, the knowledge acquired by social science can be applied, if in fact man's end is definable in a significant respect, and adequate means to it are provided, if not by nature, then by a supernatural economy of salvation.

3. Whether knowledge attained in social science can lead to categorical imperatives?

On the one hand, on two grounds it seems that knowledge gained in social science cannot lead to categorical imperatives. First, the statements of the social sciences themselves are indicative; no accumulation of indicative statements can conclude in an imperative statement. Second, social science cannot remain scientific if it includes principles of faith. Those who accept such principles may believe that without them it is impossible to formulate categorical imperatives, since all imperatives which disregard the content of divine revelation are inapplicable to man existing in his true situation—which man cannot know by himself.

On the other hand, one may argue that the knowledge acquired by social science is valuable precisely insofar as it aids in the formation of moral objects and the judgment of these as morally good or bad. Such concrete judgments of conscience are the only true categorical imperatives. The investigations of the social sciences indicate what is appropriate to men and societies of various kinds; they help one to be consistent with his own character. This assistance implies no mere static determination, since the evolution both of individual character and of social structure is appropriate. The social sciences also help us to know what to expect of others under various conditions, information important if wise judgments are to be made. Knowledge of social science leads to categorical imperatives, then, not determining them wholly, but contributing significantly to their formation.

4. Whether the objectives of the social sciences vary according to the personal commitments of each social scientist?

On the one hand, it seems that the personal commitments of the scientist cannot enter into the determination of the objectives of social science; otherwise, the social sciences would lose scientific detachment. If the objectives of the inquiry were controlled by the purposes of the investigator, then his methods and principles also necessarily would be controlled by them.

The result would be as many social sciences as social scientists (or, at least, as distinguishable moral types of social scientist); this consequence seems absurd.

On the other hand, the social sciences do seem to vary according to the political conditions and personal commitments under which they are conducted. This variability should not be surprising; the objectives of a scientist cannot be distinguished altogether from the objectives of the science itself in a non-theoretical inquiry. The social sciences neither are nor should they seek to become purely theoretical. The commitments of the scientist, consequently, will play some role in determining the science. There are not necessarily as many sciences as scientists or types of individuals, however, since basically there are only two types: (1) those who recognize the distinctness of the moral order, and treat the knowledge attainable by social science as distinct both from purely theoretical knowledge and from technical applications; (2) those who try to align social science with the natural sciences, and who treat the normative implications of social science as technical applications rather than as contributions to prudent deliberation.

VI. CONCLUSION

The second side of each argument is the one which I at present consider more likely. Nevertheless, the positions presented "on the other hand" do not form a consistent view, much less a compelling one. If they were consistent, I would be in a position to offer a hypothesis rather than a tentative problematic; if they were compelling, there would be no problems to investigate.

I am certain that many additional arguments can be constructed on either side of these problems, and I am not at all certain that these are the only or even the most relevant problems. The improvement of the problematic itself, however, is the business of the actual investigation to which these considerations are no more than a tentative introduction.

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