Summer 1978 Notes

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Part 1: Our Calling: To Life in the Kingdom of God

The key concept to be used is pleroma--completion. We find this in Ephesians and Colossians. The relevant passages are mentioned in the Dictionary of Biblical Theology, new revised edition, by Xavier Leon Dufour, pp. 76-77.

The way to get into this is to say: As Christians we look at the world around us in a human light. We do not see it merely as a haphazard collection of things and of events. We see it as a unified whole. Moreover, we don't see it merely as a whole in endless process, getting nowhere, but we see it as a unified process which is tending toward completion. The question is: What is this completion?

In using this concept, we are not going to exclude kingdom of God, family of God, and so forth. We will work in these plus the idea of the body of Christ, the husband-wife relationship, and others.

In articulating this part, the most important synthetic notion will be that of the family of God, from St. John's epistles. This notion will be the one which will be carried over and most often used in the rest of the book.

Since family of God will be used more than kingdom of God, we need a vocabulary for action in relation to a family. The first thing will be to emphasize the religious over the secular point of view, the aspect in which this is already real over the aspect in which this is something still to come. When we think in terms of the family, we will quite easily see this by observing that children do not bring themselves into being but receive life. So we will have an emphasis on the complete gratuity of membership in the divine family. In this way it will be clear that grace is the absolute principle of the whole thing.

Once the child is born, even then it does nothing to contribute for some time. Its way of life is simply to live in and to be with the other members, to be taken care of, and to have and enjoy the good things of the family, and simply to be a member of the family without doing anything to contribute at all. So this aspect of Christian life, which we must give priority to, is essentially related to the religious rather than to the secular aspect of Christian life.

Then when the child begins to become aware that it can do something to contribute to the family, it contributes its life as work toward the completion. So the notion of completion as object corresponds to the idea of work (as a verb) and to works (as what one does). The activity in the family--for instance, of the older children in relation to the younger ones--is to help bring them up. Even the youngest child, when it gets to the point where it can do something helpful to bring up other members of the family, and even to bring itself up, shares in this activity. So we can talk about Jesus and Mary

bringing up the children of God and we can talk about Christian life as sharing in their bringing up the family of God to maturity in Christian life, a maturity which will constitute completion of the family--the completion we use as our overarching concept.

The first epistle of John, chapter three at the beginning, where John says "We are God's children now," we think "children" means little children, not simply offspring of a parent. So John is saying: "We are God's little children now, and what we shall be when grown up we do not yet know, but when he comes we shall see him as he is." This notion fits with the idea of the family of God on earth already being the divine family, which one can live in as a member, and yet there is the not-yet aspect, in that children of the family are still to grow up and to be brought up to a status which is that of mature adopted children of God. The status of being adopted children will be eternal, it will be permanent, but there is a growth process of being brought up toward the mature status of members of God's family. This process of growing up is going on here and now. In this way the two aspects, already and not-yet, are included at the outset.

The second part of the book, according to the new principle here introduced, will emphasize the passive side of being a member of the divine family. Here the emphasis will be on grace, on the fact that one is receiving rather than doing, and this will be stressed throughout the whole of part two.

From this point of view, infant baptism is a lot easier to understand than it would be if one considers Christian life as a matter of human agency, where the act of faith would be more determinative than the reception of grace.

Just to the extent that we think of bringing up the children of God, the role of the Blessed Virgin as the mother of the Church is going to have an importance which will emerge at the very beginning, and it will run through the whole treatment. The Church also will appear as holy mother Church.

The natural condition of the divine persons is to be a family among themselves, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The relationship of divine persons to adopted members is a matter of adopting into the family; they do this by their free choice and so the relationship from their point of view is primarily one of community, inasmuch as they constitute the relationship by free choice. It is much like the relationship of husband and wife to each other, and to their children; it is one of community insofar as these relations arise by choice on their part. The relationship of adopted human persons to one another and to the divine persons is more one of family than one of voluntary association, because human persons become members of the divine family not so much through any choice of theirs. Once adopted, human persons can relate communally to one another, to

the divine persons, and especially to those other human persons who become members of the divine family through our efforts. The missionary has a community relationship to his children in Christ; this is not simply the natural relationship of family.

The word "commune" might have a certain usefulness in place of the word "community" for talking about the whole association of divine and human persons, to the extent that this is dependent upon free choices.

In beginning, to lay out the notion of what is good at the bottom of page 4 and the top of page 5, any language we wish to use later when talking about moral goodness should be carefully excluded here. So we should not use an expression like "flourishing." At the beginning one needs to set out the classical distinction between sensible and intelligible goods, and at the level of intelligible goods between instrumental and principal goods. So we have the distinction between the pleasant, the useful, and the intelligibly good whether the latter is a human good or not--such as the health of an animal, the goodness of a valid argument, or of human life, or of a certain work of art just looked at as something in itself, not as instrumental.

When we talk about intelligible goods, we have to distinguish between that good which is completeness totally and ideally, and the good which contributes to or goes to make up the whole, but which never is all of it.

The three erroneous alternative conceptions at the bottom of page four--the second is not only objects of desire but also objects of choice, for we need to exclude here the existentialist notion that by making choices one constitutes value. Or else one could split this up and have four counter-positions here. This also applies to God in the sense that God's willing something does not make it good, but rather God wills what is good. The goodness of the thing arises from its reality, which it has by sharing in his reality according to his wisdom.

Page 5, the first sentence in the first full paragraph: "Divine goodness is not distinct from his basic reality," because his being is completion in itself, and he needs nothing given in order to complete him, as evidenced by the fact that he does not grow up, evolve, struggle for identity--or vice versa, since he has completion of himself, he does not need to grow up, evolve, struggle for identity, and so forth.

The paragraph which begins about love in general has to be worked out in such a way that the metaphysical considerations about unity and distinction fall into or are preceded by an exposition about love, beginning from the common-sensical uses of the word "love."

To begin talking about love, we should start with the point that when you love somebody, you are interested in them for their own sake, not simply as something to be used, exploited, consumed. Thus loving someone means wanting their good and their happiness and their well-being, wanting it for them--so that they may have it. On the other hand, we don't regard love as something that one does where there is no self-interest, as if one could love somebody where there was not good in it for the person loving at all in the situation. In actuality, in our experience, an act of love is self-fulfilling for the lover, for the one loving; things done out of love must somehow be fulfilling for the lover or they could not be done. To love another then, is therefore to act in a way which is good for the one loving and which realizes the good of the one loved. The principle of love, then, is a unifying principle: this single and total good, which is the good of the beloved and of the one loving, sought and acted for together by the one loving.

Still, if one is talking about genuine love, then it must regard the good of the beloved as really theirs and not as subordinated to the lover. So the distinctness of the beloved as other must be respected all the while. Otherwise love would turn out to be a kind of consumption or assimilation of the beloved.

This might seem too unidealistic, so we can look in Ephesians 5, where Paul talks about husbands loving their wives, and he makes explicit the point that the husband is to love his wife <u>as his own body;</u> Paul gives the argument that in loving one's wife one is loving his own flesh and blood. Also we can make the point that Jesus in laying down his life--while it is very unselfish--still it is very fulfilling. He does what in the last analysis is best for himself, because he is glorified by being the redeemed, and if he did not redeem the Church and did not have the Church to redeem, he would not be anything. So he is fulfilling his own life and attaining his own glory only in and through his act of loving the Church.

Nevertheless, we maintain a distinction between the act of love, which bears on another person as another person, and the relationship of friendship, which is a certain intelligible good, which is desirable itself. But the relationship is not either person, singly, but both of them together in their unity and diversity. So friendship is a constituted whole of persons loving each other with their unity and their diversity intact. There is one friendship involving all of the people who are together in it. A single friendship is shared by two or more people and it perfects both or all of them.

Talking about love it also is important to recognize that we talk about love of persons when and only when the love embraces all of the person, all the aspects of the person. We talk about friendship only when it embraces all of

the goods which are shared. Actually, we have loving relationships with others limited as to subject matter, as when one only knows a fellow student in a particular class. Students may love one another in a certain sense and be friends of one another, yet because of the limitations of the situation never go beyond the limited subject matter.

On page five, in the fourth paragraph, where I say that agape or charity is the foundation or vital principle of the whole of Christian life, it is important to be careful to avoid making the relationship between the Trinity and charity in us be one of efficient causality, because then charity would be simply another created entity; but it also is important to try to word the thing in such a way that I do not have to get into the theology of charity that I'm speculatively developing.

Again on page five, where we are talking about the first commandment, we have a kind of dialectic of loving God and neighbor. The first stage, if we think of people not in the context of revelation, then people can love God in wishing to be morally good, for in this they implicitly love God for they recognize the good itself as the principle which they adhere to. This is quite distinct from loving neighbor which is a specific kind of action, and there are relationships among people in which people treat each other properly, and these relationships insofar as they are specified by a personal interest in others can count as loving neighbors.

At a second stage, we get into the context of revelation. In this context we can have God present himself first of all simply as another individual and the possibility of loving neighbors can apply with respect to God, although with the relevant specification since God is a different kind of neighbor.

At a third stage, one becomes aware that in God who reveals himself the goodness of all goods is present. Now there is logical equivalence, in the sense that if one loves one's neighbor, one loves God, and if one loves God, then one loves one's neighbor. Still, there remains a material distinction between the two, because the possibility of God's being one's neighbor or of one's neighbor being divinized doesn't necessarily occur yet. This is the Old Testament situation. So it was important to state and to insist upon both commandments, as distinct, and so there are commandments bearing upon God and others bearing upon neighbor.

Finally, we move to the New Testament. Here with the Incarnation we have the situation I'm talking about. In the first commandment, the love of God and neighbor collapse, because there is a material unity between the divine and human--that is, the divine-human community becomes one thing, as the divine and human share one another's natures. At this point, love becomes a single

principle, no longer twofold. It should follow that the duties of Christian life will be simultaneously duties toward God and neighbor, so that they will not have to be divided up and segregated into two sets. So there will not be some commandments which bear on God and some on neighbor, and have the duties remain quite distinct.

To the extent that we are talking about a commandment when we say here that the first commandment is to love God, the commandment aspect or normative aspect is not what we ought to focus upon here. We ought to focus on what it is to love God and neighbor and the fact that the two loves do in fact collapse into each other, due to the Incarnation. The commandment aspect will come up later, in part four.

Relevant to the bottom of page 5, we need to consider an alternative account of basic human goods along Aristotelian lines. On this view, basic human goods would be fulfillments of a specific and determinate set of potentialities. This view has four defects.

First, if there are many goods, then there will be no principle which unifies them as goods; they will be unified for Aristotle only insofar as they are goods of the same something, namely of the same person. But as goods, they will not be unified, unless one does as Aristotle did, that is, to reduce all of the goods to one, so that in the end there is only one very complicated kind of good as the end of man.

A second problem with an Aristotelian account of the basic human goods is that there is no transcendence of the good, considered as a reality, to the various instances in which potentialities are actualized. This means that on an Aristotelian account, one cannot commit oneself to a good in an open-ended way.

Thirdly, because it is the transcendence of the goods to their particular actualizations which makes it possible to commit oneself to a good as going beyond oneself, Aristotelian theory of the basic human goods eliminates the possibility of genuine community.

Fourth, on Aristotle's account, because the end and the good is determinate, it is always limited and settled, so that there really is no room for radical free choice. Choice becomes a matter of taking one or another way of reaching an already determined objective. If one does not act for this determined objective, this is only because there is some sort of defect in one's grasp of the situation.

Two additional points about Aristotle. Aristotle's account leaves no room for that which is correct in Nietzsche, namely, that there is a demand for creativity with respect to human life itself. Aristotle has no room for being creative in this sense. Secondly, Aristotle's attempt to reduce all the human

goods to unity by way of intelligence leaves him at the end of the reduction with two things: the function of intelligence in itself, and the functioning of intelligence as the ordering principle of the rest of one's life. Aristotle could have carried the reduction through all the way, and could have regarded everything else in one's life as solely significant to the extent that it contributes to the functioning of intelligence in itself. But Aristotle did not wish to do this, because it is too far from common sense. Aristotle, on the other hand, could recognize that there is an irreducible duality or plurality of ends and goods, but he does not wish to do this, because then he would lack any single principle. So what he does is to wind up with two ends--one for the contemplative and the other for the practical life, and he gives no account of how the practical life is related to the contemplative one, for any account he could give would complete the reduction, which he wishes to avoid.

The reason why Aristotle cannot have creativity in his scheme is that on his account of goods only what is normal can be established as good, and creativity by definition cannot be measured by normality.

On Aristotle's conception of the basic human goods, these goods would not permit open-ended development, for the goods would simply be the objects of natural appetites. This would preclude the supernatural dimension in partaking in divine life. Furthermore, Aristotle's view of the goods would make it be the case that there would be no norms consequent upon human morally significant activity. On our view, while there must be norms which are antecedent to the first human morally significant act, it is still also the case that by doing and in doing morally significant acts aspects of the goods emerge which one could not have understood before, because they were not yet accessible. These emerging aspects are practically expressed in norms which appear in the very morally significant activity itself. So we do have something like a creative dimension of moral norms which Aristotle could not have.

An example of the norms which do emerge in this way are the duties which arise on our account in societies insofar as societies are constituted by free choices, by common commitments to common goods. On our notion, these commitments are morally significant actions. On Aristotle's notion, society is a naturally given reality. On our notion, these commitments put people into relationships and establish an exigence for roles with the rights and duties which define those roles.

One good aspect of Aristotle's approach to goods is to see that the goods must be identical with the agent. This has the result that moral norms are not an extrinsic imposition upon the person who is subject to them. A principle outside persons which gave rise to norms, just as outside them,

either would have no normative force at all, or if it had such force, this would come by a kind of arbitrary or voluntaristic imposition (or, for that matter, acceptance by the one subjecting himself to it).

An account of goods in line with Nietzsche's view would treat goods as being merely the material for the creative activity which was really constitutive of life. For Nietzsche, human goods such as life and truth are merely the stuff with which the art works, much as the clay is the stuff with which the potter works.

One can regard Nietzsche as being very similar to Aristotle, inasmuch as Nietzsche pulls everything together by treating one good, namely, art, and one specific art, namely the art of living a human life, as supreme. In this way he integrates all the other goods or interests into a single end.

Nietzsche's account would make it be the case that it's only our endorsement or choice or willing that makes a good be good. This view would make it be the case, first of all, that there would be no intelligible direction for actions. Secondly, it seems false on the face of it, and it would eliminate moral truth. Thirdly, it is clearly heretical, and it would exclude the idea that in creating God establishes at least a certain layer of meaningfulness and value in creatures which must always be respected.

On Nietzsche's view, moreover, there can be no genuine community. His creative activity is a radically individual activity. The group of people as such cannot engage in one creative act unless one already has a notion of community antecedent to this. He has no principle for establishing community, and as a matter of fact--although this might not be built into Nietzsche's very conception of values--it comes out very clearly in his thought: it is the business of the individual to be transcendent, to be the Overman. Nietzsche has a totally individualistic conception of life. He has no regard for other people except to the extent that they're part of the objects in the world which one must take into account or they are part of the material which with one must work.

Nietzsche's diatribe against Christianity may partly arise from the fact that he has no room at all for love in his system unless love is viewed as a kind of use or exploitation of others. This obviously is related to the fact that Nietzsche wants it to be the case that the human person, precisely by what a human person is and can do in himself, can become something which is beyond man. In other words, Nietzsche is looking at Christianity and eliminating God altogether from it, and then wanting to have man deify himself all by himself.

Turning to the consequentialist. One problem with this conception of goods is that on this theory of morality it's necessarily the case that the

goods are resulting states of affairs, or states of affairs regarded as results. Thus there is a lack of unity between the agent regarded as such and the consequences or the results which are supposed to be the goods. If this disunity is maintained, as the theory requires, then the consequentialist faces the difficulty that the agent is acting for something which is extrinsic to himself as a person, not for something identical with himself. In other words, the consequentialist will not have the good as self-fulfilling. On the other hand, if the consequentialist tries to bring the goods as closely as possible into the agent self, he does this by treating the results as being wanted and as being good for one to the extent that the fulfillment of the want is satisfying, and the satisfaction turns out to be a state of consciousness. This is as close as one can get to the agent. Even then, the good is not identical with the agent. But at this point there is another grave problem, namely, the great implausibility of thinking that a certain state of consciousness is identical with human good. At this point, the implausibility can be made clear with something like the experience machine thing in Beyond the New Morality and also in Nozick's version of the same thing.

The consequentialist does seem to have the advantage that there can be a diversity of goods, on the one hand, and on the other that these various goods can make some sort of definite demand upon the agent.

But this theory also is going to run into severe difficulties with the notion of community. On a consequentialist account, it may be insisted that morality precisely is in acting for the good of the community. But the more this is insisted upon, the more the problem arises: Why should I be moral? The goods are realized only in individuals as such; as goods, they do not constitute community. The demand for community thus becomes an arbitrary imposition, which is extrinsic to the individuals. So again, as in Aristotle and Nietzsche, we have no really adequate principle of community. From our moral theological perspective, this inability to deal with community is going to be the outstanding feature of any theory of the goods other than ours.

For basic human goods to be principles--or, together, a principle--of morality, the goods have to have certain characteristics.

First, the goods must be understood in such a way that the good is not delimited to its particular instances or to particular potencies or to particular individuals. There must be more to human life as a good and a norm than what is already realized, or even than what can be determined already.

Second, goods must be conceived in such a way that they can really be identified with the one who is acting.

Thirdly, they must have enough objectivity or determinacy so that they can settle some things. Theologically, we must look at the goods as being determined by the order of creation.

Fourthly, insofar as these goods are going to be a principle of morality, they have to be both irreducibly distinct and somehow unified. This unity with the distinctness--the unity being beyond the determinate character of the goods but still as a real aspect of their goodness--is necessary if free choice is going to be possible at all. The object of the will is the good as such. Looking at it from a theological point of view, the basic human goods must be understood as different ways of participating in the divine goodness insofar as it is available to human beings. So from the start we must think of the goods as already open-ended, as opened out, not as delimited to what is proportionate to human nature without supernaturalization.

At the bottom of page five and the top of page six, we have the listing of the human goods. While we shall have to clarify what these are in terms of their being able to serve as the objectives of rational action without needing anything more as a reason why to be interested in them, we must get the specification of what they are for theology by seeing what Scripture and the other witnesses to faith point to as being human goods.

In getting out the substantive goods from Scripture, it'll be important to try to make clear that these have a kind of natural sacramentality--that is, that even according to nature they both participate in and signify beyond themselves relationships between God and creature, and these relationships then are perfected in the supernatural order. This is especially obvious with regard to human life itself and the handing on of life, inasmuch as the parent-child relationship is one of procreator to procreated, and this process is part of and at the same time signifies the larger process of God creating human life. The mutual relationships quite naturally give rise to duties based upon the unity of human life and so on. In dealing with the reflexive goods, it should be made clear that self-integration is not to be identified with health and that this will be discussed further in part five, where the other negative side of the reflexive goods also will be dealt with more extensively.

On page six, the paragraph beginning, "Because human persons are created," it's important in developing this to make clear that there is an unfolding of the goods and particularly that from the side of our knowing them there is an evolution of our understanding of them, both for individuals and for humankind as a whole over history.

True morality in general excludes relativism. Christian morality obviously has this in common with moral truth in general. But also, Christian

morality excludes a certain indeterminacy which morality in general would leave open. For Christian morality settles one's way of life by establishing a definite community, the Church, with its actual relationships. Thus Christian morality settles for one a whole life in the form of a set of duties.

In dealing with pleasure, this is not the place to get into the mode of obligation which excludes the pursuit of the apparent goods as such.

The proper argument that pleasure is not a separate basic human goods is this: Pleasure either is an experience at the sensory level, however complex it might be, and in this case it is not an intelligible good; or pleasure is taken in a broad sense, meaning enjoyment, and so it can be regarded as an intelligible good (for example, we talk about the joy of knowing or of friendship), but in this case the goodness of joy is nothing other than the substantive good which is enjoyed. The joy of knowing is not separate from sharing in the good of knowledge; the joy is not apart from the act.

It is possible to take pleasure as an end of action and to speak of pleasure sought for itself and for no further end. But when one does this, one has to be seeking sensory pleasure, experiential pleasure, under an intelligible aspect. The intelligible aspect under which pleasure can be made an end is that one wants pleasure, and having what one wants is an aspect of self-integration, even if it is not genuine self-integration of the total person, but still it is something intelligible which can be a reason for acting.

The organization of argument with respect to pleasure ought to be in the following steps: First, pleasure is not the sole good; we know this because in our experience it is possible to act for the sake of other goods, not considering whether doing so will be pleasant or not, without even thinking about pleasure. This is a matter of fact; to try to take this fact and to insist that even so, everyone who has such an experience <u>really</u> is acting for pleasure is merely a dogmatic assertion based upon a theory which happens to be incompatible with the date of ordinary experience.

This first argument leads to a second step which is some version of the experience machine argument, which helps to make clear that there's more to life than what goes on in one's consciousness, and that most people would not settle for merely what does go on in consciousness. (Our version of the experience machine argument brings out clearly that there not only is something more in life than what goes on in consciousness, but that this something more is something which human agents wish to do.

These points lead to a third point, namely that for any kind of action there can be a corresponding pleasure or enjoyment, so that whatever goods there are, each of them has its own pleasure or enjoyment. Once this point

is brought out, two things become clear. First, there are various kinds of pleasure and enjoyment, and it is not all of a piece. Second, to try to treat pleasures and enjoyments as goods is going to be to set up a duplicate set of goods to the other ones, for there will be as many pleasures and enjoyments as other goods, and there will be a pairing off one for one. Once this becomes clear, it is obvious that this duplication is unnecessary, for the pleasures or enjoyments and the acts they are paired with are not really distinct, since enjoyments are only the conscious aspect of certain acts. Since they are not really distinct, one can simplify things by getting rid of the pleasures as separate goods.

If one does distinguish pleasure from the acts it accompanies, it is an object or state of affairs which one has. Considered as such, pleasure does not contribute intrinsically to the constitution of the self, and so it gives nothing to completion, which is the principle here.

An important point about pleasure which should be developed when we deal with modes of obligation is that one should not choose to act for pleasure alone, for this would be acting for an apparent good knowing it to be such. To understand this thesis one must understand what is meant by "acting for pleasure alone." The phrase is equivocal. In one sense, if it occurs to someone that there is a certain desire which might be satisfied in a certain way, this occurrence in experience leads to an understanding of the good of satisfaction of desire which is an aspect of self-integration. When this comes to mind as a potential object of action, if no alternative comes to mind, that is, if there is no conflict which would lead to deliberation and choice, then one will act for that, and in this case one can be said to be acting for pleasure alone. However, in this case, the act cannot be wrong, for it can neither be right nor wrong, since it is not a morally significant act.

In this way, very often people simply do what comes naturally, for example, in respect to sex in marriage, without thinking of not engaging in the act because nothing comes to mind which would suggest not doing so. Under these conditions, provided that the lack of any alternative coming to mind is not itself a consequence of something immoral, there is nothing either wrong or right with the act in itself.

But if one experiences a certain desire and has the intelligible good of satisfying the desire in mind as a potential objective of action, and if some conflicting possibility also comes to mind, so that one does stop and deliberate, then to act for pleasure alone would be simply to go back to the satisfaction of desire and to determine oneself to it, just on the basis that one has this desire here and now. This sort of choice would be an endorsement

of the irrational principle of the want as an adequate ground for choice. In this sense, one cannot morally act for pleasure alone. There must be some further reason why one acts, once an alternative arises, than just because "I want it." The further reason may nevertheless be nothing more than a consideration of just what is involved in the satisfaction of the desire from an intelligible point of view.

Thus if one looks at the satisfaction of the desire as reasonable under the circumstances because there is some need to do so--it will provide something for my health, for friendship, or something of the sort--then the choice to satisfy the desire is not simply <u>for pleasure alone.</u> One is not determining oneself merely by the fact that one has the desire here and now, but rather by some intelligibility of having and satisfying the desire, an intelligibility according to which one can see the goodness of satisfying it, so that the choice to do so need be no more arbitrary than any other free choice one makes, so long as the act chosen is not one which is excluded by some moral norm or other.

In dealing with the Beatific Vision, the essential reason why it cannot be a basic human good is that if it were human individuals would be by nature divine persons. This good would be proportionate to human persons. It would be a good of human nature. For this reason, it cannot be a basic human good. The openness aspect--our hearts being made for something more than any particular good--is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for human persons being able to share in the Beatific Vision. When I talk about the Beatific Vision being beyond human capacity to achieve--this should be clarified in terms of the fact that this supreme good is not proportionate to human nature, for we really are created persons, and this is not what created persons have as their appropriate, specific completion. When we talk about the Beatific Vision not being beyond our capacity to receive, what we wish to emphasize there is that there is indeterminacy in human goods and in human nature and freedom, an indeterminacy present not only insofar as the process is going on, but also when the Beatific Vision is in fact enjoyed.

Furthermore, it is worth noting here although it is not a point to be emphasized in the course that the traditional conception of obediential potency was introduced in order to have an addition to human nature—something more than human nature but less than divine life--which would dispose us to be able to participate in divine life. This was the counterpart of sanctifying grace as a created entity in the soul. So if we are going to think of sanctifying grace as a created entity in the soul, then we have to have something like an obediential potency whether it is called that or not.

On the other hand, if there is not a created entity which is sanctifying grace and charity in the soul, then we do not need an obediential potency. There is nothing apart from human nature which makes it be capacious enough, which makes it open enough to share in divine life. But this sharing is brought about only by divine action in the first instance.

The sentence, "This is so because. . ." does not carry the argument forward at all; this sentence and the next one, "Had they been created. . ." were primarily intended to make a true enough point about the necessary conditions for participating in the Beatific Vision, namely that human persons do not have an Aristotelian type nature.

In respect to the last full paragraph on page six. It ought to be made clear that the sharing of human goods with the divine Word occurs particularly in that aspect in which human works fill out the mystical body of Christ, that aspect in which human goods complete Christ, on the side of the mutual completion relationship which is discussed by Paul in Ephesians, where Christ completes the Church and the Church also completes him. So it will be under this rubric that we see these human goods as being shared with him who is a divine person.

It is important to notice also that the respect in which human persons share human goods with the divine person of the Word by means of their contribution to the work of the Church which completes Christ is not that respect in which he is creator, but that respect in which he is redeemer and Lord, in the order of sanctification. So the question which is put in terms of: How can human persons share their goods with their creator? The formal answer is that they cannot. The human goods are not shared with divine persons insofar as the latter are creator, but insofar as the latter associate themselves familiarly with us, adopting as into their own family.

It also is important to recognize that while only the Word is incarnate, the Holy Spirit and the Father not being incarnate, still in the order of sanctification, human persons do share their goods with the Spirit and also with the Father. But in different ways than with the Word, for the relationship we have with the Three Persons in the order of sanctification is not uniform.

The Holy Spirit is certainly treated in Scripture as a kind of quasi efficient cause of the whole order of sanctification. It is He who brings about the Incarnation; it is He who renews the face of the earth, and so on. To the extent that we look at things from this point of view, human persons who cooperate with the Holy Spirit's work are helping Him to accomplish the work which is His work. It is His work, not as though it were

a new immanent perfection of Him, not as though He gained anything by it, but nevertheless it really is His work. It has to be attributed to Him and not to God the creator indistinctly. From this point of view, grace is not simply divine causality, but is better thought of as divine causality insofar as it is the Holy Spirit's sanctifying of everything created. And so to the extent that we share in the work of sanctification, we are contributing human goods to the Holy Spirit, because we are helping Him with His work.

With respect to the Father, we have a more straightforward basis in Scripture for talking about this. For we have the idea of the handing over of all things to the Father, so that when Christ has all the riches of sanctified creation gathered up into himself, he then hands the kingdom over to the Father. This handing over to the Father, the restoration of all things to the Father through Christ, so that God may be all in all, is the way in which human persons can share human goods with the Father. The relationship to the Three Persons is analogous to the causal distinctions. The Holy Spirit is a quasi-efficient cause of sanctification; the Word is a quasi-formal, exemplary cause; and the Father is a quasi-final cause, inasmuch as everything moves toward Him.

In respect to the resurrection, the Three Persons will be involved in the resurrection of Jesus and of human persons, but not in a uniform way. So if one thinks of the quasi-efficient causality which is involved, probably the resurrection ought to be attributed to the Spirit, but I do not know if there is any foundation in Scripture for this. It would be interesting to see if there is a foundation, perhaps in the Fathers of the Church. The resurrection can be attributed to the Word as to a kind of quasi-formal cause. It is said in Scripture to be done by the Father, but we could look at this not as quasi-efficient causality, but we could think of the Father as drawing Jesus from death back to life and glory--as drawing Jesus back to Himself. When Jesus rises from the dead, He says that He has not yet returned to the Father. There is some sort of process going on here, whereby we can look at the resurrection as resulting from a kind of final causality on the Father's part, bringing it about.

All this causality business, however, obviously must be understood analogously, and perhaps in terms of what is going on in moral theology, it would be better to omit talking about causality altogether. If it must come up, it should be not on the primary level, but only in the theological speculation.

At the top of page seven, the first full paragraph should not begin by saying, "Second." This is not an additional reason or an additional answer to the question previously stated. We have here an altogether different point.

The question which seems to be answered here would be something like: "Why does God love the goods of creatures, especially of human persons?" Or: "Why should we, with the love of charity, love the goods of human persons?"

This point clearly is an important one which belongs in this part of the book. The question is exactly how to relate it to the preceding point. It certainly is not properly related in the outline as it stands.

In the paragraph on page seven which beings, "Human efforts to achieve human goods," there are a number of propositions which are confused together. The first three of the propositions to be made clear are: l) the relationship between divine and human efficient causality; 2) the relationship between divine knowledge as a kind of formal cause of the order of sanctification, and human knowledge as the plan of human life; and 3) the relationship between the end, divine goodness and human flourishing.

In all three cases the point is that the two are not alternatives but rather both are necessary conditions for precisely that completion which is the end; together the two are the sufficient condition of the end. So dealing with the first proposition, it is not a question of attributing sanctification either to divine grace or to human freedom, but rather to both; the second proposition, it is not a question of attributing the plan of this either to divine providence or to human practical knowledge, and creativity in working it out, but to both; with regard to the third proposition, it is not a question of directing life toward divine goodness or to human flourishing, but to both together.

My whole approach excludes the norm: "Work as if everything depended upon yourself, but pray as if everything depended upon God." The "as ifs" are wrongly put; in both cases it should be "because."

In the same paragraph, rather than talking in terms of divine perfection, at least part of the argument here is: "If you love somebody, you love the goods they love; God loves human goods; therefore, if you love God you love human goods."

Toward the end of the same paragraph, there continue to be a number of different ideas mixed together. One idea involved here is that the responsibilities of the Christian extend somehow to the whole created world. Christian moral life is not as exclusively concerned with realizing human goods, but also reaches out to sanctify subpersonal creation. The sanctification of subpersonal creation can be understood in terms of the metaphysics of the orders by seeing it as a matter of reducing--that is, bringing to fulfillment--the first order, the natural world, in the fourth, of humanizing nature. Man does this by using things, by knowing and naming them, and so on. This is tied

down in Scripture with the Psalm about man being over the works of God's hands. If the subpersonal world were not sanctified in this way, part of creation would be as it were left out of the order of salvation. In bringing subpersonal creation into himself, man being sanctified, it is sanctified. Thus there is an order of sanctification, and this is the way in which these subpersonal things are brought back to the Father through Christ. In this way they also contribute to the pleroma which is the end.

It would be a mistake to say that in this process the created world is brought within the fullness of divine life as I say in the outline here. The proper point is that by humanizing the created world the Christian penetrates it with charity and brings it into the pleroma.

The business about human goods lasting and things which are truly good not being created to be lost again is important because the point made here is that human goods, and created goods generally, are not mere means to the completion, but somehow are intrinsic components of it. The alternative is to look at created goods, including even human fulfillment, as merely instrumental to getting to heaven, as in bad Augustinianism.

The point that human goods are destined to last forever and nothing truly good is destined to be lost in nothingness is based on two things: one the passage in Gaudium et Spes, where Vatican II says we will find these goods again burnished and transfigured, and Aquinas' thesis that God does not annihilate things. These two passages give a kind of solidity to the goods one is achieving here and now so that they are not merely means which will drop away if one gets to heaven, like a wrapper which has no significance in itself. The problem posed by this view of things is that these things do not seem to last. How can they? It looks as though someone does something good which has a certain result, but then the good which is done does seem to be wiped out and its good result lost or destroyed. Some sort of answer to this, without getting into too much metaphysics, might be appropriate.

The lines along which I would be inclined to answer it would be in terms of the distinction between orders. While things change in the first order, this is not a matter of annihilation. Even substantial change is not annihilation. On the other hand, the moral activity which goes on in the third order, and all human acts even if not morally significant provided they are intelligent, can give rise to entities in the fourth order. These entities can include the human body itself and all the results of human effort. One's own body is a kind of unique art work to the extent that one has used the material given to live one's life. From this point of view one can make sense of the idea that a particular work of art, for instance, is saved in its type even if not in its particular

token. A work of this type can turn up again in heaven. This approach also will make it possible to talk about this very body which I now live in rising from the dead, even though from the point of view of physical continuity it cannot be this very same body.

The paragraph which begins "From the vantage point already reached in this part," is an attempt to distinguish between acts which are proper to a Christian life and are informed by charity, and other acts. On Aquinas' view, as I understand it, any act which is not informed by charity is going to be a sin in some sense or other, for it will lack what the whole of Christian life ought to have. Acts which are not informed by charity within the life of a Christian divide into two kinds. Some are contrary to charity; these are mortal sins. Others are not contrary to charity although not formed by it, and these are venial sins, in Aquinas's sense, although more modern thinkers talk about faults, imperfections, and so forth. Quay pointed out that we should look into the Jansenists, and we do need to find what is being condemned or rejected when the Church condemned them.

Talking in terms of the status of people as members of the family of God, which is the way this whole part is going to be worked out now, rather than talking in terms of kingdom, we should say that acts appropriate to a Christian which are meritorious are acts which are appropriate to one who is a member of the divine family. St. Paul's "Live as befits one called with a calling such as ours," belongs here. Then there will be acts which are impossible for a member of the family. Acts like this will be mortal sins--sins in the full sense, so that if one does such acts, one simply is not a member. Then there will be acts falling in neither of the preceding categories, and such acts may include some which have grave matter but which are not otherwise adequate to be grave sins, and it will also include some acts which today might be regarded not as sins but as faults or imperfections, however one slices things up.

The last paragraph of the first part of the outline contains a number of points which seem right, but the logical connection between the sentences is not clear. The problem involved could be reformulated as a question concerning how evil contributes to the completion. In trying to answer this question, we can look at evil in two ways. First, as privation occurring during the process of the unfolding of God's plan; second, as present in the completion itself. In either case, mortal sins do not frustrate God's providential design, but they are only permitted for the sake of some good. It is the character of mortal sin as something permitted by God <u>praeter intentionem</u> which makes it possible to think of it as falling within his plan and yet not directly willed by him.

The distinction between this somehow contributing to the good for the sinner and for the overall plan is very important, for obviously mortal sin is not in any way good for the sinner although the sinner opts for a certain good which is his own, and there is an ontological goodness without which the sin would be neither intelligible nor possible. But we are not here interested in this point. If we think about moral evil present in mortal sins insofar as good comes of these while the process is going on, we can think of them as necessary conditions for the acceptance of suffering and so on, which leads to transformation--primarily the case in Adam's sin which is a happy fault in that it is a necessary condition for the redemptive incarnation, and the sins involved in killing Jesus which provide the necessary condition for him laying down his life as a victim of evil, and for the glorious resurrection which is possible only through his death. We also can think of another class of cases which seem initially distinct--cases in which moral evil done by one person provides an opportunity or occasion for someone else to do good to a victim, a chance which otherwise would not occur. Poverty which results from injustice gives an occasion for almsgiving. In this sense, we have good overcoming evil, or good undergoing it and so overcoming it. But this is still while things are going on, while sanctification is in progress.

The more interesting and difficult case is that in which evil is considered as contributing something even when the completion is arrived at, that is, in the situation of eternal life where the goods are permanently stable but so are the sinners, since hell is eternal. Here we have to take into account that just as the goods of our nature and the good fruits of our work are lasting, so there must be a counterpart of this. Otherwise, it would be as though our actions are only half significant, only counting if they are good and counting for nothing if they are bad. Furthermore, the condition of the family of God enjoying eternal life fully will in part be a condition of having eternal life in a victory over evil. And there cannot really be a victory over evil if there is no evil that it is a victory over. Thus there must be an eternal persistence of evil. The triumph of good over evil in the process of redemption is not a triumph which obliterates whatever good is involved in the evil which is overcome nor which transforms the evil so that it somehow becomes good, but is a triumph which establishes the relationship of the evil being just what it is and the good coming out on top of it nevertheless.

Earlier in this part, in treating the sharing by the divine persons of their own good with human persons, the aspect in which this good is not perfectly given in this life but is to be given in heaven, namely, in the Beatific Vision, needs to be developed somewhat more than it is in the outline.

This has to be brought out clearly, especially in view of the strength of the tradition in emphasizing this, although the tradition clearly does not say that the end of man is the Beatific Vision to the exclusion of anything else. Even in the catechism, Ronald allows that the Beatific Vision is not to be taken to be mere knowledge of God, but is to be taken as including a whole intimate sharing of life and so on. What we are saying is that the Baatific Vision should be taken to include all of this and the realization of the human goods, and somehow the communication of these between human persons and divine persons.

The end of the chapter, probably, or somewhere after the value theory is laid out, should give an account of how completion as understood here should be compared with other accounts. We have in the first place those views on which there is nothing determinate in nature and it is not going anywhere; and here we have the absurd and chaotic, which goes on and never gets anywhere. Then secondly there are views in which there is something determinate and it is going somewhere but the somewhere is completely settled so that there is no room for an unfolding of human nature leading to a sharing of human persons in divine goods. Everything in a view such as this develops to a certain point, but the distinctions between the divine and human are going to be maintained so firmly that there is no communication possible between them. This is so in Aristotle.

A third kind of position is one in which there is something determinate enough that it is possible to talk about the completion of it, but not so determined as to be closed off to the kind of completion which Christians hope for. Here there will be two positions which are in different ways counterpositions to our own.

First, there is the view in which only the Beatific Vision by itself is the end of man, and all human goods and all achievements in this life in particular become mere means which are extrinsic to the end; human action is significant only extrinsically, and the relationship necessarily (logically) is going to be a voluntaristic one. This obviously is what happens in Augustine, but even in Aquinas there is a problem since he has no way of showing that there is any necessary connection between the end of man as he explains it in the Summa and the goodness or badness of particular human acts.

On the other hand we have those positions which are post-Christian, and these do emphasize human goods and a kind of human transcendence. In effect, they seek the kingdom of God without God and the happiness of heaven without heaven. These positions tend to take into account everything that ought to be considered as part of man's end except the Beatific Vision. They leave this out entirely. So these two positions are polar opposites. And the traditional emphasis on the Beatific Vision as exclusively the end of man can be seen as

dialectically leading to the reversal, and to the post-Christian positions. The way we are articulating it here would be a kind of higher synthesis, which does not compromise what has traditionally been emphasized but which does include the consideration of the human goods which has traditionally been slighted, and which needs to be included if we are to have an adequate account of the fullness. And this is not simply a dodge to solve a dialectical problem, but has its foundation in the things we have been talking about, in Scripture, tradition, and so on.

So we need to bring all this out clearly, someplace after the value theory gets us to the place where we can lay this out without using it constructively to build up to the conclusion.

It is worth noticing that to the extent that we look at divine goods as being communicated to created persons, as the Beatific Vision is constitutive of the end of man, just to this extent we really do not bring this about by human actions and we can emphasize this aspect by considering the situation of the child who engages in no morally significant activities but who can go to heaven. In emphasizing this side, the Protestant tradition, which denies merit altogether and tends to look at the whole of Christian life ultimately as a matter of divine action exclusively, has something to be said for it. But the position is one-sided, since the completion also includes the realization of human goods in relation to God and this realization of human goods is the field in which Christian moral life is lived. For Christian moral life consists in trying to realize these goods in order to contribute them to completion of things, bringing up the family of God, bringing new members into it, raising them up, bringing oneself up, as a member of the family, toward the completion.

In this process, where moral activity is realized, we see an intrinsic worth--we are going to be able to see an intrinsic relationship between the specific human acts which are done and this end. It is exactly this whole aspect of things which the Protestant tradition rigorously excludes. We can see how in the Reformation there is a split between human natural goods and the religious dimension. The natural goods are handed over to humanism. The religious dimension is made wholly a matter of transcendent good. The voluntarism of this view comes out very clearly.

It nevertheless also is important to look into the tradition on merit in order to make sure that the way I put things does not conflict with what the Church teaches on merit. The basic way of doing this will be by seeing that although one necessarily is initially established with a position in the Kingdom, wholly due to divine action and there can be no merit prior to grace, which puts one into this position, nevertheless being put in the position, one

is then able to do things which bring about human goods out of love of God, and contribute something to God. There is a kind of ongoing relationship, as in any friendship, a give and take, and so an increase in realization of these human goods in this framework on the part of Christians working in their life, does bring about a corresponding response on God's part, so that there is an increase in the intimacy which is shared, and will be perfectly shared in heaven.

Part 2: The Way for Us: The Human Life of Jesus

The first full paragraph which runs over pp. 7-8 is not clear as to what it is doing. Nor is its organization clear.

First, it is important to maintain carefully the distinction between creation and sanctification. Second, the distinction between already being in the divine family and helping to bring up the divine family must be maintained. The former can be without any human act on the part of the individual himself; the latter is a matter of human work. Human persons can and sometimes do receive everything without doing anything--this is the case with children who die after baptism without ever making a free choice. There is a great dignity in such a person, but it is not the same as that of someone who has all this and in addition is given the gift of being a contributor to the work of God by being enabled by grace to do human works which do help to raise up the family of God.

Joe also objects to the use of the expression "self-respect," since it is used by Rawls and other humanists. The idea is humility perhaps, corresponding to the dignity of the Christian. However it is to be expressed, we have the concept of the dignity of the Christian, which involves first the dignity of the created person made in the image of God, then the further dignity of one who has been recreated in divine life, and third the additional dignity of sharing in the divine work. There must be a proper attitude of the Christian who has a right appreciation of just what he is.

The third remark is that the specific point of this introductory paragraph ought to be to make clear--beginning as a resume of what has gone on in the previous part--that in answer to the question which might be raised, "Why put so much emphasis on human acts as we are about to?" considering that everything is caused by grace, we are going to say, "Yes, everything is caused by grace, but the object of the work of sanctification is the completion, and completion includes created goods, and among these goods are human goods which are realized in human acts and not merely by means of them, as instruments. So it would be impossible for grace to cause completion without causing human acts, and so human acts are absolutely essential to completion." From this point of view we get rid of the Protestant objection which tries to emphasize grace to the exclusion of human acts, or which regards human acts as a mere expression of grace. They are an expression of grace, indeed, but they also are a constitutive part of the good.

The next point we wish to make concerns the principle which is free choice. Grace does not exclude but rather includes free choices. To deny the role of free choice is clearly heretical, just as it is to deny the role of grace. So our sanctification, especially our helping our own growing up and

contributing to the bringing up of others in the divine family, depends upon our making the right choices. These free choices, then, are a human causality which must not be considered to be in competition with divine causality; they are on a wholly different plane from grace working sanctification.

The first full paragraph on page eight, which is concerned with original sin, ought to begin from the point that in the condition of our first parents, they already had the participation in divine life. They were called to help bring up a family of God, and to do so as their own natural family. They were established in a condition which would have prevented death from having to occur for human persons. Original sin, the first sin of the first parents, looked at as his own sin, was first of all some sort of personal sin. We know how this works, not the precise content of his act. The essential working of it is the rejection of the moral boundary and the pursuit of <u>those things</u> which would be morally good and bad indiscriminately.

Because the individual who did this original sin had the role which he did have--not by nature and choice, but by nature and supernatural gifts—it led to the loss of the paternal role toward his descendants of handing on divine life. Thus Adam's family, by his sin, was born only as a human family, and not also born, as it would have been but for his sin, as a family of children of God. The personal sin of Adam also implied loss of divine family membership for him himself. What is interesting, however, is the loss of paternity of a family of God, which would have gone along with Adam's being father of the human family. For the result of this paternity for us is that we are born members of the human family without thereby automatically being born as members of the divine family.

The loss by Adam of preservation from death is then passed on, for not being born as members of the divine family, the natural condition of being subject to death obtains. The overcoming of this then requires, first of all, a special and additional divine act--that is, the work of sanctification--precisely as overcoming the situation which is left. In other words, mankind needs to be redeemed. Secondly, at least by way of convenience, there is needed a human work of communicating divine life to others, not by generation but by preaching and sacraments. This human work begins, of course, with the Incarnation and the passing on of divine life by the human acts of Jesus, but others are now invited to cooperate in his work.

Contrary to the errors of Jansen and others, mortal sin and meritorious acts are not contradictory opposites; they are contraries. So even without redemptive grace, human persons who are born in original sin can do some morally good acts. But their morally good acts would not be meritorious; they are not acts of children of God, and they in no way belong to or contribute to

the raising up of the family of God. Of course, it might be the case that the morally good acts of some who are mortal sinners do incidentally contribute somehow by way of divine grace to the raising up of the family of God, but this is praeter intentionem.

We also must talk about the positive things which go with original sin. Basically, there is the loss of the peace or harmony which was an aspect of original justice. The loss of inner peace and harmony involves conflict at all the levels where the reflexive goods would be. Within the self, there will be a disposition of disorderliness in sentient nature so that it is not well disposed to integration with morally good choices. This is not just a matter of undevelopment or of limitation or of ill health. It is an indisposition formally distinct from ill health, relative to free choices.

In considering the situation of Jesus and Mary we must exclude from them this inner indisposition; that is, we exclude from them concupiscence in the sense in which this is a consequence of original sin. We cannot however suppose that they are not in a certain way affected by original sin. For with original sin as a given, persons either commit personal sin or they do not.

If they do, then those who do are necessarily in conflict with one another, because sinners as such cannot form community. If they do not, then they are at odds with all who do commit sin. The opposition between those who are morally good and those who are not is inevitable conflict. On this basis, Jesus is inevitably in relationships of conflict with the wicked and with the sinful world. He has enemies, who really are his enemies, and the relationship of enmity is two-sided. Being good he is necessarily in opposition with the evil, and this opposition involves an evil which Jesus, while not doing, does suffer. But this evil being suffered is original sin and its consequences being suffered. He overcomes this by love, and from this point of view, his being affected by sin is a necessary condition of the redemptive act. He could not love his enemies if he did not have enemies.

The paragraph which begins, "In this state of affairs," must be fixed to make clear that Jesus is not a leader merely in the sense of being a model. He is a principle in a stronger sense than this.

In every state of affairs, the initiation of the community of friendship with God is strictly the work of God. We must distinguish between the constitution of the divine-human family and the human acts, even of Jesus, which do not constitute the family relationship, but which rather extend it to others and which bring up the children of the family.

So humans cannot initiate the relationship; it must be established, if it is to be, by God alone. In the second place, if we think of the end as

completion, then the Incarnation and redemptive work of Jesus is not merely suitable but is absolutely essential, for it is a constitutive aspect of the completion, not merely an extrinsic means to it.

I also suspect that if the natural relationships among human persons are not to be arbitrarily disrupted, then redemption of fallen mankind requires an Incarnation, so that there is a person who is both a member of the divine family and also human, and so in a position to assume the position of the first principle of grace for the human persons. In this man, Jesus, the Word becomes part of humankind, and his full acceptance of its alienated condition is to be understood in this sense that he is in a world in which there is disharmony, disorder and conflict, and he becomes a pole of it, so he has real enemies whom he must love--they are his enemies, for they are evil people who oppose him. The notion of accepting the alienated condition of fallen humankind also involves accepting all the consequences of it, specifically death.

Human persons are associated with Jesus in the first instance by divine action, inasmuch as they are made to be members of the divine family by grace. But given this fact, there is truth in this that human persons can accept and endorse or opt out. Moreover, and what is more interesting for moral, is that it is a matter of free self-commitment to associate oneself with Jesus in respect to one's further sanctification and in respect to the sanctification of others.

In the paragraph, "Jesus carries out his redemptive work by human acts," it is important to bear in mind that the third-level act which is his redemptive act is not simply a model for our acts. There is only one act which is constitutive of the new family of God, and this act is the act of Jesus as redeemer. We are joined in his act and become united in this very same act, and do not simply do other acts which are similar to his. On the other hand, when we consider the fourth-level acts which Jesus does, these are Jesus' alone; our acts which are modeled upon them are properly ours. Here we have the relationship of imitation. In considering imitation we must take into account the difference between the material with which we work and the capacities that he and we have to do things. Since the materials and the capacities are not the same, there will be inevitable differences, and it is not in this aspect that we ought to imitate Jesus. Still, the outward performances of Jesus which express his redemptive commitment, given his abilities and opportunities, are adequate and accurate as expressions. It is this adequacy of performance to commitment which we must seek to imitate.

In the case of the saints, beginning with Mary, we can look to them for a model to imitate. But for saints other than she, the performances do not always

and need never perfectly express the commitment. They can fall short of perfect imitation of Jesus. At the same time, the outward performances of the saints can be suggestive to us as to how, given some degree of similarity in abilities and opportunities, we might proceed concretely in trying to imitate Jesus. Thus the utility of a multitude of models, although they are imperfect.

Beginning with the first paragraph on page 9, one question which arises is concerning why choices do constitute oneself. A possible answer to this is that in making a choice one selects among options, such as "I could do this." The options all bear upon some particular here-and-now alternative, but the choice is a choice of oneself as a person willing to do that. The choice is defined in terms of the intelligible aspects of the situation, and so if I choose to do something, I make myself be a person who is willing to do <u>such a sort of thing.</u> To be a person willing to do <u>such a sort of thing</u> and to be a doer of it is to establish oneself in a condition which is inherently open-ended because the set of instances to which one's willingness applies is indeterminate. The sort of thing one is willing to do now can have instances at other times and places indefinitely. Consequently, unless one undoes oneself as a person willing to do such a sort of thing, one's choice continues and one remains a person willing to do such a sort of thing.

At the end of page 8, the point should be made that the community is brought about by the redemptive work of Christ and that our part is to follow him--this is to return to the question at the beginning of this part. Once we have said this, the next thing to be done is to try to clarify what is meant by the redemptive work of Christ. And then what is meant by following him.

The concept of following obviously involves some difficulties and ambiguities which can be brought out with some examples of what someone might think of as following Christ if he is thinking about it in a too literal-minded or simpleminded way. Then having brought the problem out, we must start in with a certain amount of analysis of action which will enable us to clarify the conception of self-determining acts of free choice, of the type of choices which are commitments, of the characteristics of commitments.

We can begin by trying to clarify the concept of act, both in order to be able to understand Jesus' redemptive act and to understand what is involved in our acts, insofar as these will constitute following him.

The first step in this clarification will be to formulate the distinction between acts which occur in a human person and acts of a human person, the classical distinction. In the first category, we will give some examples and indicate that the action of the beating of the heart occurs in a person but is not an act of a human person; but more interesting are acts which are behavior

of the whole, such as sleep-walking; then there are acts which are intelligently and willingly done, but which are not morally significant acts of a person, such as the activities of small children, prior to the time when they can make free and morally responsible choices. Having distinguished these cases, we can make the point that even in the case of humans who can make free choices, there are many times when a good is understood and willingly acted for without any alternative presenting itself, and such acts can occur without any moral significance attaching to them. These are to be included among acts included within a person, but not acts of a person, unless there is some prior, morally significant act which has led to them.

The acts of a human person are done knowingly, willingly, and freely--that is, by free choice, or with a voluntariness which is conditioned by free choice. To explain this, we must clarify what is meant by free choice. This will require the distinction of the various meanings of freedom and a certain amount of phenomenology of deliberation and choice, so that we can get out clearly the idea of a free choice and define it. Once this idea is out, it will be clear that there cannot be a free choice without content, and we point out that there are acts which are either processes occurring or states of a person which can be the content of choices. We must then point out that in some cases such processes or states will have a complex character--what we have called "second-level acts." Here one process is for the sake of an ulterior state of affairs rather than for its own sake. These distinctions will be helpful for bodying out the concept of free choice and distinguishing choices of possibilities which present themselves from--what we must now move on to--possibilities which are creatively projected on the basis of an understanding of a good and commitment to it.

Commitments are to goods which are understood as going beyond the particular possibilities already given. One chooses to take on a role and to stabilize oneself in respect to a good, and to reach out to behavior which will realize the good. The insight which shapes such behavior is based on the commitment and one's knowledge of one's abilities and the opportunities of a particular situation.

When we deal with the preceding distinctions, it should be made clear that free choice is <u>de fide</u> and that there is no implication of saying that people act by free choice which would exclude that they are acting by the causality of divine grace. The two are necessary coprinciples of Christian morally significant acts.

Once the notion of commitments is out, it will be explained that there can be numerous commitments in one person's life. But if a life is to be a

unified whole, so that the person's biography would be altogether intelligible, then it is necessary that the multiple commitments be organized or integrated by one which overarches all of the rest. Once we arrive at this point, we have the idea of the one big act of a person's life which unifies the whole thing and pulls it together and gives it its central sense.

Now we will be in a position to begin talking, by exegeting Scripture, about the redemptive act of Christ. We will try to put together a description of it, using the passages in which Jesus explains the significance of his life and mission. The description of the redemptive act of Christ will carefully focus upon him as an individual agent making the commitment which is involved, and so the description will initially leave out the social dimension of his act.

We then raise the objection: If that is what Jesus was doing, how do we follow it? The answer to it then begins by saying that in one sense we do not follow Jesus' act; it is an act which one cannot follow. It is unique and cannot be duplicated. But in another sense we can follow it, in the sense of becoming participants in that very same, single redemptive act. Participation in this is possible because it is the nature of his act to be community-forming. This concept then must be explained by an account of how third-level acts can be community-forming acts. In giving this account, we wish to make clear that to the extent that human persons enter into the redemptive act, by their own free self-commitment, their entering into it presupposes that they have already received the gifts of divine family membership--as is evident in the normal case in which someone is adopted into the divine family by infant baptism. Their free self-commitment to enter into the redemptive act is therefore a perfection of their family membership, in which they have become members of a community, not precisely as members of the divine family, but rather precisely as members of the divine family carrying out the redemptive work. This is the formality under which Christian moral life is going to be lived.

The next point is that to make and reflectively understand such a commitment, and to be able to use it as a principle for organizing one's life as a following of Christ, by reflective understanding of the relationship between the commitment and what one is concretely doing, requires considerable insight and maturity. We can begin with the perspective of the child who is just emerging into the position of making free choices. Such a child who has been raised in the faith can have a very simple understanding of what its life as a Christian means. Its understanding can come down to this: If one loves Jesus and wants to be like him, then one should obey what the Church teaches and do what Catholics are taught by the Church they ought to do, and refrain from doing things they are taught to be wrong. The child who on this

motivation accepts the duties of its life as a member of the Church and tries to fulfill these duties is in fact following Christ. Such following constitutes at least part of the Christian life of every Christian, and for many Christians this following constitutes the whole of their life.

Nevertheless, looking at matters in this way does not make clear precisely why certain acts are enjoined or proscribed. Thus we need to have a further and a deeper understanding of what is involved. This will be especially important to the extent that Christian life is going to be the carrying on of an enterprise where the results matter.

Having said this, we need next to move over to the side on which the Christian is able to follow Christ by undertaking actions in a creative way. Having the commitment, one can look at the opportunities and at one's own abilities, and undertake to do the thing which seems appropriate to fulfill the commitment, by carrying on the redemptive work, helping to bring oneself up in grace and helping to bring up others in the faith and in the full life of the divine family. This also includes the sanctification of the subpersonal world.

Here we could deal to some extent with the idea of vocation. One considers the situation until one definite possibility emerges as the appropriate thing to do. Freedom of choice comes in as the commitment to carry out this one thing, once it emerges.

The treatment of this will make clear that materially there will be a difference between the things a Christian will do in following Christ and the things Jesus himself does. The Christian's performances will express the commitment in a diverse way, and in this sense the Christian will do other works than Jesus does and--as he says in John--works greater in some respect than his, since they add to his work, extend it and complete it, working toward the fullness toward which the whole is moving.

We can now move into what would ordinarily be understood as a vocational option and talk about the religious and the secular, make clear the polarity of this distinction, the universal call to holiness, the sense in which everyone is called to be in the religious state according to their own modality. This ties bask to the fact that it is more basic to be a member of the divine family, receptive of its goods, than to be an actor who shares in bringing about the accomplishment of redemption. The former belongs to the religious, the latter to the secular side of Christian life. When one looks at the active life as an overflow of the contemplative, one has the primacy of the religious and the subordination of the secular aspect of Christian life.

Once the notion of the active side of Christian life--not simply the state of being a member of the divine family--is out, and it is clear that the doing

is a raising up of the divine family, a building up of the kingdom of God, we can talk about the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the work of the Holy Spirit as the grace side of the cooperative relationship involved in the cooperation between grace and human freedom.

This leads to a consideration of the virtue of hope. Hope is a disposition which has as its object the completion which is yet to be completed, precisely insofar as it is yet to be and will come to be through our action insofar as our action is caused by the grace of the Holy Spirit. When we look at hope in this way, it is clear that it involves faith, our own action, and what is to come from that action. What is to come from this action is completion, considered in reference to hope precisely insofar as it will be <u>our own good,</u> a good in us and through us. But since our own good is not exclusively realized in us, but also is realized in those dear to us--and if one has charity one's desire extends to the realization of the good of the whole divine family so far as this is still to be realized--hope can extend outward from what is more narrowly one's own to the whole.

When hope is laid out in this context, we have the problem of distinguishing between a theology of liberation, of drive toward the world's perfection, on the one hand, and a proper theology of building up the kingdom on the other. This is the point at which this topic will be discussed, and it will be treated by showing the difference between second-level acts and the fourth-level expressions of commitments. In the former, there are specific objectives to be achieved; in the latter, not so. The hope of Christians is not bearing upon the results of second-level acts, as if we had a set of things to be accomplished in this world. The conduct of Christian life must presuppose that, given the redemptive act of Christ and some ways of creatively expressing it, this is our task, it is an open-ended one, so that the total result cannot be specified in terms of any particular set of objectives that we might at some given time in history have in view.

On this account, we will exclude the type of theology which does not leave adequate room for divine providence. Here we can make our first bash against consequentialism. It presupposes that at some given time it is possible to determine what would be the greatest good--that is, that it is possible to determine this at the precise time one is about to act. Yet the good which can be realized out of a given situation, we cannot tell, since the goods are not within our foresight. New ones will emerge continually, new objectives and new opportunities, which we cannot foresee. The overall game-plan, therefore, must be left to divine providence. We bring in here the notion of providence and the necessity in Christian life of relying upon it.

Additional notes for part two.

In the transition from the redemptive act of Christ to the acts of us Christians, it is important to avoid making this be a transition from the descriptive to the normative. The point of view of this part should be so far as possible uniform, and it ought to be uniformly descriptive, both of Christ's acts and of the Christian's human acts, and of the relationship of them to each other. The point of this part would be to make clear how these acts, integrated together, both bring about and make up the completion in its human aspect. The question at the point of transition should be: It is all very well for Jesus to act in this way, but the rest of us must be involved somehow if we are to be included in the pleroma and if other human goods and the goods of subpersonal creation are to have a place in it.

Once this point is made, so that the necessity of our involvement is clear, the question arises: How can we be involved? The answer then comes in terms of following Jesus. The explanation of this is then given in terms of unity with him in the essential redemptive act and imitation of him with respect to other acts. Thus our acts and the goods participated in them or realized through them will be gathered into Jesus.

The transition to the normative point of view probably belongs at the end of this part where after some remarks still to be made about the sacrifice of the Mass, the question will arise as to how to distinguish between those works of ours which are appropriate to bring into the Mass as offerings, or are appropriate to carry out as a fulfillment of the commission we receive at the end of Mass, to go out. How do we tell which sorts of activities are ones thus suited to the Mass? And how do we tell which possible acts we could do are not going to be appropriate to offer, or to execute the commission? When this question is raised, we then have the normative problem put in the setting of specification by what will be offerable in the Mass and appropriate as a fulfillment of it, and what won't be.

Christ's redemptive act is a principle for the constitution of the whole redemptive community and the achievement of all the goods which from the human side are then to be included in the completion. But the redemptive act of Jesus still is only a principle, and as such it cannot be a basis for including all the human goods which need to be included unless our acts in some way get included in his act. In other words, Jesus' redemptive act in a very real sense is incomplete and it needs to be fulfilled by the Church. This view has clear grounds in Scripture.

Another point is that when we treat here of morally significant acts, we must point out that at least not all morally significant acts are done by free

choice. There must be voluntariness of one or another sort. And they must be related to free choice. But there can be morally significant acts which are not directly done by free choices, but which are permitted by one's not making a choice, for instance.

Another more important point is that in considering the redemptive act, it is necessary to remember that this act is different from what it would have been precisely inasmuch as it is redemptive--that is, that it must overcome a state of affairs in which disruption, death, falsity, and so on are the prevailing condition of fallen humankind. Faced with this situation, the distinction must be made, and always kept in view, between the redemptive work of Christ as healing and as elevating.

From the point of view of the specifically redemptive part, the healing part, we have to distinguish between two ways in which his act and the work of Christian life is going to be related to evil. The properly Christian approach to evil recognizes its reality, rejects the possibility of annihilation of that which suffers evil, rejects the possibility as absurd of transforming evil into good in an Hegelian kind of way, for even if the evil other than that in human acts could be in principle fixed up somehow, it is the evil which is involved in morally wrong choices which presents the real problem. The redemptive work of Christ and his followers deals with this evil in two ways.

First, by an attempt to persuade it through love, that is, to provide a fresh option which will bring about conversion on the part of those who are set in evil. The attempt to convert is one aspect of the life of Jesus, in which he announces the Gospel, performs signs, seeks the response of faith, and so on. To some extent this work is a success so that there are those who believe, and the effectiveness of Jesus in overcoming evil is visibly manifested. For example, in his public life, Jesus forgives sins and proves he can do it by the miraculous cures.

Second, the presentation of the new option and all the persuasive power it has does not eliminate free choice. The sinner has an opportunity to repent, he is tempted to do so, but also has a chance and a temptation to reconfirm and harden himself in the position of sinfulness, with the stakes now higher. This reconfirmation of the rejection of God's love in the context of the first aspect of the redemptive work of Jesus establishes a relationship of opposition, of enmity, between the Incarnate Word and the power of evil which is present in the world. This divisive aspect of Christ's work must not be overlooked. At this point it might seem that his mission is frustrated and that there remains no way for him to deal with evil successfully, really to overcome it.

However, he deals with it effectively by undergoing it, by accepting to undergo it. The suffering of evil is what is involved in the passion and death and this is the aspect in which Christian life also must involve the suffering of evil for the sake of the love of God. In undergoing evil for the sake of the love of God, evil is made as it were material which is given a status and relation to divine goodness by this act which it would not otherwise have. Thus evil is fixed permanently into its position in the completion of things as that which redemptive suffering overcomes. The undergoing of evil thus is all that is needed to bringing about completion once positive works which Jesus could do were done so far as he could do them. The same kind of pattern is going to be present in a dialectic of positive and negative moments in each Christian life.

This distinction needs to be made fairly early on in the part and carried through the whole part, for it is going to be basic in getting out what is specifically distinctive about Christian life. This distinction also is necessarily going to be involved in the point we were making about the difference between false theologies of perfection of the world and a true Christian moral in which perfection in this life is not to be expected. This conception of evil also is closely tied to the rejection of any sort of consequentialism as an essential methodology of a Christian way of thinking.

Another distinction which should have been made early in the part, and which should run through the part, and come out most clearly when dealing with different Christian vocations, different emphases with which Christian life can be lived. We must distinguish between passive participation in the divine family, like that of little children, and the more active participation in which there are human acts which are morally significant. This active participation splits into two, or has two aspects to it. One aspect in which one participates by actions to the extent that the kingdom is already realized in one inasmuch as at least one is already passively participating, so that one's actions reflect the presence of the kingdom as already accomplished. This is the religious pole of Christian life. On the other hand, one's morally significant acts can be undertaken with a view to realization of the completion to the extent that it is still to be realized. This is the secular pole of the secular-religious polarity of Christian life.

At least in one respect, this polarity ought to be present in all of the actions of Christian life. In another respect, we will have specifically the life of the religious and the life of the secular Christian. When acts are undertaken with a view to bringing out the religious aspect of Christian life, of highlighting this aspect, the consequences of one's acts even for the

building up of the kingdom become as it were subordinate to manifesting the kingdom as already given.

As a kind of wrap-up of this part, with its action theory, and before making the transition to the normative toward the end of the part, there will be a treatment of the Mass, not so much as sacrament, but as sacrifice. The two aspects, of course, are inseparable. Still, what is to be emphasized here is the Mass as sacrifice rather than as sacrament; the latter will be treated in part six.

In treating the Mass here, we will be concerned with it as an act which Christians who have already received membership in the divine family can do. In this respect, the Mass is unlike baptism. One can receive baptism as an infant, but cannot participate in the Mass as an infant. In the Mass, the acts of the Christian are foremost.

In carrying out the act of the Mass, one is doing what Jesus does in memory of him, that is, one is following him. The aspects of the Mass which seem especially to be emphasized here concern what goes on from the offertory through the consecration, and the offering after the consecration.

In the offertory of the Mass, the Christian brings his good human acts to the Church, to its unity. These good human acts are looked at simply as human, to begin with. They are represented by the bread and wine, which are fruit of the earth and work of human hands. As good human acts are a combination of natural gifts and human effort, human free choice. The offertory, it seems, was not always regarded as an integral part of the Mass, but we may nevertheless suppose that the elements, which had to be contributed, and perhaps the mingling of water with wine at the offertory, was a very ancient rite, in which the faithful could bring their own acts to be sanctified in the Mass. The bringing in of these activities then leads to the offertory which is before the beginning of the canon.

The offering here is of gifts which are communal, of gifts which are holy and unspotted. The works of the Christian, simply looked at as human acts, which we are concerned with here, are only the good works; others have been left behind, as it were, at the beginning of the Mass in the penitential rite. These good works are offered and given over to God, to Christ in God, and we then move into the canon of the Mass, with the request that these be transformed. In the consecration, Jesus does transform what we have brought and offered, turning it into himself and his redemptive act--himself as he is in his risen glory, but also symbolically as he was in his passion and death. The presence of Jesus is essential to make really present his redemptive act; it is one and the same as, not an act other than, the act on Calvary. The act is not repeated, but is

simply expressed here in a different way; it is one single, timeless, third-level commitment, but it is outwardly performed here in a different way. It is expressed by Jesus here in a way that is proportionate to the present situation. Still, Jesus is really present sacramentally, and his act is really present and thus his act is given to us as something in which we can accept a share.

The redemptive act being given to us has already also incorporated and transformed out actions which were offered prior to the consecration. Once the consecration has been done, we join in unity, as members of the Church, with Jesus in offering him to the Father. Thus the offering after the consecration clearly involves an offering by us of Jesus' own redemptive act. This offering together with Jesus is our unity with the redemptive act, in which our own human lives are now incorporated. Some of the prayers in the Roman canon still ask for this to be received.

This perplexed some people who wondered why it would be appropriate to seek that the Father receive the redemptive act of Jesus inasmuch as it is a perfect act, already received so that it could not possibly be rejected. Understanding that we truly are offering Christ's sacrificial commitment with him, and that we have entered it with him, the request that this sacrifice be received makes sense, for as our offering there is some question as to its suitability or acceptability. Nevertheless, the sacrifice of Christ is offered by us, united in the Church, together with him, and the sacrifice is thereby completed.

This ends the canon. The rest of the Mass is a matter of turning things around and the unity in Jesus, which has been transformed, is redistributed so that it is put to work to transform us in the Eucharistic meal. This aspect of the Mass will be treated in part six.

A footnote is needed with respect to the polarity of the secular and the religious lifestyles. Another aspect of this problem is that the religious lifestyle corresponds to the counsel of Christ, "If thou wouldst be perfect . . .." If we suppose that the general demand for perfection really does hold for all of us, this will be because with respect to the individual himself the recognition of the situation one is in as already being a member of the divine family means that to the extent one is, the essential one thing necessary is not something which one has to achieve, but rather is an endowment of grace.

Looking at things from this point of view, the priority of the religious over the secular emphasis comes out clearly. The Christian's responsibility toward the achievement of human goods is primarily with respect to others, and especially with respect to those who require bringing into or bringing up in the family of God. This responsibility then conditions or limits the obligation to

live as already in the kingdom, because one has to not simply regard oneself, but others, and primarily others.

The obligation toward living a religious life of perfection also is limited by other conditions--especially knowing what one ought to do and being able in practice to do it. Thus the obligation is conditioned in many ways, but still holds subject to all of these conditions. This aspect would be important to begin to bring out the difference between precepts and counsels. How much of this is required in the present part is another question, but the groundwork has to be set out to make the distinction in part four where it will be more pertinent.

Something else to be watched out for in this part is that the already and not yet distinction is in a sense a distinction between what appears to be and what already actually is. Even to the extent that Christian activities are directed toward building up the kingdom, these acts themselves insofar as they are Christian acts belong to the kingdom as already established. The not-yet aspect then becomes relevant only to the extent that one's second or fourth-level acts become expressive of a commitment which is at the third level part of the kingdom already, no matter whether it is belonging to the secular or to the religious emphasis of Christian life. This complicates the relationship in an additional way which should be sorted out somehow in the construction of this part.

Part 3: Our Task: To Make Human Goods Abound

This part will be concerned in general with the problem of the way in which Christian moral knowledge is had by the Church itself. The first point will be a transition from part two, beginning from the liturgical point of view with which part two ends. The ideas of building up the body of Christ, raising the family of God, contributing to the completion--these provide the most general principle for distinguishing what is appropriate from what is not appropriate in Christian life. What is appropriate will be what is conducive, which can be brought into the Mass and offered, and which need not be left behind at the penitential rite.

This introduction then leads to the question: But what specifically must one do? The general principle does not in any obvious and direct way indicate what sorts of things would be appropriate and what sorts of things not.

The ideal answer to this question would be: One should love God and do what one wishes to do. The perfectly integrated Christian would be able to consider all the relevant facts and positive laws, and given this information would have no difficulty in distinguishing the appropriate from the inappropriate. This ideal approach is suggested by scriptural injunctions such as, put on the mind of Christ.

This ideal situation, however, is not the typical situation of the Christian. Furthermore, it is not the initial situation of any Christian. The typical situation of the Christian is that there are many obstacles resulting from sin--not necessarily the sin of the individuals themselves. But abstracting from these many obstacles, we can imagine an idealized, well-disposed child who is in a good Christian family. By idealizing we get rid of the effects of original sin, and imagining the child to be in a good Christian family we set aside the sinfulness of the world, yet the individual at this stage, as a child, is not perfectly formed and integrated, and so the child cannot simply love God and do what they wish. The child who loves Jesus must still have some sort of direction concerning what sorts of acts are appropriate and what sorts not. The idealized child still has the question: "Well, what am I to do?" It does not have the modality: "What do I have to do?" as it would if one were to assume some indisposition. We are assuming that there is no resistance to doing the Christian thing, yet there is still a lack of ability to specify what is appropriate. That lack is not only a lack of having a set of rules to go by, but also a lack of being able to say: "I can do what I wish and know that this will be o.k."

This kind of person becomes the primary model of one who needs Christian moral instruction. We are dealing with an ideal here, but this ideal does

represent every Christian to the extent that they are like this, to whom Christian moral teaching would be properly directed. They are more or less like this child, so the ideal is not irrelevant. To the extent that we are not like this, there are obstacles other than the need for instruction, and these obstacles will be considered in part five. But to the extent that we are like the child, there is only the need to lay out the duties of Christian life. So in this part and the next there will not be an argument to persuade someone who is unwilling, but there will be a clarification for someone who is just looking for formation.

The answer to the question is: "Do your duties as a Christian. Try to live as you imagine Jesus would if he were in your place." "Do as Jesus would wish you to do, as a friend of his." The Church spells out what the duties of a Christian are for the individual, and the Church also provides ways in which one becomes acquainted with Jesus and comes to know him in an existential way, so that the idea of doing as he would wish you to do has some real content, although this content is not just a set of specific obligations. This is where the counsels of perfection come in. The duties, however, are spelled out in definite norms, such as: "Don't lie, don't cheat, and so on. Go to Church on Sunday, go to Communion, and so on."

This brings us to the sixth point. We now shift to the proper issue of part three. The question is: "How does the Church know what to say in answer to the question?"

To answer, we must get clearer concerning what "the Church" means in this question. The danger is that one will suppose that when we say, "The Church tells us what to do," this will be mistaken to mean that a few people, such as the Pope or the bishops or some theologians or someone, a few people who are currently alive and talking <u>are</u> the Church. In the position, "The Church knows what to do and tells us," we cannot take "the Church" in any such narrow and restricted a sense. If we do, the assertion will be false, and second it will be wholly implausible. So we must clarify what "the Church" means here.

The point is that the Church is a unity which, on the one hand, is not outside time, but which, on the other hand, is not merely limited to the present time. In the Church, which is one, we are united with Jesus. So the Church is the whole community which is established by Christ existing in union with him from Pentecost to the present and into the future until the end of time. The Church includes all generations of Christians, untied in the single community, with whom Christ is present until the end of time.

The unity of the Church has many aspects.

The two paragraphs on p. 19 of the outline, beginning "Someone who looked at Christian life," and the one beginning, "From within faith," are good, and these belong in the development at this point. The section ends with "called to build itself up into the kingdom of God."

There are some further remarks about this general idea of the Church.

It has the unity of a single basic commitment--that is, of the redemptive act, which is the same commitment, the same act, carried by the community over time. It also has the outward expressions of this in the Eucharist and in the other sacraments. It has certain material realities of a cultural type, such as the Bible, Creeds, and conciliar statements. Creeds, conciliar statements, and so on, are ways of formulating definitively propositions, which the Church not only holds to be permanently true, but holds permanently to be true. All of these realities are aspects of the unity of the Church and its continuity over time. The Church is not a series of different things; it is not a process which is never itself, altogether. We are dealing with a reality which, on the one hand, is not essentially determined by time, but nevertheless is within history.

This brings us to the eighth point, which has to do with God revealing. The Church, understood as we have been understanding it, is the community which is formed by faith and God revealing. Jesus is the revelation of God <u>par excellence</u>; he completes the revelation of the Father which was begun by the prophets, and communicates himself by words and deeds to humankind. Revelation is not exclusively propositional just in this sense that there is the normative proposition which Jesus knows, the proposition which expresses who he ought to be, but there also is his commitment to this and his whole existential self as integrated with this. He expresses this whole, and God in him is expressing himself to us in this totality. This whole which is presented includes the true normative proposition, but is not limited to it. It also is the case that God communicates not only his truth, but also his readiness to help us, and his goodness. A completely adequate response to the communication which is made in divine revelation will require not only faith but also hope and charity--the last to the extent that God's goodness is effectively communicated.

Another point which has to do with the side of the <u>revealing</u>, is a point as to what is being communicated here. There is a normative proposition: Jesus' understanding of what he ought to be is communicated. In effect, what he says is: You ought to join me in my act of uniting mankind with God, or of reuniting mankind with God. This proposition communicated by Jesus is a communication of something which Jesus already is committed to. He is demanding that we join him in his commitment. He communicates the norm and his own commitment to it and

his integrated self, plus the evidence that the project can be completed: namely, the evidence of his own death and resurrection.

In these remarks, the point which is made in Dei verbum, that God reveals himself in words and in deeds, and that the words have the function of interpreting the deeds and the deeds give substance to the words, this point needs to be emphasized and clarified. The maxim, Actions speak louder than words, is relevant here. A proper understanding of what this means involves seeing that when someone acts in a way which is expressive of their commitment, they are showing who and what they are, in normal human relationships, oftentimes in ways that they do not understand, sometimes in ways more complete than they might wish. Someone who experiences such actions, who is on the receiving end, gets a communication of the person which can then be interpreted. But the communication is in the action itself and in its effects, even prior to the interpretation which is reflectively undertaken or achieved.

What God reveals are truths about himself as he is for us. They are truths about God as someone with whom we are called to be joined. These truths which God reveals have a normative character about them. It is precisely these truths which the Church believes. It is because what the Church believes just is what God reveals that the Church in teaching what it believes can be absolutely certain that what it is teaching is true.

In other words, here we have the root of infallibility. It is also because one who asks the Church, "What am I to do?" can accept the Church as expressing what it believes, which is what God reveals, that the person who asks the question can accept the answer as being certain and dependable, as God's own truth.

The act of faith is a complex one. In one respect, belief is of or in divine reality, but in divine reality insofar as it is communicated to us in a way which is receivable by us. Divine reality which is communicated to us is as it were limited--in the first place, to divine reality insofar as it is to be shared in by us in community, as adopted members of God's family. It is not, as it were, God absolutely and in himself, who is communicated to us directly.

Second, faith is in divine reality communicated to us in a mode in which we can receive it, and so insofar as it is a truth, and so reality communicated in the modality of truths receivable by our minds, and so in the form of a set of propositions to which we can assent. So we have a content of faith which is propositional, not that the propositions become an object or a stopper--this is the error of supposing that propositions are not really knowledge, but that touching and feeling is! But our access to reality is through propositions, which are not to be looked at as if they were opaque tokens or mere linguistic

expressions, which might block us from getting to things themselves, but rather as giving us the aspects of reality which we can get. If we have more of the reality than we thought, this is because we have more propositions, not because we have a straight, nonpropositional shot at the reality in itself, by some sort of intellectual intuition.

Still, it is important to recognize that these revealed propositions themselves are normative truths. As such the truth which God reveals is telling us what we must do in relationship to him. Implicitly, to communicate a normative truth is also to communicate something which can be abstracted from it and stated as a theoretical truth. If one says, "You ought to shut the door," this implies that there is a door and it is open. And if God communicates to us that we ought to do certain things to be in friendship with him, he also is communicating that he is a reality and is a friendly one. Otherwise the norm could not be realistically entertained and followed. But revelation as we are looking at it, anyway, for the purposes of moral theology, is primarily a communication of normative truths, and faith is going to be an acceptance of such normative truths.

To accept a normative truth, even to make sense of it as normative, one has to have an understanding of the good on which the normativity depends. And one also must at least have some interest in this good, which is a simple volition. So a precondition of the act of faith is that one has to have an understanding of the goodness of the good which is to be achieved by the fulfillment of the norm and one has to have an interest in that good. Only in terms of this precondition--which, of course, is prior logically and not necessarily in time--can one grasp what is revealed as being a normative truth which one can assent to or not. In this aspect there is an element of will which is built into the act of faith, an element which would not be there if the truth revealed were a purely theoretical one. This is the third, peculiar sense of faith bearing upon God which Aquinas talks about, and which he gets from Augustine.

Correction. The bearing of the will upon divine goodness which I have been talking about is not the one which Aquinas is talking about, because what he is interested in is not a precondition that gives the normative proposition its meaning, but rather is the will act which directly bears upon the assent, a will act which we take to be a choice. The will act which bears on the assent, also according to Aquinas, is a will act which has divine goodness as its object. In this sense the act of faith, considered as pertaining to the will, relates to God. Exactly what this means and how it works is something which we have not yet got clear and about which we do not have any agreement.

It is worth noting that if the will act which bears upon assent usually is a choice, the child who is baptized and brought up as a Christian might assent subject to a volition which is not a choice, since it is possible that no alternative will arise which seems interesting and worth considering. Thus there can be an act of faith which is voluntary but not, in the strict sense, free.

One consideration of the way in which the will act which moves to assent bears upon God's goodness would push faith in the direction of believing on, having trust in, and so forth. This would seem to have something to do with the relationship between faith and hope, considering this relationship as a dynamic one. Normally, one having faith also then hopes in God. From this point of view, hope can be looked at as an extension of faith which is not extrinsic to it.

I think nevertheless that when it comes to believing a person, the judgment that the person is trustworthy presupposes a sort of personal act of the will, which appreciates the goodness of the person. This appreciation carries over as a reason for assenting to the judgment that the person is trustworthy. In this respect, the act of the will focusing upon the goodness of God has a role which carries over into the act of faith itself, that is, it carries over into the act of choice which motivates the assent which formally is the act of faith.

Another point about revelation and faith is that when God reveals, his revealing is according to our human mode in this respect also--that concrete entities are given as expressive. The words and deeds themselves are fourth order entities. Belief in God revealing involves a blank-check aspect to the extent that one believes whatever the propositions are which are contained in these expressions. So one believes not only some proposition which one has articulated intellectually, but also a lot of propositions yet to be articulated which God is communicating by means of the words and deeds, which we can have at a descriptive level without being able to grasp the content. So faith is of potential propositions, of propositions still hidden in the content of words and deeds which communicate and which are passed on in the church. The words and deeds themselves thus are received and accepted as part of the object of faith, and in this sense faith bears upon more than the propositional. Concrete descriptions, emotions, and actions pass on these words and deeds and make them available to us--for example, in the liturgy and in various Christian institutions and practices. These provide a material for rearticulation into propositions.

This is going to be important in giving an account of the development of doctrine, which will avoid both modernist theories of faith as a direct experience of divine reality, gnostically and immaterially (for we have something more than the already articulated propositions, but it is not gnostic and immaterial, but concrete and given factually), and will also avoid the limitation of faith to the propositions which are already articulated at some point in history.

There is a distinction to be drawn between faith and morals, but the distinction is not a separation. The whole content of faith has a moral thrust insofar as we are dealing with normative propositions. At the same time these normative propositions presuppose and are based upon the realities of God and his will for us, and these realities are ones we can know to be so through faith. So we do have some theoretical truths which are embodied in normative propositions and we have the normative propositions themselves. The normative propositions point us to acts which are to be done according to charity, and in this respect all of faith is already moral. The consideration of something in the way of specific moral norms arises inasmuch as there are human goods which we can act for and in acting for contribute something to the completion which is to be brought about.

When we consider that the object of faith embraces whatever it is that God reveals through these words and deeds completed in Christ, we are, as it were, writing a blank check. This is expressed in: "Speak, Lord, your servant listens," said with a readiness to accept whatever it is that one is about to hear. The Apostles understood, some of the things which Jesus said and did, but there was more content than they understood. When Jesus says that he will send the Spirit who will "teach you all truth," the progressive teaching is a process of articulating into propositional form, as truths, some things which are revealed in the words and deeds of Jesus but not at once understood, although they have already been accepted by the apostles who believe whatever it is that Jesus reveals. This accounts for the completeness of revelation together with the development of doctrine.

The object of faith considered in this way also is open-ended in that it is a believing of God, a readiness to accept his truth, and so it already involves a nisus toward the Beatific Vision, in which alone the fullness of his truth will be known. This is also suggested by the statement in Hebrews: "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen." What is hoped for ultimately is the full truth which is known in a mirror obscurely by faith.

The act of faith is both morally required and a free act, in the sense that we can choose to assent or not. The moral requirement to make the act of faith presupposes that we have made a judgment that we ought to believe the one who communicates to us. In order to reach this, we need a rationality norm, that one ought to believe a communicator of a certain sort. That rationality norm must be one which has no built-in limitations, which would make it possible rationally not to believe once the sort of communicator which is required is given. The sort of communicator required is God revealing. The problem obviously is how one has this norm fulfilled. The requirement that this be the specification seems clear from Vatican I. The account of how one has this requirement fulfilled which Ronald gives in the catechism allows a substantive sense in the process of the mind to the idea of the light of faith. This seems mysterious and difficult to locate in our experience of believing.

A possible way to make sense of the light of faith is to point out that just as in the case of an outward miracle one is aware of the effect but not of the divine causality itself, or even of the created input which leads to the effect, so in this case, if there is, not by efficient causality but by way of quasi-formal causality, something supernatural and miraculous operating, one will not be able to pick this supernatural factor out as an entity within experience in the ordinary sense of experience. Nor will one be able to pick out the supernatural factor as something grasped by the intellect itself by any of the ordinary, natural types of intellectual act. On the other hand, one will have the evidence that the requirement has been fulfilled, simply by one's absolute assurance that one ought to believe. If one has this sort of certitude, this sort of objective assurance, one can infer that the condition set by the rationality norm has been met. This is analogous to the situation when one observes a physical miracle: one can infer that that which is required to do the miracle has been given.

This point is a rather important one to help people accept the notion of God revealing, when they look into their experience and do not honestly find anything which they can identify as an experience of God revealing. The fulfillment of the rationality norm, the norm being as strong as it is, might seem to leave no room at all for free choice. However, it is one thing to have the norm fulfilled. It is another thing to operate in accord with it. This is not so because there is any reasonable alternative to thinking in accord with the rationality norm, but inasmuch as one can refuse to follow it irrationally, just as one can refuse to do what is morally required in any other case in a purely irrational way.

In the case of believing, since faith makes a normative demand, it is easy enough to see how one can come to refuse quite irrationally to assent. The normative demand which faith makes would require that one change one's life. If this normative demand is accepted, then one must either change or admit that one is guilty for not changing. If one neither wishes to change one's life nor to admit guilt for refusing to change, then one must refuse to accept as true the norm which faith proposes. This is the act of unbelief.

On this account, we can understand how faith can be absolutely certain, due to the sort of normativity of the rationality norm and its fulfillment by God revealing, and how at the same time--not in an objective but in a subjective sense--faith can be stronger or weaker, can waver, and so forth. The question of the strength and weakness of faith, its wavering, and so forth can be accounted for by existential dissonance--that is, the extent to which one is not fulfilling the normative demands of the content of faith somewhere along the line. This dissonance feeds back to create a temptation to discontinue one's assent.

If one has both difficulties with respect to the content of faith--something which always is possible for anyone--together with this sort of existential dissonance, then one has a situation in which one can talk about serious doubts about faith. With this in view, we can understand the position of Vatican I that a Catholic does not lose faith without fault.

When one considers the existential dynamics of faith, insofar as a normative demand is made, there is this implication, that if faith is firmly maintained, it will unfold into hope, and acts according to charity will be done. The fact that faith, as it were, naturally blossoms out into hope and charity gives us one explanation of why faith can be understood, and in Scripture generally is understood, as including more than what we think of when we regard faith formally in terms of what its proper object is. On the other hand, to the extent that we must take into account and leave room for unformed faith, these very broad conceptions of faith indicate something which is too wide for what we have in mind.

The idea of obedience of faith involving a submission of both intellect and will makes most sense when we think of the act of faith as belief in the person revealing, and when we are considering faith in its blank-check aspect.

The act of faith, as a supernatural act, still fulfills the maxim, "Grace builds on nature." There are many aspects in which the natural, human way of knowing is respected and preserved in this act. We are presented with something which claims our attention and demands our assent. Our response to it involves human modalities of understanding and assenting. Part of what provides the

conditions, and an important part, always stressed by traditional apologetics, involves arguments for the existence of God on the metaphysical side, together with certain historical inquiries.

When one gets down to cases, the most relevant aspect of this basis is that miracles are done and predictive prophecies are fulfilled. These things are pointed to in the New Testament itself as being extremely important reasons for believing in Christ. The role that these play is that they provide us with data which make it reasonable to judge that God is revealing. This judgment, together with the rationality norm that one ought to believe what God communicates, that one ought to trust God if he reveals, leads to the conclusion that one ought to believe the content which is proposed.

However, the act of faith is not adequately completed by this naturally explicable intellectual act. For the judgment that these miracles are done by God and these predictive prophecies fulfilled by his power depends upon understanding the phenomena as miracles and fulfillments of prophecy. When we consider the matter empirically, although this judgment is reasonable and a morally upright person will make it, the judgment itself is still only a hypothesis, and such a hypothesis will not provide the sort of certitude which faith in fact has. On this account, then, the closing of the circle of faith depends on the supernatural light of faith, precisely to give the certitude we find ourselves to have, and which we cannot account for except in terms of a miraculous input.

The next point to be dealt with in this part has to do with infallibility. Infallibility is a property of divine self-knowledge. To the extent that revelation is an immediate and personal communication of God's own self-knowledge of the very truth which he is, infallibility belongs to the assenting, which is involved in the act of faith. If one denies that this assenting is infallible, one in effect is either denying that revelation has occurred at all, or one is denying that revelation is a communication of truth accessible to human persons according to their human mode of knowing truth. In other words, one either denies revelation altogether or denies that there are any propositions of faith, or one must admit infallibility. The alternatives already have been excluded. So it is clear that where one has the assent of faith one has infallibility with respect to the assenting which belongs to the act of faith. Consequently, one also can talk about the propositions to which one assents with the assent of faith as being infallibly true. Everything which properly falls within the assent of faith is going to be a divine truth, which is sealed with the guarantee of infallibility that pertains in the first instance to the assent of faith.

Assenting can be looked at as the assenting of one receiving the faith, and then we think of infallibility of believing. But the assent of faith is the very same assent when one who believes utters what he believes, proposing it to another as something which deserves to be believed. The faith being proposed in this way is proclamation. And so we move on to the next point, which has to do with proclamation of the faith and the role of the apostle.

Proclamation introduces a new element inasmuch as with it we have human persons carrying on the process of revelation and faith by doing what Jesus does in unity with him for others. The concepts of those who are sent, of ambassadorship, and so forth, are relevant here. From this point of view, the activity of proclaiming the Gospel is important primarily for those who proclaim it, inasmuch as they are conformed in a special way to Christ by doing so, conformed in a way they would not be if they did not have the opportunity to proclaim the faith.

In considering faith proclaimed and accepted through proclamation, we introduce an element into the revelation-faith relationship which did not have to be taken into account when we were considering the faith of Peter as the primary example in our previous discussion. Now we have to take into account that those who initially received the faith directly by believing Jesus are presented with what are in actual fact rather different total sets of data--according to their different backgrounds and their somewhat differing experiences of Jesus, as they experience his words and deeds. Thus they get somewhat different sets of propositions to which they assent in faith.

These somewhat different sets of propositions, considered altogether, constitute a body of faith which has a richness that the faith of any one individual would not have. As the apostles go about proclaiming the faith, they will pass it on according as they understand it. The total content will not be present in the words of any one apostle, but only in the whole set of propositions believed by all together. At the same time, of course, the blank-check each writes extends to the same total content--whatever propositions can be articulated from what Jesus reveals.

The multiplicity of witnesses passing on the faith which they have received cannot remain simply a multitude, but must themselves be knit into a single community. There are at least two considerations which show this necessity. First, it's only by their being knit together that as time goes by, all who believe will be united together and united to the single principle which is God revealing in Christ. All believers can be united to the one principle only insofar as they also have a unity with one another. On this basis, the unity of the community of believers is necessary in order that all of them be

in immediate touch with the principle--God revealing in Christ. The faith of Christians will not be faith in Christ unless all of them belong to a community which has immediate touch with him, that is, unless all Christians participate in the one faith of the Church.

Second, the communal aspect is important because the faith which we are talking about is normative and practical. It sets up a project which is to be done. The project which is to be done is a work which demands cooperation. This work is to be carried out over the course of history leading up to the final completion. In the final completion there will be a community, and so the carrying on of the work through time also should be a communal work in order that it conform with the condition of the coming completion. So although there is not a simple and total identity of the Church in via with the pleroma, but there is some sort of continuity. And to the extent that the Church at present is the already existing family of God, the Church as present needs the communal, unified character of the family.

In the existing situation, since there is considerable richness in what is given by Jesus revealing in his words and deeds, and since there also is diversity and richness in what was received by the original recipients, no one of whom receives everything, anyone who is entering into the faith of the Church, while he may receive some content in which he can believe, motivated by God revealing, nevertheless such a person will have a problem in determining the boundaries. A person cannot determine the boundaries by comparing things with a whole set of propositions which he does not have immediate access to. So the Christian needs to have some criterion for distinguishing among those things which he does not have already thematized. It is necessary to be able to tell whether a given, new proposition falls under the blank-check acceptance--whatever is contained in the revelation is believed, but one must have some way of telling what this is.

To be able to have and apply such a criterion, the believer needs something which even without great sophistication he can recognize in the data of faith themselves, in the facts which are present in the world. He needs some visible criterion which he can use to discriminate the boundaries of what is to be accepted as a propositional articulation of faith. The criterion is the designation of a certain group as the authorized witnesses--that is, of the apostles. The apostolic office makes it possible for the early Christians to look to this group together as a norm of faith. So they can tell which words and descriptions, which presented data, are to be taken as Christian and which ones not. Where a person has "doubts," he can check to see what it is the apostles accept and hand on. If there is no incompatibility between something

and what the apostles accept and hand on, the proposal can be entertained as compatible. If there is any incompatibility, it must be excluded as non-Christian. So the simple believer has this criterion to pick up and apply.

The apostles and their successors--gives us bishops. The bishops, then, are a criterion for discerning the faith of the Church and what is incompatible with it. Among the apostles, and subsequently among the bishops, one still needs a recognition criterion to discern who are true and who false apostles, and which are the real bishops. This is where the central principle of unification, the Petrine office and the Pope comes into play. They give a way of discriminating those who are a true criterion from those others who are not.

On this conception, the apostle and the bishop does not become a medium between Christ and the believer, in the sense in which Jesus is a medium between the Father and mankind. Jesus is the mediator through whom we come to the Father, but the bishop is one in solidarity with whom we are in immediate unity with Jesus. This aspect also ties back to the previous consideration about infallibility. To the extent that infallibility attaches to the assent of believing, which is the very same assent which attaches to the faith when it is proclaimed, the recognition criterion for discerning what the faith is, also is a recognition criterion for telling what is infallibly proposed. So when the Church is teaching--whenever one can say that the Church as such is teaching--then we have teaching which by that very fact is infallible. The conditions for discriminating infallible teachings, then, really are conditions for being able to say that this is the Church teaching, as against cases in which it is some bishop teaching or some pope teaching, or someone else teaching.

The apostolic role and the role of subsequent bishops differ in certain ways. The apostles are immediate recipients of the revelation of Christ, and subsequent recipients cannot be so. The prior experience and personal contribution of the individual apostle has a determinative role which is not the case subsequently. Each one of the apostles has to be regarded as having been prepared and providentially selected to constitute the unity of the faith of the Church, to go into its very make-up. The faith of the Church initially is defined by the set of propositions believed by the apostles and by what they teach and hand on. Subsequently, the faith of each bishop who comes on the scene is itself defined by the already existing ecclesial community. So we know that Linus or Cletus has the faith to the extent that he agrees with the faith of the Church. But initially we know what the faith of the Church means by seeing that it is the faith we find in Peter and Andrew and James . . .. For this reason, each of the apostles individually must be considered infallible, whereas for subsequent bishops and popes, the individuals as such

are not infallible. They only share in infallibility insofar as they operate in acts in which the faith of the Church is expressed.

We come now to the topic of tradition. The basic idea of tradition is that we are dealing with the very same content which is revealed and believed. But now we are dealing with this content considered in its concrete wholeness, which includes not only formulated propositions but the whole set of realities which are used to reveal--the words and deeds, the stymie of life, the sacraments, and so on. So we have this total reality, which is content of faith, in the sense that in faith we accept all of this, and are ready to believe all of the truth which in any way is contained in it.

The idea that tradition has the very same content leads to the question: How, then, does tradition differ? The answer is that tradition is simply the faith of the Church stretched out through history. It is the unity of the faith of the Church through time. So we introduce here the idea of the handing on or the passing on, which is materially necessary for the stretching out of the faith, if it is to continue. We have the continuous process of proclaiming and receiving, proclaiming and receiving. In this sense, the tradition of the Church is explained in Vatican II's Dei verbum, very clearly. When we look at tradition from this viewpoint, we can bring out the fact that not only doctrinal elements but also the concrete style of moral life is part of Christian tradition from the outset. It is important to recognize that the life of faith was already being lived before Jesus in anticipation of him.

In Judaism we are not dealing with something alien to the Church, but with the Church in its embryonic form.

The lifestyle of Jesus and of his apostles is basically that of pious Jews. To some extent Jesus cleanses, intensifies, and transforms the received moral wisdom. His lifestyle, which is a special form of the moral life of the good, pious Jew is then passed on, and this is the basis of Christian morality as we still have it. The unity can be verified to a considerable extent by looking at the moral beliefs of sound, orthodox Jews today, moral beliefs not very different from those of nonmodernist Christians.

The lifestyle, as a moral reality, need not be altogether thematized or contained in propositions passed on explicitly in preaching and teaching and understood reflectively in every respect. The fact that this style of live is lived and that people bring their children up in it is adequate for the tradition to go on and for the moral aspect of Christian life to be part of faith.

The liturgical practices of the Church are part of the ways of the Church's acting. These too are handed on and belong to tradition.

Next we must consider Sacred Scripture. The first point to make about it is that it is within tradition. The Bible is the book of the believing community. It contains in a particular, definite form some part of the total tradition. The great significance of the Bible arises at least in part from this, that compared with everything else in the tradition, it has a fixity and permanence that the other elements lack. The Bible itself is a very hard datum of great size and complexity, which tends thus to limit possible reasonable interpretations, at least to the extent that it excludes many versions as unreasonable interpretations of faith. Of course, in principle there can be an infinite set of misinterpretations of the Bible which are coherent wholes.

In the Bible itself we have a variety of things which are content of revelation in one way or another. Some of the sentences in the Bible are expressions of descriptive propositions concerning the very words and deeds which were the medium of Jesus revealing. Some of the sentences in the Bible express propositions which were the interpretation of the former, by the apostles or apostolic men. Some of the sentences in the Bible are parts of the activities of the Church, and thus are chunks of tradition, insofar as the tradition involves acts of talking, for example, preaching, arguing with people, and so on. Included in the parts which involve the activity of the Church we also have a variety of things, for we have some things which are constitutive parts of the activity itself, then we have some propositions which describe the activity (as in the Acts of the Apostles), and then we have propositions which interpret the ongoing activity.

The tendency of modern biblical criticism is to look at the various books of the Bible, especially of the New Testament, as pieces of the activity of the Church. Next, each part of a whole is regarded as a piece of activity, and so on as far as possible. This is form criticism. In general, this approach cannot be wrong because the selection and keeping of these materials had to be for some kind of purpose having to do with the work of the Church. From this point of view, something was being done in the very writing down of the gospels and so on, which had ecclesial and religious significance.

Nevertheless, to press the analysis on the assumption that this sort of thing proceeds down to the least units is not by any means well grounded. Further, to the extent that the activity includes some sentences which seem to express propositions descriptive of the very words and deeds of Jesus, while it is true that these obviously would have been selected and arranged with overall purposes in mind, one also must suppose that the early Christians, being genuine believers in a reality which they knew they had access to only by the concrete medium of preaching--observing what Jesus said and did, understanding it,

proclaiming it--and these early Christians being realistic people, they would not have purposely distorted or added to the data which they had.

To have done this would have been lying and would have been falsifying what they had to work with, in a way which clearly would have been unacceptable. The supposition that they would have been doing this involves a kind of gnostic or idealistic assumption that their faith was not really grounded in the way earlier discussed, but rather involved some other access to the truth which then uses material things as a symbol for its own self-articulation.

Turning to the use of Scripture in moral theology, we consider first the Old Testament. The apparent moral prescriptions of the Old Testament cannot be taken straightforwardly as norms for Christian life. In the first place, the Old Testament is anticipatory in respect to Jesus and leads up to him. As such, the standard for Christian life found in Jesus is only partially and inadequately represented in the Old Testament. There also is in the New Testament a reflective critique of the content of the Old Testament--for example, in Jesus' handling of divorce. In general he purifies and transforms the moral content of the Old Testament.

Moreover, the way in which revelation works and the way in which Scripture is related to revelation is not the same in the Old Testament as in the New. This problem of the usability of the Old Testament and how it is to be handled essentially comes down to this, that the norm which is set by the moral teaching and practice of the Church as a whole simply makes clear that the Old Testament must be taken in a very qualified way. The uses of the Old Testament by the Christian Church as a whole do show that some things in it do have a normative character, but others do not. Further consideration of the status of the Old Testament requires some research into this topic.

When we turn to the New Testament, we have a different problem. Here the words and deeds of Jesus give us something which is directly normative and content of revelation. Faith bears directly upon what we are presented with in the New Testament in a way which is not the case for the Old, for there we are dealing with a whole series of revelations and a residue of a religious reaction which is inherently ambivalent. We do not have such ambivalence in the New Testament writings themselves.

We should point out in respect to the New Testament that here Jesus himself is presented as disengaging certain more permanent and typical aspects of the received or traditional aspects of the Old Testament norms of morality, cleaning these up, endorsing them, deepening them, and transforming them. The teaching which Jesus gives includes both more general and some more specific moral precepts and counsels. There are additional moral teachings in the

apostolic writings of the New Testament, especially in Paul's epistles. These teachings can be understood in terms of the Christian point of view, and they really cannot be reduced to anterior sources except to the tradition of faith which is present in Judaism in preparation for Jesus.

The moral content of the New Testament, unlike that of the Old, has been formative of the Christian community, of whose tradition the New Testament itself is a part and a residue. So we have the fact that the Church has taken the New Testament in a certain way and has used it in certain ways. This shows how we must take, use, and interpret the New Testament. It would be strange indeed if the Church had always used the New Testament as a source of moral formation in a fairly direct and straightforward way, and if doing this were somehow a mistake only discovered by us in the twentieth century.

We come back now to the office of the bishop. The office of the bishop, the institution itself, is a part of the tradition which is handed on. It is part of the apostolic office, leaving out what is necessarily special about the immediate recipient and witness. The office of the bishop, which is a part of the tradition, still is a peculiar part of it, for in a special way this office is instrumental to the handing on itself. The bishops manage the handing on of the tradition. Being present within the Church and being able to hear what is being said within the Church, the bishops are able to talk back responsibly, over time, speaking in the name of Christ. Thus the bishop provides within the Church an instrumentality by which Christ is present and able to argue and dialogue with unbelievers and with believers.

Considering the bishops as a group, speaking together, because they do manifest the faith of the Church--because one can tell when the Church acts by the bishops being the center of it--when they teach in a way which meets the conditions laid out in Vatican II, then they are teaching clearly as an expression of the faith of the Church. When they teach under these conditions, the Church is teaching, and this is the reason why such proclamations of faith are infallible and are recognizable as such.

We can now move on to the problem of definitions of faith. A definition is not necessary for infallible teaching. Definitions add nothing to the certitude of the teaching. In case the bishops define, the fact that they are all teaching the same thing and presenting it as binding--the fact that the conditions are met is itself declared and made clear. So this is one thing defining does. The other thing which defining adds is the precision of a single formula. The precision of the formula does not lead to an absolutely single proposition, for different bishops who agree in a formula may each have their own nuances of meaning; as long as these interpretations are not

incompatible with one another, there is no double-speak involved. But it is likely that the bishops who agree in a formula have somewhat different propositions in mind or different qualifications of a single proposition, even though they can come to agreement on the same set of words. It is the set of propositions--and a certain set of contradictory propositions--which are being held to and rejected by the definition. The definition also provides the discipline of a definite linguistic formula.

In one respect Protestants are right in thinking that in defining the Church is doing something like adding to Scripture, for in defining we get something which is fixed and established, once for all, and can no longer be changed. But as is the case with Scripture, this does not mean that the faith and life of the Church is ended. Also the definitions are themselves merely a residue of the faith and life of the Church, which already has been present in the tradition. The bishops cannot define anything which has not already been there.

We next come to the Fathers of the Church. These are basically a group of bishops and people closely associated with bishops, living around the same time, whose writings are recognized by the Church as an expression of Catholic truth. They were recognized in their own time and in early centuries, so that by the time the patristic period ends, their authority was already accepted.

The Fathers, having this character, and lacking other evidence of episcopal teaching in the early centuries, give us a case of the community of bishops. And so when the Fathers agree upon something as pertaining to Catholic faith and morals and present it as something one must hold to be a Catholic, then it is clear that the point on which there is consensus does pertain to Catholic faith, and the conditions for an infallible proclamation of the faith by the ordinary magisterium are met. This explains the significance of the Fathers as a theological source.

The Fathers also are interesting in other ways. In the very early Fathers, we have the example of the first group of bishops receiving revelation from the apostles; they are exemplars of the situation of bishops from then on. Holding the episcopal office as distinct from the apostolic office, they show bishops of later times how to fulfill it.

The later Fathers exercise together and without distinction the tasks which later become distinct--namely, the roles of bishop and theologian. In exercising the two offices together, without them yet being distinguished, they provide an example of how to fulfill all the various duties of the theologian. Although theology subsequently becomes distinct from the episcopal office, something appropriate enough inasmuch as theology has a different sort of task,

the closeness of the relationship in the Fathers provides something of a model for how closely related the work of the bishop and the theologian should be, even now when the two are normally distinct.

The next topic is the sensus fidelium. From one point of view, the sense of the faithful is simply another evidence of the faith of the Church. When the whole Church agrees that something is a matter of Catholic faith, then it is clear that this is a matter of Catholic faith. Thus what the faithful universally understand and accept to be of faith cannot be anything other than what faith is. The whole Church cannot be wrong.

The idea of the sense of the faithful also involves certain other elements. There is a subjective element to it, a kind of ability to pick out what is true immediately and without any argument. To the extent that we think of the propositions of faith as being normative truths, we have here simply a case of the ideal situation of the Christian; insofar as Christians are as they should be, they do have the ability to pick out Catholic truth and to distinguish it from contrary errors, and they can do it, as it were, just by ear. Here we get the phrase "pious ears" and the concept of what is offensive to them.

In recent times, of course, the sense of the faithful has been abused, with the introduction of a democratic conception of what the Church is going to teach. This has been criticized in the outline, and this criticism belongs here.

Having talked about the work of the bishops, we can now see the place of doctors of the Church and saints. The authority of these is subordinate to the magisterium. Doctors of the Church do not have any teaching authority and saints do not have any authority as moral exemplars for Christians except to the extent that the doctors and saints are set up by the Church as exemplars. When a teacher points to something as an example, then it is an example, and when a teacher endorses a certain source, it becomes his own. So the doctors of the Church are picked out by the magisterium and designated as people one should go to find out Catholic teaching in areas they have thought about and written about. The saints are pointed out as people whose lives are exemplary for the faithful; to the extent they are so designated, one can look at them.

But we must notice that the Church does not commit itself to everything a doctor of the Church says or to the exemplary character of everything a saint does. Even taking the doctors of the Church as a group, it is possible for them to all be wrong on a particular point. With the doctors of the Church teaching unanimously, we do not necessarily have an expression of the faith of the Church, although it is likely that in fact we do. In the case of the

saints, it is possible for all the saints at a given time to approve of something and for them to be mistaken materially, because the Church is not committing itself to the saints being materially correct--they might all have thought slavery was o.k.--but only that they were formally good.

Moreover, apart from Mary, we know that the saints are not sinless. So while they are given us as examples, part of their exemplary character is to see how an imperfect person who is like us in many ways--for example, in circumstances, problems, abilities, and in defects and faults--can nevertheless be holy people. So there always will be in the life of a saint examples of their overcoming their own sinfulness, which is part of the exemplary character of a saint.

Over time, the faith of the Church must articulate itself in expressions which do two things. First, they must make it possible to keep articulating it and handing it on, considering that new concepts become available and older ones less so for many people. Second, new expressions must unpack the content of faith--the propositional context which is not from the beginning fully articulated--with the new means which become available. This process arises quite naturally, as we see already in the New Testament, and more so in the writings of the Fathers. The process leads to the formulation of new propositions, which can be believed explicitly. Secondly, it leads to the expression of the faith in new linguistic forms and new modes of activity. The whole is developed.

This sort of development can and does occur in respect to individual believers. As it occurs, the development does not carry with it a warrant that the conceptual formulation and expression is an adequate and accurate articulation of the faith, rather than something arising from a peculiarity of the believer or from some other contaminating source. Still, development is bound to go on. Considering the necessity of handing on the faith and the role of bishops in it, bishops themselves are inevitably going to be involved in development, and they are going to pick up the products of others' attempts to develop and begin to use new concepts and expressions in handing on the faith. As they do this, they are saying things which have never been said before and they are saying things which not all bishops will at once assent to. So the individual bishop in trying to express and hand on the faith of the Church will develop doctrine, but since he is only an individual, there is no guarantee that he cannot go wrong in this development. A bishop has no immediate way to check his development out and there is no absolute assurance that it is an accurate expression of the faith of the Church.

This being so, other bishops or other members of the Church can consider what a particular bishop is saying in a case of this sort and find in it something which seems to them incompatible with that which they believe. If this is so, then they obviously cannot believe what he is saying, because it is impossible to assent simultaneously to contradictory propositions perceived to be such. However, the faithful who are guided by a particular bishop ought to accept his teaching as an expression of faith and try to understand it as such. Unless they see it to be incompatible with what they believe, they should accept it as an expression of faith. This is where religious assent comes in.

Looking at things in this way, it is clear that there is no room for nonassent except when someone who believes finds that what is being said cannot be accepted because it is incompatible with what is already held on faith. In this case one has a difficulty, an apparent contradiction of faith, and needs to investigate it.

It is one thing to talk about nonassent and another thing to talk about dissent. What we are interested in here is nonassent, a possibility which cannot be eliminated when we have individual bishops developing doctrine. When there is an element of development involved, there is room for nonassent. But when there is no such element, there is no room for nonassent.

The next point is that when development proceeds to the point that all of the bishops are saying the same thing on a point, and presenting it in a way that meets the usual conditions, then the development is completed, and we have a truth of faith proclaimed infallibly. It does not matter whether it is defined. If it is defined, of course, it is clear that the development has been completed, and this has happened in the past.

We next consider the role of theological reflection. This is a kind of self-referential wrap-up of this whole part. We are saying what this whole work is doing, for the whole work as a work of theology.

Properly, theology does the following things. First, it gathers together those expressions which definitely are expressions of the faith of the Church. Second, it tries to accurately form the concepts and propositions which these expressions do express, especially a task when it comes to ancient expressions, which must be understood as to what they meant at the time they were first uttered. This is the basic task of proper work in Scripture study, exegesis of conciliar statements and so on.

Next, the theologian must try to translate the truths of faith linguistically. Once the concept is grasped, the language in which it has been expressed may just not be adequate today because language keeps changing. And so there is a problem of linguistic translation.

Thirdly, there is more than translation, for it is necessary to understand things better and to express them in the concepts which are now available, so the theologian self-consciously, purposely undertakes to develop doctrine. These developments involve the normal risk which always is involved in development, a risk we have already talked about in connection with the bishops.

Fourth, the theologian has the job of showing the relationships between different propositions and sets of propositions which are parts of the content of faith. In doing this, the theologian tries to make clear the unity of faith. Showing relationships which are not already explicit in the material involves articulating and developing some further concepts, so this is one aspect of the development of doctrine--merely trying to put the thing together and see it as a whole is itself going to inevitably involve developing doctrine.

Fifth, the theologian also must try to draw out implications which are not already drawn out for the life of Christians, to show what faith means and what it leads to in practical terms.

Sixth, the theologian should try to answer objections and questions which are raised, Questions which are raised are really requests for development if they are not merely requests for information. In answering questions, one kind especially important is a question which challenges the faith and therefore requires a refutation. So it is part of the task of theology to refute opposing errors, to the extent that they can be refuted--the extent to which challenges are proposed with some plausible ground which can be removed.

There are certain things which the theologian does not do in trying to refute opposing errors.

He does not try to demonstrate the foundations of the faith; this cannot be done. There is no questioning of the foundations in theology; the only legitimate inquiry with respect to what is fundamental is an attempt to see what it is. The theologian does have the task of uncovering the foundations, but he cannot get under them to support them. And so he does not try to prove them and he never questions them.

Second, theological thinking is developing and thinking and articulating the faith. There are other legitimate kinds of thinking in philosophy, psychology, and so on. And someone who is a theologian can also be interested in these other fields. But so far as he is a theologian, he should not be doing these other things in their own, proper and autonomous way, for that would be presenting as pertaining to faith what does not in fact belong to it. This would be confusing things; it is a case of pot-mixing which always is dangerous and misleading.

Third, the theologian must take nothing other than the faith, in the forms in which it is accessible, as norms for his judgments as a theologian. If he takes either philosophy or psychology or anything else as determinative, then he is in trouble. Even empirical facts are not normative for faith; they are facts which faith will not reject insofar as they are facts, but faith will interpret them and if necessary simply say that what we see is not necessarily ultimately real. This is so in the case of the doctrine of the Eucharist and this also will hold for moral teachings; no matter how clear it seems that something ought to be so, and no matter how widely accepted it is, faith must prevail over every other source whatsoever.

Fourth, it is especially important that we realize that the opinions of individual theologians have only the weight they derive from their conformity to the normative teaching of the Church and they can be seen to do so, from the arguments and evidence drawn from the fonts of theology. Apart from this, they have no value at all. In the group of theologians, there is a somewhat different situation. Looking at theology as a whole, one has an encounter of revelation with the receptive capacities of humankind. Partly, these capacities are unreceptive to faith and reject it. So if you look at the theological record as a whole, you have evidence of God's dealings with mankind, believing and unbelieving. So the theological record as a whole is an ambivalent mixture of things. And the opinions of theologians are going to be partly an apologetics and expression of unbelief. So far forth, there is no consensus of theologians, for they hold contradictory positions. This very contradictoriness means that if one looks at theology as a whole, one cannot possibly take it very seriously.

On the other hand, if the believer considers the opinions of theologians who meet the standard of teaching in accord with the college of bishops, on all the points on which it is clear what the college of bishops have to say, then if this group of theologians comes to a consensus that something is an expression of faith, it is pretty clear that is it. So we have another way of seeing what the faith of the Church is in the community of theologians. In practice, since there is a close relationship between the work of theologians and that of bishops, when there is firm consensus among faithful theologians, then either the bishops will utter it, or give the theological teaching an indirect authority, so that it becomes clear that the consensus of theologians is an expression of the ordinary magisterium of the bishops.

But if there is a consensus of the establishment theologians--that is, of the people who happen to hold the jobs add can get the club together--this consensus can be one of nonbelieving theologians. Where this happens one has

something which in reality has no weight at all, but which can be a very misleading source for the faithful and for the world, since there is something which pretends to be faith but which is not. This is especially dangerous to the faithful, who are likely to accept this as a standard for their own faith.

Part 4: The Truth for Us: The Word and Words of Christ Jesus

The first thing in this part will be a general introduction in which the nature of the part and its importance will be stated. This part of the book will be trying to answer the question: What is it, most generally, that the Church does tell us to do in order to live in accordance with Jesus? Once the question is put in this way, it will be necessary to point out that the question will not be adequately answered if we merely say: This is what you are to do--with no explanation given. Living a Christian moral life cannot be simply a matter of following specific prescriptions as a child follows a set of definite commands obediently. It cannot be this because we cannot truly understand our duties and therefore we cannot really fulfill what truly are our duties as rational beings unless we see why we should do what we should do.

This is at least necessary to some extent, and the more the better, since the more we understand what our duties are, the richer our actions are in doing them. And since our acts are truly important since they contribute to the constitution of the pleroma, the richer our acts are with meaning, the more they contribute. So a lack of understanding when understanding is possible for a Christian detracts in a serious way from the contribution which we ought to be making. This point is in line with St. Paul's dictum that we should give rational service, intelligent service, since this is the kind of work which God wants from us.

Once this point is made--that there is an intrinsic ground for understanding--the next point is that we need in the course of this part to notice that there are certain problems which must be solved if we have an adequate understanding of our duties as Christians. One of these is how Christian morality specifically differs from secular alternatives. Another is how disputes concerning moral teaching would be settled, by going from a particular issue to more basic principles of moral teaching. This is not to be looked at in terms of trying to find the epistemology of settling them--which was the question in the previous part--but in terms of how, for example, a bishop in a council arguing about what the Church truly ought to be teaching on a certain moral issue on which there is some dispute would go about putting together a sound argument which really draws on principles of faith, not on some extrinsic principles. If we understand the more general principles of Christian morality, we will be able to describe how the bishop would proceed. A third point is that understanding these general principles will help us to give appropriate answers to new questions--to moral questions which might arise and which have never been discussed before among Christians, simply because the kind of action involved was not possible before. Fourthly, understanding the general

principles with some clarity will help to make clear how to settle apparent conflicts among one's Christian duties.

This brings us to see how important this part is. A final note is that principles to be discussed here will serve as the basis for the clarifications of the various duties that will come about in the subsequent volumes. So when we treat specific questions about social justice or sexual morality, we will be reaching back here to find the principles of the reasoning which will help to clarify matters, or, in apologetic terms, to provide arguments, insofar as arguments are possible, defending the truth of Christian moral norms against those who do not accept them.

The primary and overarching principles of Christian life are charitable love of God and neighbor, and the redemptive act which is the expression of this love which is appropriate under the conditions in which we in fact exist. Part I dealt with charitable love as a state of things--the unity of the divine and human persons in the same family. These persons in their community are the love. This good, this reality insofar as it specifies the will, is the principle of action in Jesus as a human individual and in the Christian who follows him. This good is to be looked at as a termination of the will to that good as the end, as <u>pleroma</u>. The determination of the will to this good can be regarded as something we ought to do only to the extent that it is something which due to sin we can violate, we can lose. In principle, it is not an act which we initiate by choice, but an act we spontaneously do by the divine nature in which we share by the love of God poured forth into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. By this love, we are united with the good which is the <u>pleroma</u> insofar as it already exists, and we rejoice in it, and we are united with it insofar as it is to come about through our action and so desire it, and are determined to act for it effectively.

In Jesus the redemptive act is the primary human act which follows from the desire which is the direct consequence of love of charity. The redemptive act is the commitment to bringing about the desired good insofar as it is in his power to bring it about. Our Christian lives simply depend upon being united with and accepting union with these acts of his. Hence to understand the primary principles of Christian life we need only understand these aspects of the action of Christ.

The notion that the love of charity is a kind of motion toward God and toward neighbor--as other from ourselves and objects toward which we are oriented as toward alien goods--misses the reality and makes the whole thing utterly mysterious, in an unnecessary way. Also in the view we are taking, it is possible to think of charity specifying the will, of this good specifying

the will, as being an immediate presence of the uncreated persons to us and our sharing in their life immediately and intimately. The Alfaro book seems to be pointing in this direction. On the account we are giving, there will only be one act of charity which is not otherwise specified, that is, the act by which we love in response to God's personal love. Apart from this, all human acts are going to be specified by human goods. Even the redemptive act is not simply the act of charity but is the act of commitment to the realization of the good which is loved through charity to the extent that this good is to be realized by human acts. Then every other human act which is shaped by charity will have to fall under this basic commitment.

This goes against at least some things which have been said in the theological tradition which seem to suggest that there are specific acts which are proper to the virtue of charity, acts which do not pertain properly to any other virtue. But I do not think this is necessary--this needs to be investigated--and it seems incompatible with the requirements of the analysis.

Once these principles are set out, so far as Jesus is concerned, the next point is to recognize that the requirement of love of God and neighbor, which sets up an exigence having various aspects that we can see articulated in the Gospel, can be expressed in some vary general norms or guidelines for living a Christian life. In Jesus' own existential being as the redeemer there is a certain character which has various aspects corresponding to these very general norms. So this first section of part four will take up the very general norms of Christian life, which are all simply more determinate forms of love of God and neighbor, and will take up the various aspects of the character of Jesus described in the gospels, which are nothing but aspects of the existential self of one who is the redeemed.

Since our concern with love of God and neighbor is a practical one, the specifications of it are going always to be toward the reality of the divine-human family insofar as this is still to be realized and can be realized through 0human action. Thus these will be determinations of desire for the fullness of the divine-human family, and will indicate how to make choices to fulfill this desire. The underlying principle is: Seek this fullness. Act for the full realization of the divine-human persons. This being the case, we can understand the various specifications.

The first of these is: Seek first the kingdom of God and everything else is only going to be a part of this pursuit. Goods which are real goods in themselves and can be recognized as having their own intrinsic value are not excluded from the fullness of the kingdom, but are realized and realizable properly only in it. In their fullest possibility, they can only be realized

in the realization of the kingdom. So one who really cares about a good such as human life or truth will, due to this very care about it, be more concerned about the wholeness of the kingdom, and so will seek first the kingdom, not excluding these other things but paying attention to the corollary: and all these shall be added besides.

The corresponding character trait is purity of heart, which is Christian single-mindedness. It is a matter of caring only about one single thing, the coming of the kingdom. It involves not having any doubleness of concern and so allowing no room for a divided heart which would involve duplicity, self-deception, and so on. Purity of heart is opposed in the gospels to the hypocrisy of the Pharisees.

The second general norm of Christian life is to pray always, to seek everything from God, receiving all as a gift from him. The whole of one's activity is to be asked for as something which will be given by God. This has to do with the fact that the kingdom which is to come is seen as a good which is wholly gratuitous. It is founded wholly on grace. Our contributions also are a grace--it is a gift for us to be able to share in the work by which God extends his divine family life to include us. This general norm of Christian life is exemplified in Jesus in his humility. Humility does not mean regarding oneself as low, but regarding oneself as of great worth, but recognizing that the great worth has not arisen from within oneself, but wholly is a gift of God. The Magnificat is a perfect example of humility. It shows the true regard of the Christian for his own dignity--in the case of Jesus, for his own dignity as the Incarnate Word, as the one who he is, in our case in our true regard for ourselves as creatures and as called to share in divine life, with at the same time the recognition that this great dignity is given us, and is something we achieve only by being given the power and the very act of achieving it as a gift of grace.

The third general norm of Christian life is that everything must be done as an act of obedience to the will of God: Not my will but thine by done. The principle here is the response of the Christian--all activity should be done as the fulfillment of one's vocation which is one's life as part of the work of the redemption. In the case of Jesus this character trait is exemplified clearly and explicitly in his acceptance of the will of the Father in the Garden of Gethsemane, but also throughout his life by his docility to what the Father has laid out for him.

This norm of obedience and following out the single vocation carries with it an aspect of simplification in the life of a Christian. Instead of having from one's own point of view a whole lot of diverse roles with potential

conflicts among them, the Christian really only has one overarching role which is living as a member of the redemptive community, and other roles are so subordinated to this one, that they do not maintain their own solid limits. To some extent we might talk here about the fact that for the Christian all of life a matter of doing one's duty, of fulfilling one's vocation, and every act is a dutiful act.

The love of God and neighbor is such that no act one might do in this life is ever adequate to express it. So any commitment which one makes out of this love inherently demands to be extended until death. The fourth general norm of Christian life is faithfulness until death to all of one's commitments or promises to the extent that they are commitments or promises which are constitutive of the kingdom in the making. We can see this sort of thing operative in Christian life in the indissolubility of marriage, in the demand that the priesthood be permanent, in the idea of sacramental character, in the notion of permanent vows, and so on. Faithfulness in Christ is exemplified in his sticking with his commitment through everything.

There can be certain promises which a Christian might make which can of course be broken. But such promises are not instances of a commitment which is part of one's vocational response precisely as such. The cases in which there will be a demand of perfect faithfulness will be cases in which the commitment is to a good as completely integrated into the object of the redemptive commitment, and to other persons in the relationship one has to them in the pleroma. This kind of commitment really already realizes the pleroma, and to the extent that it does this, it is part of the already existing kingdom, and so as such it has an eternal and unchangeable quality about it.

The fifth general norm of Christian life is to be detached from everything, to give up everything, and to hold fast to nothing other than to the good of the kingdom. The idea of total detachment is exemplified in the notions of putting on a new man and putting aside everything which one already was, living in the Spirit and putting aside the flesh. The counsels of perfection of the gospels--sell what you have and give to the poor, leave everything behind, and so on--exemplify this.

The character trait which corresponds to this is the liberty which is displayed in Jesus, the liberty of the children of God which Paul talks about. Liberty here means that one is not tied down to anything; nothing which is given is sacred except to the extent that it belongs in the reality of the pleroma and fits in with the redemptive activity which is to be done. Apart from this, whatever is antecedently is something from which he can detach himself utterly.

If Christian life is shaped by love of God and neighbor, then it also follows that one must love one's enemies. This follows to the extent that fallen mankind is an enemy of God, and looking at fallen mankind, including oneself insofar as one is still to be redeemed, from the perspective of the love of charity, is to look at enemies. The demand in Christian life that we love enemies is a demand to destroy the enemy by means of making him into a friend. One is to destroy the enemy by eliminating the evil by fulfilling the good which is present in potentiality, in this way overcoming the privation and so changing the enemy into a friend.

The character trait in Jesus which corresponds to loving enemies is his meekness. It is the attitude toward those who will him evil of not resisting them, and of continual determination to redeem everyone, also those who will evil.

If one loves God and neighbor above all things, then to the extent that this community can be realized by our action, it requires suffering, demands that one be willing to suffer evil for the sake of this good. So another general norm of Christian life is to accept suffering willingly for the sake of good. The principle involved here is one of self-oblation. This is obviously exemplified in the character of Jesus as it is portrayed in the gospels.

Loving others is shown in sacrificing oneself for them. So the general standard of Christian life is to sacrifice one's own self for the benefit of others, and to prefer the good of others to one's own good. This character trait is shown in the mercy of Jesus, in his compassion and so forth. Mercy and compassion really involve being more concerned for the good of the other than for what one would in justice be entitled to for oneself.

The next move is to take up the first principle of morality, considered from a Christian point of view. This is simply taking the notion of love of God and neighbor, or sharing in the redemptive work, and relating this notion to human goods. To relate this to human goods, we consider the fact that so far as we are concerned by our own free choices we can remove obstacles to divine love --we can overcome the alienation only to the extent that we can rectify our relationships to human goods. It is not possible for us directly and immediately to be in opposition to the supernatural good. Nor is it possible for us to do anything to bring it about. But it is possible for us to be indirectly in opposition to this good, for divine goodness is present in all of its participations. In these are the human goods which we have talked about in part I. So the redemptive work of the Christian is going to be in the first instance a matter of removing the obstacles or avoiding the obstacles to the <u>pleroma</u>, obstacles which would be present existentially in an appropriate kind

of relationship which would be realized through one's freedom to basic human goods. In this aspect, we are looking at Christian life as healing, and we are considering the respect in which each individual Christian contributes something by not being in the existentially wrong relationship. A lot of what traditionally has gone under the heading of saving one's soul and the whole idea of avoiding mortal sin really belongs here.

The other side of the coin, however, is that these human goods can be realized by our activity as a contribution to the building up of the pleroma. They can be realized both in other persons and in ourselves. These goods do perfect ourselves and others as members of the kingdom, and these goods will last, and they are being contributed to the pleroma and shared with the divine persons. Consequently, there is a positive side of raising up the kingdom of God, precisely by acting for human goods in a way which is integrated with the redemptive work. So, acting for these goods in a proper order is a positive side of Christian life. The Christian then is called upon in the overarching principle of moral Christian life to realize human goods as a contribution to the kingdom, and to avoid acting toward them in ways that will separate oneself from the kingdom.

So this moral norm is to do what we can do by human actions in the way of loving God and neighbor.

Fulfilling this primary moral norm of Christian life, engaging in redemptive activity, and building up the pleroma, is simply a specific way--at present the only possible way--of living a specifically good human life. Underlying the Christian moral norm, then, is a norm which would hold even if we were not called to share in divine life, even if we were not fallen and in need of redemption. Such a norm would hold for human activity as such. This implicit norm is: Act toward the whole ambit of human goods, respecting all of them integrally, and seeking to realize some of them in our lives.

More briefly and more accurately, the first moral norm without the Christian specification would be: Always act toward completeness of human being --and "human being" must be understood as communal human being.

This first principle of morality really is a first principle in the moral order. Consequently it is self-evident. Nevertheless, it is a principle which presupposes some prior truths although these are not morally determined truths. Like any other true proposition it presupposes the principle of noncontradiction. But as a practical principle, the first principle of morality also presupposes the first principle of practical reason, which is: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. This first principle of practical reason is not as such a moral truth. It is presupposed by and it

shapes every possible human act, even including intelligent and voluntary acts which are not free, that is, ones done spontaneously in response to understood goods where no choice is required. The first principle of practical reason can never be violated, by any human action whatsoever. This first principle does establish the framework for all action and as such it is the principle by which practical truth is possible.

The fact that the first principle of practical reason is a first principle means that practical truth shapes an order of reality in which what is realized exists by the determination of will--by the act of will bringing it into being. But what is to be is made intelligible and rational by the intellect which shapes that volitional act. The truth which is involved here will be the truth of the conformity of what will come to be through human action with a genuinely rational and intelligent consideration shaping it.

The first principle of practical reason must stand against attempts to reduce it either to one of two things. One is an attempt to reduce this whole order to a kind of factuality in which there would be no truth whatsoever. Sentences which seem to express moral truths and practical truths, then, would be taken to be expressions of some kind of fact--all the various kinds of noncognitivism emerge here. The other possibility, would be to think of practical truths as being reducible to truths about things which are already given, that is, to theoretical or logical truths, including hypothetical imperatives, or to some combination of these and of given facts such as wishes or choices. This kind of reduction would eliminate practicality from reality; it is a falsification of what is going on in human action inasmuch as human action really does bring about something--namely, the human person himself and the creative results of the human person's activities upon nature in the fourth order of being.

From a theological point of view the falsity of the counterpositions can be made clear by showing that they are inconsistent with the idea that human persons have free choice. The denial of free choice would simply eliminate Christian life entirely and it is contrary to a teaching of faith.

The first principle of practical reason--Good is to be done etc.--together with the understanding of the basic human goods indicates that these goods are to be realized and that what is against them is to be avoided. Yet this determination--These goods are to be done, and what is contrary to them is to be avoided--does not yet provide us with any principle of morality. The indication that each of these goods is to be realized can still be satisfied in morally bad as well as in morally good ways. A principle which is the single principle of the whole genus of human action cannot at the same time be a

principle which will distinguish the morally good species from the morally bad species. Thus, something must be added, something not derivable from what we already have, in order to get to the morally discriminating principle, which is acting for the completeness of human life.

This necessity for an addition makes it be the case that the first moral principle also must be a self-evident principle, in the sense that it will not be derivable from these antecedent conceptions and principles. However, the understanding of the first moral principle will presuppose these antecedents.

The first principle of morality will only come into play in cases in which there are human acts in the strict sense--that is, in cases in which action executes choices, or at least depends upon voluntariness which is conditioned by choices antecedently. So the first principle of morality governs our self-determination between at least two different competing alternatives, ultimately present in deliberation.

Second, it is important to recognize that not all choices involve a moral issue. In many cases a choice is simply a matter of selecting among possible ways in which a morally good commitment might be put into practice. In a case of this sort, one is really only determining oneself in respect to the fourth-order action. Here there is no moral issue. Similarly, of course, one can make a choice among various ways of doing evil. But this choice, just as such, is not where the moral issue lies. The moral issue lies in choosing between two or more alternatives, one of which involves the possibility of moral good and the other of moral evil.

If we consider the self-evident first principle of morality, one way to try to clarify it will be to think about the situation in which someone has chosen to do something which is immoral. In a case like this, one has an understanding of various goods--the goods which are involved in diverse possibilities. In the case of at least one of these possibilities, one we will call immoral, one has, besides what one understands, besides the rational grounds one has for choosing it, one also has something at the emotional level which is a more determinate interest in this good as such a good, good for me, here and now good. This determination of the good, insofar as it is in fact part of oneself, can set up the possibility of reflectively being considered as itself an aspect which, if one gives in and acts according to it, would be integrating oneself in a certain way and in a certain respect. So conceding to this emotional principle of determinacy can itself be seen to be an intelligible good. Yet insofar as the principle of the concession is something other than an intelligible good itself, we have the strange situation that one is determining oneself intelligently but not according to reason. One thus has the possibility

of acting--that is, of acting in the fully human sense by choice--but of acting in a way which limits one's determination of oneself by and to human goods which one understands.

The alternative is to avoid thus limiting and restricting oneself, not to limit one's involvement with intelligible human goods, not to do this but to maintain openness toward all of them. And this is the morally right alternative. Reason insofar as it simply makes its own, whole, unified demand is what is called right reason. Right reason is not rectified by something extrinsic but rather by the whole set of goods considered as a unified set of intelligible principles of action. So acting morally, then, will be acting in a way which is in accord with this unified set of goods, considered as a whole.

The basic human goods thus have in themselves two aspects which must be distinguished. In one respect, they have the goodness which each of them has. Looked at in this way it might seem that the only unity among the goods is that they are all things we are interested in, as a matter of fact, and they are all possible principles of human actions. We can choose for the sake of any one of them. But our capacity to care about human goods is a single capacity of the will. This capacity extends to the goods not only in their determinacy, not only in any delimited aspects which make them diverse and incommensurable, but in all of their aspects and also in aspects of them which we do not even understand as yet. This transcendence of any limitation, even of the already understood limitations of the good, is in the nature of the intellect as being open to everything which could be understood as good, and the intellect is in principle open to anything which can be good. This being so, the human will is in principle, of itself, open to divine goodness. From this aspect, all the basic human goods, even considered according to nature, share in a unity insofar as they are in fact--though we need not understand it this way--participations in divine goodness. To act for all the basic human goods in the full range and extent of their goodness, to act for them this way and not to delimit oneself arbitrarily, then, is to maintain openness to divine goodness. Immoral action, then, necessarily puts an obstacle in the way of sharing in divine life, which is sharing in divine goodness.

A further note. Intellect as such has being as its object. This is wider than determinate being, that is, what already is. So the object of the intellect is a principle for creative action. Free choice is a capacity to act creatively. It is not limited to certain definite goods but is open to all goods which are in the power of one having intelligence. Free choice in human beings is limited to possible objects of human interest. Therefore, we have the basic human goods marking out the range of the possibilities of free choice.

The moral problem arises because free choice, being the response to intelligence, has goodness itself, under the rationes of the human goods, for its object. But the definite being who has free choice, namely, this human person, also has a determinate nature, this human nature, with proportionate, already given goods. This is part of the object of free choice, and therefore it can be accepted as exclusively determinative. Thus it is possible for a person to settle down to being what he already is, rather than acting creatively to be what he can be. It is essentially this settling down with what one already is which is what is involved in immoral action. The acceptance of one's finitude to the extent that it is not necessary to accept it constitutes immorality.

The angels have a nature which is per se intelligible. The angel can choose this nature which is already given rather than to accept the possibility of being more than what it already is. Human nature involves motivation only by way of experience. And so human persons have the problem and the possibility of determining themselves according to factors of delimitation which are given at the empirical level. To do this will be to determine ourselves by an arbitrary principle.

Right reason is not virtuous reason, as it is often thought to be, and as I used to suppose. Right reason is simply reason not determined by some arbitrary principle arising from inclination. All arbitrary principles arise from the determinacies of passions which are not in line with reason--that is, which are more limited, more restricted than the intelligible principles of action themselves would be. Arbitrary principles always can be accepted under the intelligibility of unity or harmony within oneself, but this yields a self-mutilating or a self-limiting unity, a harmony which integrates reason with passion rather than integrating passion with reason.

Once the precise elucidation of the first moral principle is given, then we can go over the ground three or four times, pointing out how this understanding covers and makes sense of various things which are commonly said about immoral action and sin. This is a process of showing that sin is looked at as separating one from the divine good, it is looked at as a matter of selfishness, it is looked at as a sort of self-mutilation, and it is looked at as a kind of irrationality. Each of these views is correct and gives a somewhat different emphasis, and all of them fit into the notion which is key in our view of the matter.

Now we are about to begin talking about the modes of responsibility as they are derivable from the first moral norm, which is implicit in the specifically Christian moral norm, which we have just been talking about.

These modes of responsibility, which express the requirements of reasonableness itself, when looked at in relation to Christian life, express necessary but not sufficient conditions for living a good Christian life. They express necessary conditions in this way: that they show us what we must not do if we are to avoid evil and loss of charity. The norms tell us what we should do, however, only insofar as they are transformed into the Christian norms. The realizations of the goods will only be genuine and adequate to the extent that they are brought about under the conditions and demands of the redemptive act overarching Christian life. For this reason the natural-law norms have a kind of negative character, and in this way we can grasp the emphasis of traditional moral on natural law since it was concerned with avoiding mortal sin and thereby getting Christian life off to its necessary start, since the first stage has always been recognized to be avoiding mortal sin, and when this is done, there is a more active pursuit of perfection.

The determinacy of human nature which is found in its sentient level can provide principles for arbitrary choices in several different ways. The modes of responsibility are specifications of the primary moral principle which rationally exclude these various ways in which determinacy might provide arbitrary principles of self-determination. Thus, the modes of responsibility exclude all the sources of arbitrariness from becoming determinative.

The various modes of responsibility are not uniform in the bindingness which they present. As rational principles, they all do make a rational demand. They exclude arbitrariness as a principle of free choice. But the ways that the diverse modes of responsibility work in excluding arbitrariness differ, so that we have diverse genera, not just different species of the same genus.

There are some differences between the modes of responsibility. In one way, we have a demand for rational self-determination, and there is uniformity across the board in this. But in another way, the voluntariness which is involved in determining oneself contrary to one or another mode of responsibility is not uniform. For example, there is a difference between failing to act for a good, due to laziness, and acting contrary to a good out of hatred. It is clear that one determines oneself or makes oneself be a person of a certain sort in reference to the goods rather differently by these two kinds of immoral acts. I suspect that the same thing holds for each of the modes or responsibility. If we could get out the subtler differences of self-determination which are involved we would considerably clarify at least some things about varieties and degrees of immorality, which are involved in diverse sorts of immoral acts.

We have been thinking about the difference between acting contrary to goods out of hatred, as when I clearly decide to destroy someone I feel I would like to see dead, and acting contrary to goods for the sake of some ulterior end to be realized. The case of acting contrary out of hatred seems to fit the Nazi destruction of the Jews, while the case of acting contrary to goods for an ulterior purpose might fit a euthanasia program or abortion, or something of this sort. In these latter cases, it is not usually a desire to have the person dead which specifies the act. With other modes of responsibility, there will be still other ways in which one determines oneself in respect to the goods. And to the extent that these are different, they will embody a diverse sort of voluntariness--some difference in the modality of the voluntariness, and so some difference in the way and the extent and the depth to which one determines oneself in respect to the goods.

In theological terms, all of the principles for arbitrary self-determination fall under the heading of concupiscence, which will be discussed in part five, insofar as it is an obstacle to living the Christian life. But it is important to notice that even if the determinacy of our sentient nature were not perverted but were innocent of the effects of original sin in all respects, it would still be the case that the determinacy of our sentient nature would present us with options so that we could be tempted, as Jesus was, and could have an opportunity to choose contrary to the goods.

Much of what is said in Scripture about passions and desires and so forth can be understood as relevant to the present point.

The first mode of responsibility is: Do not pursue apparent goods as such. The basis for the arbitrariness which is excluded here is that one can have a sense desire to which there is no intelligible correspondent except that one can satisfy one's sentient desire and regard this as a way of integrating oneself. The natural virtue which belongs here is a sort of self-awareness in one's action which prevents one from hiding from oneself exactly what one is doing in acting. This is a sort of moral honesty. Self-deception is always involved in acting for a merely sensible satisfaction, a merely apparent good.

The norm as it is naturally given is deepened in the Old Testament by the clarification that the intelligible goods are what are truly human, by consideration of the goodness of creation, and by understanding the complex nature of man made in the image of God. It is further deepened in the New Testament by seeing that even these human goods, even considered simply as human, are to make a contribution to the <u>pleroma</u> which the merely apparent goods, not being intelligible, cannot.

In the fallen world, the demand to pursue real goods--if one really cares about such goods--will necessarily lead to a requirement that they be pursued only in subordination to the building up of the pleroma, for real goods can only be realized to the fullest possible extent in the actual condition of things by being pursued in this way. So we come to the transformed virtue which is purity of heart and the complete single-mindedness of the Christian.

The second mode of responsibility is: Get moving. The basis of the tendency contrary to this is simply laziness or the tendency at the level of sentient nature not to act because there is an inertia which needs to be overcome. The natural virtue here is ambition or drive--the hardworkingness of someone who wants to accomplish something and habitually overcomes this inertia.

The deepening occurs by recognizing that the good as something possible is more genuinely possible. The faith, even in the Old Testament, holds out a much more real hope of realizing or protecting human goods. Further, it is fully possible to be realized, and abundantly so, in the pleroma, under the New Testament. This gives Christian life an urgency and energy which otherwise is unintelligible.

The transformation occurs by recognizing that human effort as such under the existing conditions cannot even be fruitful to achieve human goods. Thus human effort must be an achievement only insofar as the activity which accomplishes is received by us through divine grace--healing grace. This recognition, then, establishes the Christian virtue which transforms ambition and drive into Christian humility.

The third mode of responsibility is: Pull yourself together. The meaning of this involves the idea that an individual should be responsibly directing himself toward goods because his pursuit of them involves other people. We do not pursue any human good to any significant extent all by ourselves, but only in cooperation with others on account of the naturally social human condition. Our involvement with others sets up expectations on their part. Consequently, a requirement based on the fact that the pursuit of goods will be cooperative is that we organize our lives so that we do not wind up with a lot of unsatisfied expectations on the part of others. The basis at the emotional level for the arbitrariness which is excluded by this mode of responsibility is simply that we have many diverse desires for goods and so we are tempted to get involved in many things, to make many commitments without worrying about the implications of these commitments for potential conflicts of duty. The natural virtue is a kind of dutifulness or seriousness about getting involved in things that prevents us from overcommitting ourselves and committing ourselves in a disorganized way.

The natural norm is deepened under revelation by recognizing that we are all members of the human family, created by God, and that it is a fallen family, but that we have an interdependence as children of God. It is deepened further by the New Testament recognition that we have co-membership in the Body of Christ, and should look at our lives as being parts of one another.

The transformation comes about by recognizing that in our lives the demands of the divine-human relationship is primary, and so there really is only one role, one basic commitment which we ought to make in an absolute way and that everything else is simply to be a part of this. This insight and the transformation of the natural norm transforms the obligation, Pull yourself together, into the obligation: Look for your Christian vocation--the one thing in life which we can live as a member of the Body of Christ, and finding that one life to accept it, to accept the vocation and to live it. Thus dutifulness is transformed into obedience to the call of God, and in some ways the idea of childlikeness, a simple life, where one simply lives one's life of obedience to the leadership of God, comes into play here.

The fourth mode of obligation is: Be persistent; do not irrationally quit. The sentient principle which is contrary is any kind of sense tendency which interferes with the intelligible action which is good, and tends to slow down such action or stop it. Fear is a key factor here, for it can arise and make us wish arbitrarily to quit. Discouragement also is involved. The natural virtue of being persevering is courage.

The natural norm is deepened in the Old Testament by seeing that goods and evils are more serious and that the ones which are at stake in human actions are far more important than any others. Also an understanding of the social character of human life which makes clear that goods will suffer in others if we do not persist in our involvement with them. In the New Testament, the permanence of the goods is revealed to the extent that one can see that having courage is required for the sake of something which will last eternally. Goods are given a far greater depth and impact than they can have without this revelation. Where commitment is to others as members of the kingdom, the relationship is already one of participating in the family of God. Persistence in one's commitments, then, becomes a matter of sticking with an already realized aspect of the <u>pleroma</u>. This, then, involves the Christian virtue of faithfulness, so perseverance and courage are transformed into fidelity in the full sense. The idea of faithfulness is closely related to the conception of fear of the lord. Fear of the Lord is a kind of reverence. Fear of the Lord involves reverence for the reality of God, which we ought to be concerned about, and this is what overcomes our fear of anything else, which would make us not

persist. The martyr who is faithful to death does not actually overcome all fear but overcomes all fear other than the right fear, namely, fear of the Lord.

It very likely is the case that, in every one of the modes of responsibility, the sentient source of the temptation to act contrary to reason will under a proper Christian formation turn out to be precisely the motive for doing the supernaturally good act. The training of desire in the first mode of responsibility is to have one's affections focused upon divine things. The training of ambition or drive is to be ambitious for the higher and more excellent goods--this is the second mode. The training of the tendency to be involved in many things, in the third mode, is a matter of focusing one's eagerness to enjoy goods in the one vocation in which they can all be present together.

This brings us to the fifth mode of responsibility: Be detached and creative. The underlying problem is that when one is acting there is a tendency for the sentient make-up to get involved with and integrated with the action one is engaged in so that not continuing to act in the same way, changing and being different, becomes a problem of overcoming a kind of dynamic inertia. In this case the problem here can be regarded as one of not taking first-order conditions as givens but looking at them as material to be transformed into an expression of our commitments, by bringing what is into line with them in creative performances. The natural virtue here is temperance, a proper self-integration, which prevents one from being overly locked into habitual patterns of satisfying one's desires and interests.

In the Old Testament the natural insight into the necessity of detachment is deepened by giving us the concept of original sin. We recognize that our natural tendencies and desires are not what they ought to be, and that they need to be dealt with and not accepted. The natural is no longer seen as normal and normative; there is no absoluteness in the way things are. The New Testament adds to this the recognition that this situation is in principle overcome to the extent that the redemptive act has been done, and so there is no necessity for us to remain locked into the old man.

The transformation of the principle of detachment comes in the recognition that the kingdom is already present and that one is a member of it, and so one ought to live as someone who is a member of the kingdom already present--Live as what you are, as children of the light, in accord with the new nature you have, live holily, put on the new man, live according to the Spirit and not according to the flesh. The Christian counsels, sell all you have and give to the poor and so on, are ways in which this norm is expressed. The Christian virtue, then, is the liberty of the children of God.

This brings us to the sixth mode of obligation: One must not destroy goods out of hatred. The problem here is that sense appetite can dictate negativity with respect to something even in its positive being, because the sentient evil is a positive reality, not a privation. So sense appetite can demand the destruction, for example, of a person or the life of a person whom we hate, although from a rational point of view there is no real evil overcome in the destruction of someone's life, nor is any real good achieved by such destruction. The destruction is required only by passion. The mode of obligation follows then merely from the rational demand to act for a good, that we not be destructive of goods with no ulterior reason at all.

This is deepened by revelation to the extent that goods are recognized as created and redeemed, and that evil is a privation, and that the impulse to destroy evil will be satisfied only by overcoming it. One gets rid of enemies by making them into friends. And so the transformation is to love enemies and to be perfect as the heavenly Father is perfect. The Christian virtue here is meekness. Hatred of the sinner is transformed by the Christian into hatred of the sin as such, which is the proper focus of it. Hatred of the sin, since the sin as such is privation, leads not to destructive action. Rather the more one hates, the more constructive one gets.

The seventh mode of responsibility is: Do not do evil that good might follow therefrom. This is a requirement to overcome the tendency to be more attached to some goods than to others despite the fact that one cannot rationally commensurate them. The natural virtue which is involved here is something like natural piety or respect for the dignity of persons.

This natural norm is deepened by the insight into providence and in the New Testament by Christian hope. Living in a fallen world, the suffering of evil is inevitable if one is going to be good. You can either do evil or you can suffer it, but one cannot avoid the dilemma. Everyone is going to be either on the side of Jesus or against him, and doing evil that good might follow. The inevitable suffering which one has to undergo can be transformed by being accepted as a means of bringing about good. This is the Christian position, so that we have the Law of the Cross: to suffer evil that good might follow, and the Christian virtue which corresponds to respect for the dignity of persons and goes beyond it is self-sacrifice or self-oblation.

The eighth mode of responsibility is the universalizability principle: Treat others as you would wish to be treated by them; do not do unto others as you would not have them do unto you; or however we are going to formulate it. The need for this is to counter the natural tendency to be more emotionally

attached to one's own good and the good of those dear to oneself than to the good of others. The natural virtue which corresponds is fairness.

The understanding of fairness is deepened by our understanding of our common situation as creatures, fallen, redeemed. Given the datum of Jesus' action of dying for us, the natural mode of responsibility becomes transformed by the insight that we will not be fair if we are not prepared to sacrifice ourselves for others as he did, since we do want him to do it. Being willing to sacrifice oneself for another is being willing to give up the standard of fairness in favor of promoting his good, and where doing this is giving up something one is justly entitled to, it is a matter of mercy. This is the way that fairness becomes transformed into mercy in the Christian concept of things.

The tendency of selfishness which is at the root of the need for a requirement of fairness is transformed into the Christian passion of being selfish for the kingdom, with which one becomes wholly identified. Thus one identifies oneself with the whole of the divine family and then is selfish for it.

With the apparent goods mode of responsibility, an additional note is needed. What is happening here is a moral problem not because one is acting for pleasure alone but because one is acting <u>by choice</u> for pleasure alone. If a desire arises, the simple fact that the desire has arisen would lead one to understand something to be a good and one would act for it voluntarily, without choice, if nothing else comes to mind. There can be nothing wrong in this. But if the sensory demand arises and a choice becomes possible, this is because there is some other intelligible alternative which ought to be considered. Then if one determines oneself to act simply because of the sensory satisfaction which is involved, this is not an adequate reason, for on the other side there is something which deserves consideration. One would have to have some intelligible good other than simply satisfying sensory appetite to justify acting for the pleasant good.

There are many particular responsibilities which go to make up one's Christian vocation. We wish to divide these into two broad classes. First there are those responsibilities which pertain to every member of the Church. Second there are responsibilities which pertain to some members but not to others. The latter will divide into the responsibilities of persons according to their various conditions and states of life, except insofar as they are precisely holding an official position vis-a-vis one another as members of the Church; and then those responsibilities which are diverse for various members of the Church, and which do pertain to them precisely insofar as they hold an official position vis-a-vis one another as members of the Church.

The former set will be dealt with in volume three; the latter set in volume four. The responsibilities common to all Christians will be dealt with in volume two. Here we are only interested in doing two things. First, describing in general those responsibilities which pertain to all members and how they fall into different categories; second, talking about responsibilities which pertain to some but not others according to their different conditions and states of life, which will be the subject of volume three.

The responsibilities which pertain to all members of the Church will be considered in volume two. These fall into four different classes. First, members of the Church are members of the divine-human family. As human persons, they have the responsibilities which every human person has, and these are inescapable, since a Christian does not cease to be human. And a Christian's human personhood is important for his Christianity in the sense that a violation of it will necessarily separate him from the divine family, and also because the fulfillment of human personhood is a contribution to the pleroma.

The responsibilities which pertain to all human persons just as such can be considered by taking the modes of responsibility and applying them to the basic human goods. But it is important to bear in mind that while we can explain much of what Christians think about the responsibilities of human persons, by making this application, still the specification of various kinds of acts as morally required or forbidden which one finds in Christian faith will not necessarily coincide precisely with what we will get out of our analysis. This means that while we can articulate to some extent what we think to be the responsibilities of Christians as human persons, we will not necessarily be able to clarify everything, to explain everything, or to argue for everything.

In addition to the responsibilities which all Christians have because all human persons have them, there are secondly responsibilities which all Christians have because being a Christian is being a member of a redemptive community. Being a member of a redemptive community means that one has those responsibilities for redeeming which we have already talked about near the beginning of this part. These responsibilities have been stated in general and it is characteristic of Christianity that these responsibilities are not more closely specified in general in application to everyone. The positive living of the Christian life in this domain is something which every Christian is required to do, on the one hand, but, on the other, is left free to do creatively. The demand to positively live the Christian life in a redemptive way, while universal, and while the general categories of Christian responsibility are universal, the carrying out of the commitment is left for individuals to do according to their own ability, their own understanding, and

their own situation. As we shall say shortly, there are in each case different gifts given, different graces given, which will make a difference in what the outcome will be. There are no general specifications here although there are what are called counsels which indicate areas for Christians to consider, yet they do not bind on everyone, but only are guides to doing what is the responsibility of every Christian, and that is living redemptively.

In addition to the fact that the divine-human family which is the Christian community is redemptive, it also is perfective of Christians in divine life. It puts them into divine life and it perfects their living of it. In this aspect, it is not merely healing but also elevating. And so there are some things which are specifically required of all Christians. These are things which pertain to the sacraments which are required of all Christians--that is, if it is possible for them to receive them. These demands are either to receive the sacraments or to do something which is preparatory to or consequent upon their reception. We have for instance baptism. On it there is a consequent responsibility to profess the faith and not to deny it. We have confirmation which has the consequent responsibility to carry out the duties of one's state of life as a way of proclaiming the revelation of God in Christ. We have the Eucharist; it is our duty to receive it, and we have the consequent responsibility to give thanks to God, to praise and glorify him. This is the positive responsibility of Christian worship. We have the sacrament of penance, which we have a duty to receive if we fall into serious sin, and the consequent responsibility of penance. And we have the last anointing, which it is our duty to receive if we need it and are in danger of death, but by the very nature of the case there is no consequent responsibility except to prepare for death. The other two sacraments pertain to special conditions and so we do not need to deal with them here.

Finally, there are responsibilities which pertain to Christians insofar as they are self-consciously members of the visible, human and Christian community, which is the Church, as it exists in the world. These responsibilities are those which are demands of Catholic life which pertain to every Catholic precisely because they are established and decreed by the Church, such as Sunday Mass participation, as distinct from the requirement in general to worship God, or other things which all Catholics are required in general to do. These precepts of the Church which commonly fall upon members of the Church tend to be taken without much seriousness today, for they are after all prescriptions which are humanly determined and they can be changed by human judgment.

But it is a mistake not to take seriously these precepts of the Church, for these common responsibilities belong to the Church membership also insofar

as members are Christians. And the requirement that one function as a member of the unified and visible community in a self-conscious and responsible way demands that these be respected, although they might be different. As long as they exist, it is a violation of community, the very unity in charity of the Church, to disregard them or to violate them in any arbitrary way. Therefore, they should be followed with great care. But they are humanly made and made for purposes which are understood by those who make them and can be understood by the members of the Church. To this extent, the purposes for which such precepts are made are dominant over the particular prescriptions. Hence if a member of the Church should sometime be in a position to know with assurance that those who made the precept would want something else done on a particular occasion, if they were in a position to consider all the circumstances of the case, then that is the thing which ought to be done, not precisely what the precept specifies. This will not violate the precept but rather will fulfill it by a mode of action which is more appropriate than what it explicitly specifies.

When we come to the category of responsibilities which are different in different persons, considering them simply as human persons, we have in the background the fact that all human persons as such, given the modes of responsibility on the one hand and the basic human goods on the other as common principles are going to have some common responsibilities and there are especially the negative ones which get specific. When we look beyond these common responsibilities, we must consider differences among people, differences which differentiate their responsibilities in significant ways.

This need not mean that the responsibilities which people have insofar as they are different are less serious. How serious they are, what force they have, depends upon what modes of responsibility they arise from, and upon which and how goods are at stake. But there are going to be differences of persons which generate different responsibilities so that some have responsibilities which others do not.

People will have different responsibilities depending upon what they can know in a practical way and can actually do. This is not the only basis of differentiation but it is an important one. The difference in what people can know in a practical way and can actually do can be caused by a difference in the stage of individual development. Children do not have the same responsibilities as adults. Further, there are individual differences in ability, or in opportunity, so that people who have different levels of ability or of opportunity are going to have in the concrete different responsibilities. Included in this one must take into account accidental abnormalities in people, so that a person who lacks some abilities or has some abnormalities, such as

some sort of insanity, will not have the same responsibility as a person who has the ability or who is sane.

A very interesting category which is differentiated by what people can know and can do is caused by cultural differentiation, since people in different cultures simply do not have the same range of possible actions open to them. Consideration of this category will require a discussion of historicity, and a reduction of historicity to its proper size.

These sorts of differences are not the only ones. We also have differences which are caused by different natural roles. To some extent these may be regarded as differences which arise because of what people can do, but there are particular kinds of what people can do, which are as it were built into the human condition. For instance, there is a natural role of parenthood and childhood, and there are the natural roles of men and women vis-a-vis one another. These roles give rise to diverse responsibilities. These things do not depend upon anyone's choice, but they do create some differences in the relationships of persons to one another. These differences have significance in differentiating responsibilities of people.

There also are cases of different roles which people have in virtue of the acts of someone else. For instance, the victim who is rescued by the Good Samaritan now has a responsibility of gratitude and perhaps of helping his rescuer in a similar situation--or of helping someone else who is unfortunate. But this responsibility arises due to the act of someone else. This is especially important from a Christian point of view, because being redeemed we are in the situation of having responsibilities we would not have were we not redeemed, and yet these are generated not by our own act but by the act of someone else--Jesus redeeming us.

There also are different roles which are accepted by our own individual acts, even without the creation of a community. For example, when someone makes a gratuitous promise, he has an obligation to fulfill it--which, of course, may be limited by universalizability and other modes of responsibility, but which is nevertheless a form of responsibility. This has an important place in Christian life to the extent that Christians often make gratuitous promises, such as in prayer or in other connections, and then have a responsibility for fulfilling them. This used to be taken more seriously than it is now.

There also are different roles which are created by one's own action together with the actions of others. Common consensus in commitment to a certain set of goods together with universalizability, the facts of the situation, and an inventive insight into how best to go about acting for the goods leads to the creation of roles. These carry with them certain claims

and expectations. These are rights and duties in a certain strict sense. The roles having been created, those in them are not immune from the working of the other modes of responsibility. Under these conditions, within the role, one can acquire some further responsibilities, which are ones a person would not otherwise have. So a person, for example, who has the role of teaching will have in that role chances to do good to others which they would not have otherwise, although not strictly required by duty in the narrow sense, will then have some moral responsibilities which they would not have had they not accepted this role.

All of these things create differences in concrete responsibilities without creating any kind of conflict among the responsibilities which people will have.

If we move into consideration of the responsibilities of Christians insofar as they are not merely human persons but are members of a redemptive community, who are to act as members of the divine family and as human persons who have a redemptive task to do, we then have the things which fall under the counsels. As we said, we have something in one way common to all Christians here. But the actual specification of what is required is different. And we are now at a point where we ought to say something about why there are differences here. To some extent, all of the principles of differentiation which operate on the person as a person are going to operate on Christians here, for they are different.

Another way of considering the situation is that people simply have different levels of ability to understand and to do things which fit into the specifically Christian mode of human life. These differences in level of perfection in the Christian life can be regarded as a result of the various gifts of the Holy Spirit which persons have received and the different extent to which people are acting according to these gifts. These differences, on the other hand, can be considered simply and specifically differentiations made by natural factors, but since these natural factors here are specifying differences in the redemptive order, they are now to be regarded as referred to the activity of the Holy Spirit. Thus we have diverse graces of the Holy Spirit, relationally predicated.

Another consideration is whether one can fall seriously short in this area. On the one hand, it would seem obvious that considering the importance of the area, one should be able to fall seriously short. There is no doubt that in many cases of activity within the area, there will be either mortal or venial sin. However, in such cases, what is done also would have been mortally or venially sinful because of the responsibilities of the Christian qua person.

When we leave all these sorts of cases out, the question is: What about the possibilities? The interesting thing is that the tradition never seems to wish to talk about mortal sin here. We talk about different degrees of perfection and imperfection. I suspect that the way the thing works is that while there is a responsibility here, it does function really as a true ideal, and the level of one's ability to understand and to fulfill this ideal is matched up by one's level of willingness to fulfill it. This seems fitting because the whole redemptive way of being is given as a gift, and our participation in it also is a gift, which makes it possible for us to be more closely identified with Christ. If the giving of the gift did not carry with it an efficacious grace to fulfill it, then it would be given as a rather self-destructive gift. It would be like giving a bomb to a baby. Perhaps in this area especially, the idea of, "My yoke is sweet," fits. For on this account of it, one gets just as much efficacious grace to fulfill as one has real obligation to do.

The consideration of the way the law works in St. Paul's epistle to the Romans--either the old law or the natural law--and how it serves as a source of condemnation because the law is given but the grace to fulfill it is not, and his contrast of this with the law of Christ, indicates that the foregoing analysis must be correct for the understanding of this aspect of the law of Christ and of Christian perfection.

The category of divergent responsibilities of Christians according to their role as members of the redemptive community which is also already sharing in the divine life, precisely insofar as they are sharing in it, will include some different duties which arise in connection with the various sacraments because of personal differences, and then we also will have the differences between matrimony and orders, and what pertains to them.

Finally, we have the precepts of the Church. These affect members of the Christian community to the extent that they are self-consciously and knowingly members of it, acting as effective cooperators in its visible life. Here we talked about the general precepts of the Church, but it also is obvious that precepts of the Church specify different conditions under which individuals will have different canonical responsibilities.

All of these differences can apply to differentiating the responsibilities of Christians.

Part 5: Fallen Men and Women in a Broken World

The general topic of this part is the aspect in which our redemption is yet to be done. We are concerned with looking at what the task is. What are the obstacles which must be overcome for the completion of the redemptive work?

The basic question arises from the fact that although we have been redeemed, yet in fact the life of the redemptive community is not here in many respects. There are many people who have not yet been touched at all, apparently, by grace, and Christians, it seems, are hardly thorough-going in living Christian life. The Church is a Church of sinners. The question is: Why and how is this situation possible? In the next part, part six: What are we to do about it?

The first question can be divided into three. Why does God allow the situation? Second, what is there about human nature which makes possible man's being saved yet still not perfectly saved? And third, what is it about man's actual condition which makes it be the case what though we are redeemed we are still in fact sinners, not only potentially hut also actually?

With respect to the first question, the answer is that although God might have done otherwise, for he might have saved us without the process we experience, it would have been in one fell swoop. There would then have been no possibility for human action to be involved. By choosing the route of the Incarnation, God has made it be the case that something created, namely the humanity of Jesus, is able to be the principle of redemption. And while Jesus redeems and the redemption is perfectly present in him, in his death and resurrection, still God has chosen to allow it to be the case that redemption spreads out from him materially through the world, spreads out both in time and in space. And in this way God makes it possible for us to participate in the redemptive work of Jesus. Thus we have the maximum chance to conform ourselves to Christ, not only by the respect in which we are redeemed and therefore made like him, but also in actually sharing in redeeming, both ourselves and also others. We would not have this opportunity if we were merely passively redeemed.

With respect to the second question, while the world is to be redeemed and the whole world is to be redeemed, this world actually is a multitude of things spread out in time and place, a multitude of people. This allows it to be the case that salvation is present in its fullness at Calvary and in the resurrection, but still has not spread out to all people at all times and places. This situation also exists not only between persons but also within each person. The initial touching of redemption is at a certain moment in a person's life and in a certain part of the personality--the love of God is

poured forth in the heart, at a certain time in one's life. But redemption must spread from there through the whole of the person and the whole time of his life. The complexity of the world outside us arises from a number of factors.

First, there are subpersonal parts of the world, which are not yet involved in the human. Second, there are many people, some of whom have and some of whom have not heard the Gospel. This goes on age after age, because all the ages in the future are still to be evangelized. Third, there is a complexity of cultures.

Within each person there also is complexity. First a complexity of time, since life has many stages. Second, a complexity within the various orders of reality. Thirdly, a complexity which arises because there are several orders.

In sum, the ontology of the created world makes the redemption a process which extends over time and which unifies a multiplicity of things and of elements both in time and in place.

The love of God is poured forth in one's heart. The divine goodness informs one's will and demands a response. The first question, then, is about making commitments, which are in conformity with God's love. Then there is a question of making an ordered set of commitments, which are either tightly integrated or which fail to be so. The various kinds of integration are not present at the outset. This is partly due to the fact that human persons cannot begin with such integration, due to the inability of children to do it. Moreover, there is a communal aspect to commitments. Most of our commitments involve others. These commitments which involve cooperation with others can be more or less integrated both with others and into one's own life. One's own commitments might be integrated while those of another might not be.

In addition to one's commitments, it is possible that one's thinking involved in commitments might not be entirely unified with the thinking which is not involved in one's commitments. So there can be discrepancies here. It is possible for a person to hold contradictory propositions at the same time provided that the contradiction is not explicit. Moreover, thought involves thinking the thoughts of others. It depends very heavily upon beliefs. It is possible that one reasonably accepts another's false beliefs or there can be breakdowns in communication to have a discrepancy here.

Thinking and commitments both depend upon our sentient nature. There is here a natural determinacy of the biological order. This is further limited by health factors which include disease and abnormality, and also by stages of development such as infancy. The material at the sensory level, images, imagination, experience, emotion, and so on, has many parts. These parts are not necessarily altogether unified with one another. Moreover, our sensory

and emotional life also involves interdependencies with other people, something which is especially obvious with respect to emotion. For emotion changes in reaction to and in consonance with the emotions of other people. This can even be observed in the case of groups of animals, where emotions seem to be contagious. Even if an individual's emotions were fully integrated, then, there would still be emotional interchange with others, for instance in the case of mob hysteria.

We also must look at cultural reality--the fourth order. Thinking and commitments are only a principle of human life, not the whole of it. They only become human life insofar as they are expressed in words and in deeds. Words and deeds must use material media. These may be more or less nonintegrated with the thoughts and the commitments which one wants to express by means of them. The material media may be more or less recalcitrant. They are especially likely to be so if one looks at them as social realities--that is, insofar as they are already in the fourth order, and one tries to make use of them to express one's own thoughts and commitments, when these fourth-order entities have been put there by some other thoughts and commitments which may not be compatible with one's own. Thus there are misunderstandings in communication, and one finds that the tools and devices and other things which are available do not quite fit what one wishes to express.

The feedback of the fourth order into our sentient nature, into our experience and emotions, to the extent that this fourth order material is not integrated with us or we with it, leads to a kind of constant return into us, at the sensory level, of things which are not integrated. And so we both find difficulty in using things to live our lives and then these things come back to make it difficult for us even to maintain our thoughts and commitments, as they are, when they are not completely in harmony with the material media of the culture.

Our story, then, is a story of complexity and multiplicity. We have not yet talked about sin. The conditions we are talking about up to now are simply those which would be present even if mankind were not fallen but was simply in a condition not of integral justice. We can now introduce the idea of human fallenness.

In Christ there is no sin. And yet even in him there is a process by which the love of God works its way throughout his personality. This is evident because he undergoes temptations and in the course of his life one can see that the principle of his holiness pervades his personality little by little and only completely pervades it in his dying.

When we introduce sin into this picture, we get to the third of the questions we raised at the beginning of this part. Adam and Eve as they were traditionally described were created with all of these things integrated and with original justice. Thus there were no gaps and no real obstacles. However, according to Genesis, they separate themselves from the love of God and yet even in doing this they cannot separate their whole personalities and all of creation from him. Thus the divorce which is begun in principle by the original sin is not an absolutely total divorce. According to the account in Genesis, Eve sins first. Adam has the chance to redeem her, but he does not do it. Instead of bringing her back into line, he joins her. Then there is no further principle of redemption, since he is the father of the whole group. So when he gives in, everything is gone. His sin is to make a wrong choice which is destructive in principle, dividing the human family from the divine, so that we are not naturally a divine-human family.

But after Adam's sin we have a spreading out. First of all, there is rationalization in the business about the serpent, the shame which comes from nakedness, children are not born in original justice, they are in conflict with one another, some are related to God in a sound way but others are not, there is conflict of emotions, there is a disruption of culture finally ending in the tower of Babel, where language breaks down utterly. And so we have original sin and its effects described.

Also at this point we can take various examples of individuals whose personalities are more or less extensively disrupted and corrupted by sin. David, for instance, who is in many ways a heroic character, nevertheless is a great sinner, and one can see how his sin works itself out. Thus we can with this and other examples indicate the scriptural description of the dynamics of sin and its consequences, and its spread through the personality and its gradual disruption of one after another aspect of a person, wherever there are potentials for disintegrity because there is never perfect integration. There sin can get into the chinks and establish obstacles to redemption.

Some consequences of sin are necessarily the results of our own sins. These are ones which involve freedom itself in some way. Others are from the sins of others, from the culture, or from ourselves. In going through the list, we can see how at each juncture where integration is needed but not automatic some breakdown can occur. When it does, there is an obstacle to fully living the redemptive life.

We must talk to some extent here about original sin as an obstacle. We must say some of the traditional things about it--that it has the effects of concupiscence, darkening of the intellect, weakening of the will, and so on.

But it is impossible to sort out these various effects; we cannot really tell what is the result of original sin and what is the result of the actual sins of others, or even of ourselves. We have the problem of complexity, of cultural input and feedback. But there is no real necessity to try to sort these things out except to note the traditional position about the consequences of original sin, since we must not deny or overlook this. What is important is to recognize that there are effects of previous sins and that these effects of previous sins, whether original or the actual sins of others, are causes of sins so far as one is concerned. Then there also are the effects of our own sins, and these are another source of difficulties although they cannot be sorted out well either so far as they add to and intensify the effects of the sins of others. So what is really important is the residual effects of what we have done ourselves which we can sort out, for there are some special things here which we might otherwise not attend to properly.

So far as original sin is concerned, the important point is that this is an obstacle to the redemption just insofar as everyone who is naturally born just as such is not a member of the divine family. Although we are not going to discuss this in this part, in part six, this will be the point about baptism, that it overcomes this situation.

We omitted to discuss certain factors which make for diversity in the existential order. These will be discussed here before we go on to consider actual sin in general.

One factor is the distinction between what one is doing and the subjective conditions of doing it. When we talk about commitments, we are talking about choosing to do something. The choice itself, as a free act, is one thing. What is chosen is something else. In addition, there is the factor of the cognition according to which one acts. One has more or less morally significant cognition shaping the choice. It can be the case that what we are doing is wrong but one is not actually choosing it, but doing it without choice or doing it in one or another way of choosing. Moreover, it can be the case that what we are doing is wrong and we are choosing it but we do not know its wrongness. These factors will make for possible diversity. It is to be noted that they also can operate on the other side; they are not only involved where it is a question of moral evil. This is why they belong in the account of multiplicity, and not in the consideration of sin.

Another necessary distinction is between the commitment and the performance. We already talked about this. We need to make clear that thinking something can either be something we choose to do, or it can be the choice itself to do something. Sins of thought can mean either of these.

A decision which is not executed can be called a sin of thought, and so can an execution of a decision to think something one should not. There also are words and deeds, which are obviously just two different sorts of external performance. These distinctions should be made without talking about sin, in order to set up the business of thought, word, deed, and omission.

In laying out the diversity, it also is important to make clear the various modes or varieties of voluntariness. There is the voluntariness involved in choosing itself, the voluntariness involved in bringing something about through the execution of a choice where the result is understood and foreseen but not chosen, the voluntariness in what is not brought about by choice where its not coming about is foreseen, and the voluntariness in what is omitted--first, when one chooses to omit, which is the same as the earlier kinds, and second, the voluntariness of the pure omission, which goes back to antecedent choices. If this is wrong, it is because of the antecedent wrong. Pure privativeness shows up here and there in one's life. Finally, there is the voluntariness of the voluntary act which isn't free at all, where one is simply responding to an inclination, without deliberation and choice. This will happen, sometimes, with no moral responsibility at all, but it also can occur that there is no choice in the action but it happens without deliberation only because earlier one has done something wrong. In this case the indeliberate action itself is an expression of the earlier wrongdoing, and we have a positive counterpart of the pure omission.

In addition to all of these distinctions, we must notice that the various modes of responsibility bring about different modes of response to the goods. Thus for each mode of responsibility, there are two different modes of response --an affirmative or a negative one, depending upon whether one fulfills the responsibility or not. These different responses are going to be different ways in which one determines oneself vis-a-vis the goods which the mode of responsibility bears on. The same goods being at stake and other things being equal, the different modes of responsibility generate diverse modes of response which are existentially significant in terms of the depth to which one commits oneself to the good or, in case of a rejection of responsibility, alienates oneself from it.

For example, the alienation which is involved in the destruction of a good through hatred is somewhat deeper than the alienation which is involved in the destruction of goods for the sake of some ulterior end; both of these are somewhat deeper than the alienation which is involved in the damage to goods through unfairness; this is deeper than the alienation which is involved in the damage to goods in not doing what one should do to realize them, and so forth.

In all of these cases, one is establishing one's identity more or less pro or contra the goods, depending upon what modes of responsibility are being either fulfilled or violated. The general principle will be: The weaker the mode of responsibility, the more significant the response to it will be if affirmative and the less significant if negative.

If, as it were, the demands of reason are put more softly, then one's failure to respond is not so bad; if they are put louder, one's failure to answer is worse. On the other hand, if the demand is put softly, one's ready response is better than if the demand is louder, for then one will respond with a less deep identification with the good. On this basis, the person who works hard to preserve his faith, other things being equal, including the cost to the individual, loves it more than the person who does not deny it when that denial would be required for the sake of some ulterior good. A person who would be willing to die to promote the faith is more virtuous than a person willing to die to avoid denying the faith. So the missionary who risks his life to convert the unconverted is more virtuous, other things being equal, than the martyr.

The consideration of diversity also ought to include a consideration of diverse kinds and numbers of human acts. Trent requires confession of sins according to species and number. The differences in kind and number do not pertain only to sins, but also to good acts, but there is not the same need to count these up! Differences in kinds are specified by what it is we are doing, and circumstances are taken to be relevant. In general, what this comes down to is that we are to put what we have done into the categories of the Church's moral teaching, making all the distinctions the faith teaches, so far as we are aware of them, and then to attend to sorting out our lives according to these categories, which serve as a heuristic device for the formation of the Christian conscience and its examination.

When it comes to numbers, in the case of some sins, this is fairly straightforwardly a question of how many choices one has made. When it comes to others, it can be that different external acts determine a multitude of sins even if there is only one choice. There are cases, for example, with omissions, where it is very hard to talk about the individuation of the acts. These things are theoretically very difficult and complex, but in practice the Church's teaching tended not to take the business of solving these problems of enumeration very seriously, except to the extent of saying that we must confess how many times. It thus comes down to doing the best one can and where some kinds of sins can be counted, one must do it, but when one cannot enumerate one's sins, it is o.k. So no subtle theoretical inquiry is necessary here, nor likely to be helpful. What is essential is that the penitent give a sincere

expression to what is on his conscience, of the actual state in which he finds himself. This is necessary both to set forth what is to be judged in confession, and also for the pastoral purpose that the confessor cannot well respond appropriately if he does not have a description not only of what the person is doing but how often, in some fashion.

The eight modes of responsibility give sixteen modes of response, when it comes to the existential involvement by voluntariness in choosing itself. Not all of these can apply when we are dealing with what is praeter intentionem, especially the strong negative ones, and even the apparent goods one. Universalizability certainly can apply to the voluntariness of what is praeter intentionem. With respect to omissions, the diversity does not matter except reductively, with respect to the diverse voluntariness of the moral acts or act on which the moral significance of the nonaction depends. Oftentimes this is not a single act but a state of sin, which can involve many violations of diverse modes of responsibility in respect to some good. With respect to the nonfree but voluntary acts, also, the same thing as is true of omissions holds.

The modes of responsibility involved in voluntariness praeter intentionem need to be worked out more. It seems clear, however, that the "Do something" mode gives no mode of response so far as what is praeter intentionem is concerned, in respect to what is brought about, but does give a distinct mode of response in respect to what is not brought about, due to our doing something other than what we ought to be doing. This whole matter demands considerable analysis and the analysis should help to clarify greatly why acts which are equally free and equally bearing upon a good even with the same results do not always have the same weight in terms of the gravity of the sin, or the merit of the good act, looked at moral-theologically.

Something needs to be said about object, circumstances, and end. These are said to affect the moral character and classification of acts. The important fact is that when one does something, this action has many complex aspects, and whatever one is doing can be wrong if any of these aspects is wrong. Thus it can be that what one does is wrong, or the ulterior reason why one is doing it is wrong, or that there is something about the situation which makes it wrong. This way of expressing the matter makes for very difficult and complex analysis, which we do not need since we have our own analytic devices. But the main point they were trying to get at by talking in terms of object, circumstances, and end was important and legitimate.

We come now to personal sin in general. This requires some scriptural background, where sin is a deviation from the path, a kind of lawlessness, and so forth. All the scriptural background will lead into a general clarification

of the idea of sin in which we'll recapture some of the things which were said before--that it is of different kinds, and so on. We next need to give some sort of general account of wrong human acts and how they can occur. This is a phenomenological-analytic treatment. The important concept to clarify here is the idea of temptation. So we have the goods and the modes of responsibility; we put these together and we get some concrete alternatives, some of which are morally required and others excluded. But this fact does not determine us to choose those which are morally required, because we can hoke-up a reason for choosing contrary to right reason. This already has been discussed. If we incline to choose in a way which is incompatible with right reason, the incompatible alternative is called "temptation." If we adopt that proposal, we are giving into the temptation and sinning.

Thus the phenomenology. It is called sin rather than simply immoral act because of the relationship which it has to our membership in the divine family. Immoral action does affect this relationship quite directly. In case the immoral action is of a radical kind, it will banish us from the divine family, or kill us so far as our membership in it is concerned. This corresponds to a cultural phenomenon. Every culture has various kinds of wrongs which are recognized. The serious wrongs put a person outside the community--either by exile or by banishment--taking away their citizenship--or by death. If they are killed, this is like being in hell, for there is no restoration to the community possible. If they are banished and their citizenship is removed, they could be restored by an extraordinary act of which would make them citizens once more. This is like reclaiming someone who has lost their faith. If they are exiled but without losing their citizenship, then they might be permitted to come back in by a change of heart on their part and pardon from the government or something of that sort.

Besides these sorts of acts, all of which correspond to mortal sin, there are various kinds of offensive acts within a society which lead to fines or to some disability or to the requirement that one do some extra work or lose some privilege or suffer a beating or something of the sort. These kinds of acts are like various sorts of venial sins. They do not affect one's community membership or citizenship or put one outside the community, yet they can be quite serious offenses or minor ones, for which one might only be shamed or made fun of for doing what one did. So there are many possible offenses in any community, and some are very serious while others are not. Similarly, there is a range of offenses so far as membership in the divine family is concerned.

It is important to realize that the kinds of acts recognized as either sinful or meritorious in Christian life are in the first instance generated by

common sense--a common sense operating in the light of faith--by considering human behavior descriptively and taking kinds of acts as they are defined by common sense. Then there are further distinctions made either because they are socially very important or because they are important from a religious point of view; these are introduced to distinguish certain categories. Thus things which from the common sense point of view would be circumstances are taken to be morally specifying. Once the categories are established to the extent that they are, then other factors become ulterior ends and circumstances, and in this way we get the traditional categories of acts. These categories of acts, considered moral-theologically, can all be accounted for by a kind of genealogy of Christian moral life, in which we would see how these things develop. This will be talked about in more detail when we discuss mortal sin.

A distinction must be made between seriously immoral acts and sin. Even if we consider the human person without any consideration of redemption, seriously immoral acts involve an implicit rejection of divine goodness. This is so because in being willing to make an exclusivistic choice, any exclusivistic choice, the individual in principle is closing himself to the limitless good, and so in principle is rejecting divine goodness. If we consider things from this point of view, then the redemptive act apart, all acts which really involve the conditions necessary for free self-determination and which are not inclusivistic choices are going to be contrary to divine goodness. If one carried this view into moral theology, then every immoral act, it seems would have to be a mortal sin.

But we know that this is not so. The point is that mortal sin is not simply an immoral act. It is not the incompatibility with divine goodness as such which makes a sin mortal, for this is common to all sins in which there really is a wrong choice, including venial sins which are such due to parvity of matter. Rather, what makes a sin mortal is the incompatibility between the self existentially determined by the sinful act with the love of God. The love of God is poured forth in our heart by the Holy Spirit, and this love is the principle of Christian life. In response to this love, the first and basic choice, which must be specified in the light of faith, is to be a living and active participant in the redemptive community--that is, to act towards the realization of and participation in <u>pleroma</u>.

It is this basic choice which is the overarching moral act of Christian life. This act is a middle term, which serves to integrate everything else in a Christian's life. If this act is given and in place, whatever else the Christian does will be measured by it. Anything done which is harmonious with it and integrated with it will be meritorious; anything harmonious with it but

not yet integrated with it will be a morally good act belonging to the Christian but not fully and specifically Christian in its character. Anything the Christian does which is incompatible with the basic act will be incompatible with it either explicitly--a known incompatibility--in which case we have a mortal sin, or will be incompatible with it only in an implicit kind of way, only by being incompatible with perfect openness to divine goodness in its fullness. And in the latter case we have venial sin.

The basic act of Christian life has some specific determinants. To the extent that some acts can be immoral and yet only implicitly incompatible with these determinants, by way of being incompatible with full openness to divine goodness, there are some things which are immoral but which a Christian will not be able to see to be incompatible with the redemptive act. Thus his immoral acts will only be determinative for his Christian life--they will only destroy it--to the extent that there is an explicit chain of connection which can be followed out. One can hold contradictory propositions simultaneously, provided that the contradiction remains unseen. The same thing is true here. And it is important to recognize that the opposition is at the practical level, and so the awareness of the incompatibility would have to be explicit at that level of cognition, and not simply at the level of theoretical reflection such as we are now engaged in.

In virtue of what we have just said, it is possible that there be things which are objectively light matter. For instance if someone steals a few cents from someone, knowing it to be unfair, this unfair act done freely and quite deliberately to someone of ordinary means, can be done without a Christian making a commitment incompatible with the basic commitment of Christian life. If someone were not a Christian, it would contract his hold on divine goodness, so that he would no longer be open to it. But for a Christian, while he on the one hand does something which <u>implies</u> closing himself to divine goodness, at the same time the basic act of determination of the self toward the <u>pleroma</u> can remain intact, and by this the individual is determined to openness to divine goodness. The two are quite inconsistent, but there is no difficulty in this, for beings who are not all of a piece, as angels are.

If acts of such an immoral kind are done by nonbelievers, there is nothing to stop the full effect of the act. So immoral acts of nonbelievers—of those who do not have a participation in the redemptive act or some other overarching good act--will be mortal sins. But for believers there is a protection from mortal sin in most cases by their participation in the redemptive act. But this does not protect one absolutely. For it is possible to do something which is immoral and which is openly related to the redemptive

act, so that the fundamental option of commitment to share in the redemptive act is itself forced out. In this case, the sinful act does separate one from the love of God, and we have mortal sin.

The next part of the story is to clarify at least some of the instances in which we can see how the explicit incompatibility arises, so that the immoral act excludes the love of God. These will be instances of mortal sin, and all of them will be fundamental options, although some of them will be more fundamental than others. Each case will be an immoral act which has at least some feature directly incompatible with commitment to the redemptive act, so that if one makes a choice of this type then one cannot at the same time hold fast to the commitment to partake in the redemptive act. The cases we are interested in are not going to be cases in which one is choosing straight on either to do a certain thing, ceasing to share in the redemptive act, or not. The notion that this is how it must be makes mortal sin practically impossible. For it makes it be a matter of choosing between two things which do not seem to come into confrontation with each other. But there are at least five diverse ways in which the incompatibility can be present in one's choice even though it does not have that straight-on character.

For the footnotes, the question might be raised how nonbelievers can commit a mortal sin at all and are not simply committing immoral acts. In the context of the redemption going on, the significance of the immoral acts of nonbelievers is going to be interpreted in the light of the context. They are called to share in the redemption; to the extent they are committing immoral acts, which establish a barrier to their being redeemed, they are committing mortal sins. This is not precisely mortal sin in the same sense that the believer commits it, but it sets up a barrier to sharing in the redemption, and in this sense the nonbeliever is committing a mortal sin. Moreover, the tradition has held that baptism is needed not only to remove original sin but in the case of adults who are guilty of it to remove other personal sin, including mortal sins.

Before we go on, it is important to recognize that there will be kinds of acts recognized cross-culturally which are going to be seriously immoral and which are grave matter. So there are something like natural kinds of evil acts here. If we take examples such as the direct killing of the innocent who are members of one's own society, we have something generally recognized universally as wrong. The trouble is that the recognition depends upon a sense of fairness, which is all right as far as it goes, but does not correspond to any other requirements of the good of life other than that one be fair with respect to it, and its protection within a community. So we do have some sorts of acts which

because of universalizability and the common features of human conditions are adequately specified so that they will hold up as being seriously immoral and grave matter for moral theology, and these are not going to change. Yet not all of the things which are classified as grave matter can be like this. Also, as Christians come to see things more clearly, it should be the case that they will consider certain sorts of things wrong which they previously considered to be permissible.

There are at least the following five sorts of situations in which one can choose in a way which amounts to a mortal sin. These, it is important to note, are not different from one another in being mortally sinful. But they do differ in respect to how utterly they separate one not only from the love of God but even from other principles which would make it possible for one to have a reconversion to this love.

The first case is that of young children, say in the six to twelve age bracket. Even before this age, children can tell the difference between being obedient and being disobedient, being nice kids and naughty kids. These distinctions, however, do not necessarily have a moral significance, even though they are not reducible to animal behavior. The child, unlike the animal, knows things symbolically and also has a reflective awareness of the personal relationship which is involved--for example, in making mother feel bad. Still, the child does not see its disobedient and naughty behavior in terms of any mode of responsibility. So there is no morally significant act.

But when the child begins to be able to reason practically and to consider its behavior in a more complex way, certain considerations of moral responsibility do begin to emerge. For example, an awareness of fairness and unfairness, and even in fairly young children there is the ability to discern when others are being treated unfairly and they are not personally involved, and be outraged by it, noticing what is wrong as such. This shows the operation of the suitable kind of intelligence for moral responsibility. A child like this can themselves have a choice to make between two things, doing one of which would be unfair, and the child can thus make a wrong choice. Yet while this is morally significant, the child need not realize that there is a connection between this morally significant choice and the area with which they have some sense of morality--that is, where obedience is involved. And it is only to the extent that action is tied up to the basis of the child's Christian life by way of obedience that they can really seriously go wrong.

If we think of the child's situation, we need only consider a certain point of development where the child comes in terms of moral principles or modes of responsibility aware of the wrongfulness of being disobedient. The

child even so may in particular cases be disobedient despite a general willingness to obey. This will be inconsistent. However, the child can come to a situation in which there is a general question of whether to be an obedient child or not, whether to try to obey, or whether to throw over the whole business of being obedient as something which one ought to do, and rather regard this as merely a performance which one will put on to the extent that one has to, and apart from this outward performance to do as one pleases to the extent one can get away with it.

Such a choice, which can occur in a child between six and twelve, before puberty in any case, would be a mortal sin. If the child has the lock-in to the redemptive act by means of at least voluntary response to the idea of sharing in the kingdom of God, then the tendency to make this choice will be correspondingly diminished, and other immoral choices will be effectively blocked from affecting the child's existential orientation. In cases in which the child is brought up as a Catholic and begins the practice of the sacrament of penance early on and regularly, there is a very substantial reason to expect that the choice to be disobedient will not be made. One of the things which a child is taught is to try to be an obedient child, to please God. And one of the sins the child goes to confession to confess is being disobedient. On account of this, with regular confession the child is most unlikely to simply give up the whole idea of being obedient, and to reject the whole thing, which is the one way that the young child of these years could really reject the redemptive act--this act being in itself in principle a kind of obedience to God as one perceives him, a kind of willingness to submit to the divine will as one is aware of it. The child is aware of it by means of the obedience to parents and so on. So the child can in principle do itself in, but given the practice of early and frequent confession is very unlikely to do so. This tells a great deal about the wisdom of having children going to confession from six to twelve, and not delaying it until puberty.

The next stage which we must consider is the stage of puberty. Here the child may be tempted to engage in sexual sins of one kind or another, and actually begin to fall into them with something of a bad conscience before being entirely clear about what the significance of such activities is. To the extent that the child has something of a bad conscience, but is not wholly clear about things, we perhaps have initially sins which are serious in their matter but are not mortal for the child, because the appreciation the child has of what it is doing is not such as to bring the act in any real way into conflict with the commitment to the redemptive act.

But when the child begins to become aware that certain things are sorts of acts which are mortally sinful, the temptation will still persist. There is a potentiality for sins of weakness, which do not always have the same formal object, and which the child might sometimes commit without actually doing the mortally sinful things. However, there is something which the child can do here which will be of utmost significance. It can either make a choice to try to avoid these things, and to remain in the love of God, or to choose to give up the struggle. To choose to give up the struggle here is clearly a mortal sin, and this choice not to remain faithful is incompatible with an aspect of the redemptive act which demands a faithful effort to seek and respect divine goodness.

The third stage to which we can note what clearly is mortal sin is where an individual is tempted to do something which they can see to be a serious affair and they recognize to be incompatible with the good of themselves or of others. An example would be a case in which someone is tempted to have an abortion in order to solve a personal problem, and the individual can see that this is very important and that it is not really compatible with a familial attitude toward others. The incompatibility here can be accepted nevertheless, with the idea that although one is going to do this, one will subsequently repent. There is presumption involved here. This is deeper, for it is not only incompatible with love, but also incompatible with one aspect of hope. The choice to do this sets the person existentially against the redemptive act, especially insofar as this act bears upon the human good which is violated by the choice in the example, human life. The individual who is thus acting can nevertheless repent. Even though there is presumption, the repentance might turn out not to be a false one--the grace of God may well be sufficient to bring about a reversal. Conversion can in fact follow and be genuine and effective.

The fourth stage is where an individual has the alternative of putting themselves into a relatively extended situation of sinfulness, and takes the attitude--for instance, by entering into a bad marriage--that despite the sinfulness which is involved and despite the separation from the love of God, this is to be accepted, with a prospect of possible damnation, but this also is accepted. Here we have hope suffering an attack in the form of despair or incipient despair. So this is another kind of serious sin.

Finally, the fifth stage is when an individual, being in the state of mortal sin, has the temptation to solve the problem not by conversion but by the extirpation of faith itself. This is the most radical kind of sin because it removes the principle which is basic to the partaking in the redemptive act in any sort of intelligent and active way. One cannot oneself do anything at all,

even given grace of conversion, when faith is destroyed. The individual sets about here to determine himself in infidelity. This is the sin against the Holy Spirit, I think, as it has been understood in the tradition.

Thus there are at least these five diverse sorts of ways, and there may be others, in which people can commit mortal sins. But there are at least these kinds.

If we consider this subject in terms of the genesis of the tradition, we can begin by thinking in terms of a people who are rather primitive but who are also in a religious orientation. They will have an awareness that some things destroy community and these will be recognized as serious matters, to the extent that the community itself is also the family or the people of God. So doing serious things which destroy community will be recognized to be a destruction of one's relationship with God which is by way of this community, by way of the covenant. This is the situation in the Old Testament.

These naturally repugnant things, then, will not be able to be done easily by members of the community in any way which will lead to this sort of separation. Subsequently, people will see the results of doing these things on their lives, on their relationships, and other members of the community will see how doing certain things redounds to a person's involvement--his living and existential involvement--in the society. This insight will lead to a clarification of types of acts which are to be forbidden. As these types of acts come to be publicized as being always wrong, it becomes even more difficult to do them without the issue of their wrongness coming out into the open. Thus there is a progressive development of doctrine in which the wrongness of various kinds of things is little by little unpacked.

An additional consideration with respect to serious sin, is to try to distinguish what traditionally have been called "capital sins." These are not species of sin so much as they are dispositions to violate the modes of responsibility, either in their common form or in their specialized form as modes of Christian responsibility. We have talked about the virtues; these are the vices. So we do not properly here have a list of sinful acts but a list of attitudes or dispositions, which may be more or less involved in various sorts of sinful acts.

If we consider the apparent goods mode of responsibility, the natural virtue is sincerity. The opposite of it which is tied up with serious sin is hypocrisy. The Christian virtue which corresponds is purity of heart; the vice which is especially incompatible with this virtue is worldliness.

If we consider the get going mode of responsibility, the natural virtue is ambition. The opposite of this is sloth or laziness. The Christian virtue

is humility, and the vice especially opposed to this virtue is an attitude of autonomous self-reliance, of wanting to be complete unto oneself, of wanting to be on one's own in life--which is one sense of pride.

Get one's self together--the natural virtue is dutifulness, so one is careful not to accept too many roles and responsibilities which might conflict. The vice is a sort of irresponsibility of getting oneself involved in a lot of things without care to avoid conflicts. The Christian virtue has to do with responsiveness to vocation, and this would be obedience. The specific opposite of this will be living one's life unto oneself, being concerned with various roles and activities without integrating them into a vocation--living a life in which one's religious commitment is only a part of one’s life, only one concern alongside others, even if more important than any other.

The mode of responsibility which is detachment has as its natural virtue temperance; the opposite is a kind of rigidity or fixity in a particular form of behavior. The Christian form of this is the liberty of those who are detached from worldly things, and the vice is attachment to material things, to all sorts of things.

The mode of responsibility which is faithfulness has as its natural virtue perseverance or stick-to-it-iveness of a good sort; the vice is being a quitter. The Christian virtue is faithfulness and the specific defect is to merely hang on, in a shaky sort of way--to hang in merely by the skin of one's teeth.

The mode which used to be the eighth has natural piety as its virtue; the opposite is inhumanity, lack of respect for the dignity of persons. The Christian virtue is self-oblation, self-sacrifice, and the defect which is opposed is minimalism.

The mode which has to do with not acting destructively against goods has as its natural virtue self-restraint or calmness in the face of provocation, by which one puts up with or tolerates evil. The opposing vice is vindictiveness or malicious destructiveness. The Christian virtue is meekness, and the opposite defect is self-defensiveness, or resistance to any incursion upon one's turf.

The mode which is universalizability has as its natural virtue fairness; the opposite obviously is unfairness. The Christian virtue is mercy and the defect is to always insist upon one's exact rights, not to be willing to settle for less than one's precise rights.

We must look in Scripture for appropriate names for the capital sins and the special defects of Christian life.

When we come to talk about venial sin, it is necessary to be clear that this is a very mixed bag. Actually, venial sin includes everything about the

existential aspect of Christian life which is other than it should be--other than original and mortal sin. This means that venial sin is going to embrace not only the materially light things; any such matter could in principle come to be seen as incompatible with one's basic commitment, and if it were chosen anyway, then the sin could be mortal. But venial sin also embraces cases in which the act is indeliberate, when one is doing something which is chosen but not realized to be bad, also cases in which the act is unfree, but one should not be doing it, cases in which one is omitting through a kind of voluntariness which follows from previous, sinful conditions, but with no new sin, and so on. Also, we can look at all of the acts, even ones morally good, which are not integrated with one's basic commitment as being defective or imperfect. Older scholastic writers perhaps considered these venial sins, although many more modern writers object strenuously to this. Really, it is a terminological point, for there are important differences in the subject matter, and whether we call it all "venial sin" or not is not itself important.

There also is the category of actions which are done by natural disposition, which do not involve any deliberation or choice. Prior to their being integrated, these may be things which would be wrong if they were freely chosen. At least the principles of such actions can occur; these were classically called the "first movements" of sin, when they were the beginnings of acts which would be wrong if they were freely chosen.

We also have the inadequacies of Christians who fail to fulfill the specifically Christian modes of responsibility. These inadequacies, insofar as they can be present without any mortal sin, will be venial sins too.

We also have certain things which are prescribed by certain precepts of the Church. One might fall short in some of these in a very minor or insignificant way, or a precept might prescribe something without making it a matter of grave sin. In a case of this sort there also will be a possibility of venial sin.

So in many ways there are possibilities of venial sin. And "venial sin" is not one something, but a very mixed bag.

If one takes into account the variety of modalities of existential response to the complexity of the modes of responsibility, it becomes clear that the range of possible places where venial sin can lurk in one's life while one is still basically a Christian is multifarious. In this sense the simultaneity of being a sinner and redeemed, and the divided heart as a reality of Christian life is very clear.

Further notes on how a person is diversely disposed toward goods considering different violations of different modes of responsibility. These

are diverse modes of response considered negatively. In each case, a mode of response indicates a more or less inadequate or wrong relationship of oneself to the good which one is choosing not to existentially identify with as one morally ought to do. So what we are looking at is choices in which one does what is wrong, and we are looking at that good toward which we should be operating, the good which is inherent in the alternative not chosen when the wrongful choice is made. This good not chosen is determined with respect to us exclusivistically in different ways according to the difference of the modes of responsibility and response.

In the first place, in the mode which has to do with faithfulness or perseverance, we are identified with the good, in fact, but not sufficiently identified with it to overcome burdens and so on; the identification is weak to the extent that we do not keep going when things get tough. In the second place, where the mode has to do with creativity and detachment is violated, we are identified with the good, but not enough to give up fixations, to let go of things which interfere with our fulfillment of the requirement of identification. These first two modes of responsibility demand of us morally at least that we continue to carry on a struggle to satisfy the demand of the good with which we are identified. In the third place, the mode of responsibility which has to do with laziness, the get-moving mode, is a case in which just as such we are simply not identified with the good; what is demanded morally is that we make some commitment to it; the situation here is a purely negative one.

In the fourth place, the mode of responsibility which has to do with getting oneself together is a case where one is identified with a good, but only as to certain aspects of it, namely, only as to its actualizations and its immediacy, and not as to its ideality or open-endedness of the good to go on and on. In the fifth place, the universalizability mode of responsibility, we are identified with the good, but only insofar as it is realized in me and mine. In the sixth case, the apparent goods mode, we are identified with the good, but only insofar as it is my experience of it. The fourth, fifth, and sixth require of us that we purify or rectify a commitment to the good which is present but perverse.

In the seventh place, we have the old eighth mode; one is not just perversely identified with the good here, but actually set against it, in a contrary relationship; one is set against it within the bounds of some rational principle; so that if one kills burdensome relatives, one sets oneself against life to the extent that it is burdensome, but still in this frame of mind one can rationally love life when it is not burdensome. In the eighth mode of

responsibility, which excludes sheer destruction of goods out of vindictiveness, one who violates it sets himself against the good in a contradictory relationship--that is, opposes the entire intelligibility of the good as such; one who takes this attitude has no reason not to kill anyone at all, to destroy life utterly, except sheer arbitrary reasons. These last two, numbers seven and eight in this list, demand that one turn oneself around insofar as one's commitment is negative. The second last leaves some sort of foothold in one's partial respect for the good, to turn around the remainder of one's concern.

In the order in which we have given these, we have the list set up so that the first case is the least bad response and the last is the worst. As said above, there is an inverse order when the demand is fulfilled, that is, other things being equal, to lay down one's life in overcoming burdens in pursuit of a good would involve a greater love of the good than if one merely avoided destruction of the good through hatred, and would rather accept death than do this. This gives a clearer view of the point discussed earlier--that diverse modes of responsibility generate diverse depths of existential response. So we have sixteen here when we consider the responses which involve choices themselves and we have some other cases where something is <u>praeter intentionem.</u>

Next we can talk about double effect and cooperation. The way to get into this area is by pointing out that we have lumped all the sin in Christian life which is not mortal sin in the big grab-bag of venial sin. The question would be: Does this include also the evil we inevitably bring about in our acts considering that we are living in a world which, while redeemed, also is still fallen? If you do intend to leave this in the grab-bag of venial sins, then you are saying that Jesus also committed venial sin, since he knows that he causes certain bad consequences by his acts, by his divisiveness and so on. Yet he seems to be willing to do this. Of course, it is unacceptable to suggest that Jesus does any sort of sin at all, since as a divine person he cannot do anything which is any way alien to divine love or unintegrated with it. So we must try to make sense of acts of Jesus in which he consciously and willingly accepts evil, as when he accepts his own death. This kind of bringing about of evil, willingly, is not going to be any sort of sin at all. The same will hold true, since our life must be modeled on his, of our Christian lives.

This brings us to the explanation of double effect, although "double effect" will not appear in the large type part of the text.

The first point will be to recall the idea of deliberation and choice as considering and adopting proposals, and of outward actions as executions of proposals. Once this is out, the second point is that when we make a choice which is wrong, the wrongness involves us in a wrong or inadequate response to

the good which is the content of the alternative--the one we are not properly choosing. The third point is that what is praeter intentionem when we make a choice is not something we are involved with except to the extent that some mode of responsibility bears on it, and our choice is a failure to fulfill that mode of responsibility. Thus a choice can involve a wrong existential response to what is praeter intentionem, but only if a mode of responsibility is violated. Finally, if there is no mode of responsibility bearing upon what is praeter intentionem, then there is no self-determination in respect to the good which is involved in that. Using this, we can explain how it is possible for Jesus to lay down his life without determining himself in any way inadequately or wrongly with respect to the good of human life.

Having done this, the next point will be to look at human acts as they are usually classified in species, and to formulate the more traditional principle of double effect in terms of conditions which it requires. It is possible for the same act to have two aspects, and in case it is permissible to do it under one aspect and the other is not a means to an end, and there is not some reason why we should not accept what comes about under that other aspect, then we may do the act even though in that other aspect we know it is destructive or damaging of some human good. This then will be identified as the principle of double effect and also the point will be made that some Protestant situation-ethics people have rejected this principle, and introduced instead a notion of compromise, or dealing with borderline cases, or something of this sort. Their treatments are intended to try to take care of certain difficult problems here, and they need to be understood sympathetically, but at the same time it must be recognized that on their account one would hold Jesus to be a sinner and this is unacceptable for Christians.

Once this is out, we can go on to talk about helping. The treatment of helping is already in the euthanasia manuscript.

After this, the next case is where it seems as if the other's will is incompatible with the redemptive act. This presents us with two problems. First, it sets up pressure against our own commitments, to the extent that we must deal with such people; second, it sets up a resistance to handing on the redemption to them.

So far as the pressure against our own commitment is concerned, it simply needs to be pointed out that what we experience as incompatible commitments is simply the force of evil in one form or another. It is either that they are really incompatible or they seem to be and there is something wrong causing this seeming. Against this it is our business as Christians to struggle. The temptation to give in because there is its own punishment in being a Christian

is a temptation which as such is not to be surrendered to, for to give in to it is to surrender the whole of the Christian life.

So far as handing on the redemption is concerned, it is important to remember that the existential status of others is not really visible to us. Their actions can be adequately understood and interpreted on some level as immoral without us being in a position ultimately to judge them. We see now why this can be so, when we consider the possibility of considerable discrepancy between the immorality of a certain action and the ultimate commitment, which, nevertheless, stands. We also must recognize that some individuals, either in different cultures or with different forms of belief in our own culture may have a basic fundamental commitment which amounts to partaking in the redemptive work of Christ, because they sufficiently understand the idea of seeking God and regarding him as a rewarder of those who do seek him, and they are committed to God as they understand him. In this sense, they have what is essential to be Christians, but they may very badly understand what is involved in the redemptive work and what is required in this basic commitment. If the commitment is specifically distorted, but not through their own fault, then it may not by any means enable them to see things to be wrong which Christians very well know to be wrong. On the other hand, it may even require them to do things which from a Christian point of view are quite inappropriate--for example, eating their enemies. Furthermore, it may serve as an effective shelter or shield to much of their wrongdoing, in ways that a better understood Christian commitment would not. Thus we do not ultimately know that someone is opposed to the redemption and will not accept it.

We can only assume that this is <u>not</u> the case. The pessimistic assumption would lead to a failure to make the attempt to communicate. Since the attempt is required--the Gospel must be preached and Christian life shared--the attempt at cooperation must be made. So we must be ready and willing to pass on the Gospel and Christian life on the assumption that no one who seems to be opposed to it really is deep down in their hearts--that is, in their fundamental commitments--or, that even if they are, this opposition is not so radical and total, since there is no such thing as total corruption, that it would not be possible that hearing the Gospel and experiencing its lived reality in Christians could not bring around the other party. On this basis, the difficulty is a challenge for the effective communication of Christian life, which we'll consider in part six. Also, it will ultimately be an opportunity to undergo the evil which one must undergo at the hands of resisters in order to transform it ultimately into the stuff of redemption.

This completes our discussion of the first section of the treatment of obstacles--that is, the treatment of existential ones, considered just in themselves. We are now ready to go on to the treatment of the ones which fall into the intentional order, cognitive obstacles to the spreading out of the redemption in our lives.

Looking at these obstacles also will help us to understand how it is possible that we have as much nonintegrity, how we manage to keep things apart as effectively as we do in the existential domain, which we have just been looking at, since that nonintegrity is rather startling.

The situation first of all is that if we were completely integrated, our thinking and our acting would have no gaps between them. As a matter of fact this is not so, even without considering sin, because our thinking and acting develop, and our thoughts guide our action, and so there has to be a commitment following understanding. We first think of what we ought to do and then we choose to do it. This happens even in the case of Jesus, who has to see what to do, and then bring himself to do it by making a choice. But in our case there is an additional factor, since our existential self is not integrated, is in some ways at odds with itself, our thinking if it is consistent cannot possibly be altogether consistent with our existential self. Thus our thinking as to what is to be done, we experience as a kind of demand, which seems to us to be external to ourselves. This demand to do this or that, is what is ordinarily called "conscience." And the demand, when it is made in advance, we talk about conscience telling us or warning us; when afterwards, our conscience condemns us or approves.

These ways of talking sound as though conscience were an extrinsic principle over against us. This arises especially from the otherness which we have just mentioned. In cases in which conscience, thus experienced, is telling us what we ought to do, the requirement seems to make the self to whom it is presented be the other self, who is reluctant to fulfill the demand. We tend to identify the reluctant self as the real self. This is why one must be careful in talking about conscience. The real self, if the conscience is correct, should be identified with the conscience, not with the reluctance to fulfill it.

It also is the case that since conscience is experienced in this way, believers who tend to think of moral demands as coming from God, quite naturally and rightly, will then if they think they are faced with a real demand, think of conscience as being the voice of God within the heart, and will talk about the voice of God in the most intimate recesses of the soul, and so on, as Vatican II does. This view may be all right if one's thought as to what is to be done is

correct and in line with divine truth. But if it happens not to be this way of looking at things can be very dangerous and misleading, as we shall see.

When it comes to judging what is to be done, it is possible for people to operate in a number of ways which are bad. One thing they can do is to consult their moral feelings--to ask what is respectable, what shameful, what makes them feel guilty, and so on. And they can determine by feelings. A second way is to ask oneself: How does it seem to me? And try to see what is right and wrong. And people are convinced that they can just see that something is right and something else wrong. A third approach is to take things where people are simply convinced, it is absolutely clear to them that this is the voice of God, and then they insist that any questioning of this is an attack upon the Holy Spirit. Another way is to say that one must be true to oneself, one must be consistent no matter what, and the demand for consistency can be followed out simply by being logical and starting from the way one already is to figure out what is to be done. Other people, fifthly, take an approach which is more open to argument, which leaves room for thinking things out. They say that in order to determine what is to be done, one has to start from some basic view of things and then proceed to figure out what that requires, in a particular case.

There are several different ways of doing this. One way is to start from a conception of what the good and happy life would be like and to try to figure out what in this case one must do if one wishes to be happy. A second way is to begin from a clear understanding of what one wants; get clear in your mind what you want in life, and then think your way back to what has to be done in order to get what you want. A third way is to begin from a consideration of what is required to carry out the project you have, and this project is simply something you have chosen, and then whatever is required to carry out this project is what is to be done here and now. All of these three ways and the other prior ones are subject to a single criticism.

All of them are quite capable of being expressions of one's sinful self as well as being an expression of one's redeemed self. Since the problem we have as to what is to be done only arises because of this nonintegration or ambivalence, between our redeemed and our unredeemed selves, these approaches are all good ways of seeming to have an answer while managing to avoid finding any answer. So none of these will do.

One's moral feelings may be partly a result of sin. One's supposed insights express the way one is--partly sinful. What one thinks of as the voice of God speaking in one's heart can just as well be some other spirit. What one has to do to be sincere and authentic can be what is needed to be authentically bad. And the principles from which one will reason also are

suspect. What seems to be the good and happy life will look different to someone to the extent they are not a good Christian than to someone who really is a Christian. What one wants varies tremendously depending upon how holy or sinful a person one is. Finally the project which one chooses for oneself is similarly conditioned. It is only if it is the case that the good and happy life is Christian life, what one wants in the kingdom of God and his justice, and one's only project is one's vocation, and one is totally integrated with these principles that they would work. Otherwise, reasoning from anything short of this is a sure way to make what one is as partly-sinful and partly-redeemed a principle of continuing to be just that way. That is not progress at all.

Oftentimes conscience is commended as a principle of morality and said to be ultimate. In a certain way this is so. But we must recognize that commendations of conscience, demands for freedom of conscience, the suggestion that one's conscience is one's only sure guide, and so on, are themselves ambiguous inasmuch as they can refer to any of the sources of conscience we have talked about up to now, or they can also refer to the genuine, true Christian conscience which is the conformity of one's mind to the mind of Christ.

Despite the perils, conscience in fact is an inevitable and essential condition of moral life for human beings, and therefore for Christians. To live the truth, one must be identified with it. To be identified with the truth, the truth has to be got down to here and now, and to my doing in this particular situation. Moreover, it must be my truth which I am identified with, and so we need a determination of the truth down to myself and to my condition, my particular situation. To get this determination one has to go through a process of application, a process of bringing the truth to bear upon oneself and one's life. The starting point of the process for Christians who are going to have a truly formed Christian conscience is the faith which one has in God revealing.

The starting point of the reasoning, then, which goes on in conscience, will be the things which God has revealed, the truths God has revealed. These one knows by reflection upon what the Church teaches. And so the Catholic forms his conscience starting from what the Church teaches and from everything else he knows considered in the light of faith--that is, from facts, and from science, and from anything else, considered just to the extent that it somehow fits in with what faith teaches and is somehow useful, but only insofar as it agrees with faith, because divine truth is the standard by which all other judgment is going to be judged by a person who truly believes.

It might be objected that this approach is one which alienates the individual's conscience and makes him a slave to the teaching of the Church. But this would be an error--to claim freedom of conscience as if one could in

some way have a conscience which derived from nothing and nowhere, would be to claim that the human person in thinking about life and in acting is an entity which creates itself from absolutely nothing. This is clearly impossible. We are in fact creatures and we are redeemed, and our own identity and reality is in our creaturehood and in our position within the redemptive community. Therefore, it is in no way an alienation of oneself, a loss of one's soul, to be saved. The situation of proceeding in the formation of one's Christian conscience as described is simply one aspect of the fact that one is redeemed.

The working of the Christian conscience, because the principles are themselves part of the content of faith, involves proceeding from an understanding of basic human goods and from modes of responsibility, both those which are naturally known and those which are grasped only in the light of faith. So the Christian conscience operates from these principles in its reasoning. And it carries out its thinking under the overarching principle of love of God and neighbor, which we have discussed in part four.

A person who is trying to form his conscience in the way that we have said it should be formed runs into an obstacle, for conscience is often doubtful. One does not know precisely what one ought to do. In some ways, from the point of view of the individual themselves, there are fairly simple procedures for overcoming doubt. We can talk about them right here.

First, if one is doubtful what one ought to do, and if one has no time to try to investigate matters to resolve the doubt, then one can always pray quickly and simply try to judge as best one can what Jesus would want, and then do this with confidence that one is doing the best one can and nothing more is ever demanded by God. If there is time to inquire, then the believer who is doubtful will try to look at his question in order to see whether he is doubtful whether something is the case or not, or whether he is doubtful about a standard as to what should be done. If he is doubtful as to what is the case, a matter of fact, then this is to be investigated, first of all within the teaching of the Church, if there is any answer there, then in anything outside the Church's teaching where one might expect to find truth, that is, to find beliefs which are in harmony with the Church's teaching. If one cannot get results that way with regard to factual questions, one must make the best guess one can. With regard to normative questions, the same procedure is to be followed. The believer should try to see what the Church's teaching is and then if that is something definite, the believer will simply follow it with confidence. But if it appears that the Church is not teaching anything consistent, but is either saying different and apparently inconsistent things or not saying anything at

all, the believer having done his best is simply left with the necessity of simply judging as best he can for himself.

The question of the resolution of difficulties, so far as the teaching of the Church itself is concerned, does not really pertain to the problem of the believer as such. These questions will be considered much later on in this work, in volume four, but as a practical matter, one can say at once that there is a body of solid teaching which bishops ought to propose clearly and unambiguously. They should not permit anyone to appear to be teaching with their authority in conflict with it. And priests who wish to know what ought to be taught are always able to go back and look at manuals which were published before 1963 and getting the answers to many questions, although not to all.

An instance of the doubtful conscience is the so-called perplexed conscience. This is a situation in which it seems to an individual that of the various alternatives open to them, no matter which they choose they will be doing something wrong. In a case like this the individual who wishes to do what is right is obviously in doubt. The procedures for resolution are no different from that we have already talked about in connection with a doubtful conscience. But it is important to recognize that in most cases, a person who thinks that their conscience is perplexed is actually in a situation such that on the one hand they have the requirement of faith, which they know it would be wrong to violate, and on the other hand they have a consideration of other factors which are very dear which it seems somehow wrong to violate. The resolution which is required by faith is to act in accord with faith and to give up whatever else is dear to oneself, even if that is one’s life. So wherever there is no opposition between apparent demands of faith with demands of faith themselves, there is no true perplexity for the Christian. If there were a case in which this appeared to be the situation, then one would go about resolving it just as we have talked about resolving doubts in general. It is obvious that if there is perplexity of the sort described, there is an error somewhere, perhaps through one's own fault, and this is obvious because the demands of faith arise from divine truth which is single and cannot ultimately make any incompatible demand upon us.

It also is important to note that in many cases in which there seems to be a doubtful conscience other than the apparently perplexed one are not really different in kind from what we have said about the perplexed one. Doubt can arise simply because one is not sure whether to follow the requirements of one's Christian faith and to live it out, or to follow some other requirements which are incompatible with one's faith. In other words, one is being tempted, and the temptation is thought of as if it were a perplexed or doubtful conscience.

The various situations which are called conflicts of duties come in at this point. Generally speaking, a conflict of duties is a conflict between a genuine moral requirement and something which is not really a moral requirement at all. But only an expression of what one wants. To the extent that there are conflicts of duties which one cannot resolve by coming to see that the conflict is between one's Christian duties and something else--to the extent that it seems after truly sincere reflection that one is required to do two different things or to have two incompatible alternatives and only two, and both seem still to be requirements of Christian life and demands of faith, the individual has the same kind of problem that a genuinely doubtful conscience always presents.

In addition to perplexed and doubtful consciences, we have two other kinds. One is a conscience which is troubled, although not doubtful, and the other is a conscience which is confident. We take confident consciences first.

Confident consciences can be correct, in which case there is no obstacle in them to the redemptive life, or they can be mistaken. A mistaken conscience which is confident does present an obstacle, for it leads one to constitute oneself existentially, if one follows it, in ways which are at odds with real truth. But if one's conscience is confident, then since that it is one's best judgment as to what one ought to do, in following Christ, one would have to follow it. So there is an obligation to follow an untroubled and confident conscience which in fact happens to be mistaken, because one cannot tell whether it is mistaken or not if it is this confident.

Of confident consciences which are mistaken there are four types.

The first is one which is confident, mistaken, not guilty for the mistake --it is not one's own fault--and one can correct the mistake. An example of this would be an instance in which a person thinks he has a certain duty but in fact has not; a child might think he has a duty to do everything the teacher says no matter how unreasonable. In fact the child has no such duty. And it is not the child's fault that he has this impression. And the child can in fact correct the misimpression. How? If the child thinks along these lines: This is what I ought to do, but habitually asks: Is there something which would be more pleasing to Jesus than just what I ought to do? And when asking this question begins to reflect upon the demands which are made, the child may come to see that although he has been confident that this is the right thing to do, he may see there is more to the situation and realize that the demand is not after all fair.

A second possibility is that the individual is confident, mistaken, and able to correct the mistake by themselves, but it is their own fault. This

would be the case in someone who has got a mistaken impression due to a prior sin of their own, perhaps a sin of omitting to study something which they ought to have studied; at the time they omitted to study it they knew they should, and chose not to do it for some reason; such an individual can correct his own mistake if they examine their conscience regularly and thinking back over what they have not done which they should have done come to the juncture where they remember they were supposed to study something, and recognizing the failure go back and look at it, and in doing so discover the corrective of the error in which they are.

A third kind of mistaken conscience is one in which the error is such that one cannot overcome it oneself, and it is not one's fault. An example of this is the conscience of the sincere crusader who thinks it is God's will to kill the Turk. He sets out to do it with a good heart, and there is no way he can discover this to be wrong. This kind of erroneous conscience, although in error by that individual and in the particular case, could be corrected by someone else, for example, by the development of moral thought, or in the case of many individuals, where the error is about something the Church already knows, by adequate instruction, by better catechesis.

Fourthly, we come to a particularly unpleasant case, that in which the conscience is invincibly erroneous and culpably so. This is a case in which someone has committed sin which has brought him to the point where he is confident that something is right, as a matter of fact it is the wrong thing to do, and the confidence and the mistake are somehow tied up with the prior sin, and there is no way for him to correct it because there has been a process by which he has become unable to recognize the prior sin which led to the situation. It was a process of darkening of the mind, as we used to say, so that he is no longer able to see the source as being something questionable, or that has to be repented.

Now we must go back and talk about troubled consciences. A troubled conscience here is one which is not doubtful. Inherently, as to the judgment involved, there is no cognitive ground, there is no reason, to think that the judgment is false. There is a judgment which seems right and no amount of looking at it will show it to be wrong. Yet the individual is still somehow bothered; there seems to be something over against the judgment, and this troubles him.

A troubled conscience could be correct. Then the question is: Why is it troubled? This can be for various reasons. One is that the individual still has moral feelings which are at odds with the right conscience. He has done what he should do, is confident that the judgment is right, but still feels

guilty. This is the case with a scrupulous person. Another case is one in which one is confident that the judgment is right, but just cannot see it to be so, and the lack of insight bothers them. This would be the case with someone who accepts a moral teaching of the Church and yet is perplexed by bad arguments offered for it, which make it hard to see that the moral teaching is correct. Another case is one in which an individual is confident in the truth of the judgment, and can think the thing through, but someone else tells them something different, and they feel this is bothersome and not simply to be ignored, especially if those challenging the judgment become numerous. Another kind of case is one in which an individual is confident in a judgment, yet has a ground for thinking something else as well; there are conflicts and the problem is how to be consistent. Then we have cases in which individuals can be troubled by inability to ground their confident conscience--for example, they are aware of the direct teaching of the Church but find it impossible to ground this in the sources of faith. So we have all these different sorts of correct but still troubled consciences; the troubles can be obstacles, but as long as the correct conscience is followed, and the individual tries to clear up the trouble, the inquiry is likely to be fruitful in leading to better self-understanding and a better integrated grasp upon and living of the Christian life.

The other kind of troubled conscience has a less optimistic prognosis. It is one which is false. The errors can arise from all of the sources we have talked about. The erroneous, troubled conscience will eventually be one where the individual has done something wrong and then has begun to line up feelings and supposed insights and everything else with what he has done wrong. Here we have self-deception and a process of rationalization going on. To the extent that the individual develops this rationalization process there is a kind of consistency achieved. It is never absolutely perfect, and as long as the conscience is troubled, it is easy enough for individuals who make it a practice not to leave the troubled conscience lie but to try to figure out what is going on and to try to get help to resolve it, to begin to uncover the rationalization process, to get to the bottom of things, and to undo the sin, which is the real obstacle. It is important to recognize that this process of rationalization will involve bringing into play one's moral feelings, experience, and so on, so that the troubled conscience in a process of rationalization more and more tends to be identified by the individual with the elements of the pattern of rationalization--that is, "My conscience tells me such and such is all right," meaning that I feel it is o.k. now, or perhaps that this is in line with my project (a project no longer in line with one's vocation), or this is what I

want or this is what I think is going to make me happy (when what I want or my conception of happiness is no longer in conformity with Christ).

In addition to cases in which the conscience stays troubled, we can imagine a process of rationalization going on to the point where an individual is no longer troubled. This brings us back to the conscience which is erroneous and culpable and unable to straighten itself out. This is essentially the end of the line for the erroneous and troubled conscience, at least as far as the particular kind of act is concerned. One has reached a point where it is not troubled; it is confident that this right, and it is wrong, and it is the end of a process of rationalization which has succeeded. Here an individual both is obliged to do what conscience directs and yet because of the sinfulness with which the confidence has been achieved is carrying on a sinful life, in the very following of conscience. It would seem outrageous that this should be the case and it is outrageous, and the only way it comes about is through one's own sin.

Moreover, this process is not going to come to this end within the Church unless there is fault on the part of others. On the one hand, members of the Church, especially priests and bishops, ought to be constantly helping others. We ought to help one another bear our burdens, and thus fulfill the law of Christ. Thus we will make sure that everything is done to keep one another troubled. One way of bearing others' burdens is by correcting, reminding, and so on with the result that it will be impossible in the Church to be confident, wrong, and untroubled. If we keep correcting each other, this helps, but if we begin to get shy about doing this sort of thing and are afraid to interfere in each other's business, then it is partly the fault of those who did not keep troubling the individual, as well as his own sin, which brings him to this pass. Therefore, there is a kind of common guilt, a failing of the Church to work as it should, a failure to bear one another's burdens.

The worst case, however, is the one in which the individual who has ended in this position has been helped there by others, has actually had the conspiratorial assistance of others to bring him to this position. This can happen in various ways. One way that it can happen is that someone is trying to help others to have a peaceful conscience, to get rid of their trouble for them, and in order to do it confirms the troubled individual in a false judgment, for example, by telling him that he need not follow what previously has been taught, on matters of contraception and other things, for instance. One helping in this way can get sinners to the point where they are no longer troubled, and yet this confirmation is putting the individual into a box. What was intended to be helpful has ended in a situation in which the individual is hopelessly locked into his position. It is important to recognize that being locked into this

position does not eliminate the fact that the act is a continuing expression of the sin which began the process, a sin not yet repented. And so getting locked into the position does not now make one be in good faith in a true sense.

This point is extremely important. Even if an individual has been sinning by violating a falsely restrictive conscience, when what he has been doing could be approved were his conscience correct, the rectification of the error does not eliminate the sinfulness of the prior violations. This individual should not be assured that what he was doing was all right, but should be assured that if he does this in the future, his judgment about it should be different than what it has been in the past.

It also is important to realize that the rationalization process, short of its limit, leaves individuals both troubled and yet so inclined to be confident that it is very difficult for them to explore their own trouble and to get it cleared up. This makes clear how urgent it is to avoid giving people false doctrine as a method of trying to make them have good consciences.

A further point is that it is important in Christian life not only that people not be formally guilty of mortal sin, but also that the person does what is materially right. There are several reasons for this. First, the building up of the pleroma in fact is an important business. The goods which are actually present in our acts--not merely that our will is not a bad will--are important. Secondly, engaging in many kinds of sinful acts has many bad effects on the living of the Christian life and on other things. For example, engaging in sexual sins tends to make people think of their bodies as objects, which leads to dualism, which leads to a tension between the spiritual and the material, which leads to materialism or to a kind of gnosticism. If it is resolved on the side of the material, then the spiritual just begins to seem unreal and if in gnosticism, then faith becomes unacceptable, for it is not in line with what I understand and believe. So, there is an inherent dynamics in the commission of sexual sin which goes on whether one is formally guilty of the sin or not.

Another point about this sort of bad conscience is that it can be sealed off more or less totally. Some of the more awful situations would be ones in which brain-washing which is not so much a matter of torture or drugs but of convincing a person that they should get into line with their own guilt, after instigating the guilt, is carried out. Another kind of case which is very serious and important is classic, Freudian psychoanalysis, where a person is morally guilty and feels themselves so, rightly, but is gradually convinced with a deep, practical concrete conviction that they cannot be guilty because they are not free. The argument that one is not free is the repeated exposure of

mechanisms of the subconscious. When the individual finally reaches this practical conviction of unfreedom, they are healed by a curing insight; they get themselves together and no longer have guilt feelings. But they are now locked into a conviction of no moral responsibility, and they act accordingly. And so they act quite selfishly, doing what they must in their own interests, to the extent they see what they want and what is good for them, but they no longer feel any moral responsibility at all. This is the proper product of classic, Freudian psychoanalysis.

Considering what we have seen about the possibilities of erroneous and troubled consciences, it is clear how questionable and dangerous is the idea that if one simply follows one's conscience, one is in the clear. It also is clear how dangerous is the idea that one's conscience is the voice of God, if this is not qualified. The Christian conscience is the voice of God, but only because it has been formed in accordance with revealed truth.

To sum up. We have four kinds of consciences: perplexed, doubtful--either sincerely so or guiltily so--troubled consciences and confident consciences. These again divide according to whether we are dealing with a conscience which is true or one that is in error, and if it is in error whether this is through one's own fault or not.

Another way, besides conscience, in which there are obstacles created for the redemptive work in the intentional order, is that there are all sorts of elements which belong to the wisdom of the age--ideology which is other than faith, together with what is or pretends to be science, together with common sense. All of these are more or less mixed with false opinions, or opinions contrary to faith. And all of this flows into our initial practical thinking, determining the very possibilities which we consider in deliberation. So the Christian not only has difficulty in knowing what ought to be done but even has difficulty in thinking Christianly what might be done or could be done--since this to a great extent is shaped and predetermined by these understandings, which constantly get mixed in with faith in shaping possibilities.

Besides the actual obstacles in the intentional order, to the living of the Christian life, there also are potential obstacles wherever there is ignorance or error at any stage or in any level with respect to any subject matter.

This is so because the unfolding of the faith, both by reflection and by prayer, and the sacraments, and the unfolding of Christian activity, extends further and further and encompasses more and more of things. Thus to an increasing extent, things which earlier seemed simply irrelevant become pulled into relevance. For this reason, even someone who is trying to straighten out

some esoteric area like Egyptology or nuclear physics is working away at removing things which are obstacles to the spread of the redemption. If they are not obviously so now, they will be. From this point of view, the pursuit of truth by Christian scholars is not only a matter of contributing that truth to the pleroma as a human good, but also of working out sanctification, of overcoming the error which is an obstacle to the spread of faith and Christian life as such. Therefore, it is more directly redemptive than one might think.

It is worth noticing that Aquinas has a question, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 73, art. 5, on the distinction between carnal and spiritual sins. This distinction corresponds to our distinction between the different modes of responsiveness which arise from the diverse modes of responsibility. The carnal sins are the ones which are lower on our scale and the spiritual sins are the ones which are further up. Vindictiveness is the worst, and that would be for Aquinas a more spiritual sin. This set of distinctions is important because it shows in the tradition a recognition of diverse modes of responsiveness. The sins against temperance and fortitude are actually low on the scale, as to their degree of seriousness.

The five basic types of mortal sin which we distinguished earlier involve a dialectic. We begin with disobedience, whether by a child or by someone older, We move from this to being unwilling to keep up the good fight, from this to being willing to do things which are seriously destructive as a means to an end, from this to being willing to put up with a whole situation in which there is despair, and from this to the extirpation of faith. There is a dialectic here, and on this basis it should be clear that one already has gone some way when one moves into the later stages of this dialectic. The danger of complete loss of faith only arises at the end of the line.

Vatican I's point that a person once a Catholic does not lose faith without sin is covered by what we have said.

Much of the foul up in the intentional order as to the content--that is, dealing with the false beliefs, the sophistic arguments, and so on--is a result of sin. These things come about because rationality norms which could and should be followed are not followed. This leads to all the foul up. The situation in which one jumps to conclusions and so on--this itself is an aspect of sin. The consequences of this in terms of error, oversimplification, and so on, are all parts of it too.

We begin next to look at obstacles to redemption in the natural world, in man's sentient nature and in the rest of the natural world. The primary effect of sin in the natural world is that it brings about human death. According to the tradition, and it seems to be a matter of faith, had Adam not sinned he

would not have died, and men generally would have been born immortal. This does not mean that they would have been born in heaven. It means that they would have been created in a condition in which being in friendship with God, they would have been destined to live for a certain time on earth, and then would have been confirmed in justice and glorified, and so would not have been able to sin any more.

The supposition, then, is not that death was unnatural, but rather that humans, created in grace, were simply prevented from dying. We can give a reason for thinking this to have been fitting. First of all, the point of having intelligent creatures other than angels was that materiality gives a spreadoutness, which leaves room for the distinction between actuality and potentiality, which does not exist in the same way in the case of angels, and so leaves the possibility of individuals being constituted and yet not completely realized--the possibility we have been talking about. This opens up the possibility of people helping to complete the work of creation, of themselves and of their own world. Angels cannot do this. The activity of man, then, is useful because it communicates an aspect of divine goodness which otherwise would be lacking in creation.

However, materiality also brings with it the dispersability of matter, which implies that a material creature is necessarily destroyable to the extent that it is dispersable. The gift of immortality would have been a kind of locking together of the human organism such that it could not die, could not be destroyed. Perhaps what might have happened is that when someone would by accident or by other conditions be about to die, they would then be transported. In any case, we can suppose this initial condition. It will be very hard to believe in the immortality of the resurrected body if we do not find it possible to believe in the immortality for which humanity prior to original sin was destined.

In this initial condition, there would not have been the fear or the basic anxiety about death which we have, since we can die. Lacking this, there would be a different attitude toward pain. We would have natural sensibility and would be able to observe different conditions as more or less appropriate. Pain is a perception of the extremeness of some condition vis-a-vis one's organism. But pain is not only a matter of sensation; it also has added to it a fundamental anxiety which runs through human emotion. At least this element of pain would not be present if we were not anxious about death.

With this element of pain absent, our irascible appetite would be very different from what it now is. We would not have the situation of being faced with sensible evils, which we do, and so we would not have the hatred, anger,

and so on, which we do experience. At least, these would not be anything like the way they now are. Given that we did not have this sort of irascibility, our basic desires, our concupiscible appetite, would be different from what it now is too. The reason is that as this latter appetite works, it involves a tendency to what is proportionate to the organism and to our sense functions. This tendency to what is proportionate would not create problems in itself, even though it is determinate. But when we add to this a mixture of pain and anxiety, then we get a bias toward those things which are pleasant as such. Thus the shifting of a bias from what is proportionate to us to what is less painful, and so what is more pleasant as such, what makes us less anxious and so on, this shifting means that we get trained and predisposed--even through our genes, since the natural selection of the human race is different than it would have been, and favors the offspring of these parents who are more nervous about death--to be inclined toward what is pleasant as such. To some extent this is a bias toward what is not very proportionate to the organism. We have desires which even at the sentient level tend to do us in. This situation would not exist in us except on account of sin.

Given this situation, our choices are always--if they are reasonable and maintain openness to intelligible goods--going to have to oppose a kind of perverse bias at the level of sense appetite. Thus the choice to be moral is always a choice to pay a price in frustration or in unsatisfied desire or in accepting a more frightening situation, or something of the kind. This would not need to be the case if moral choices were not choices to be good against a corrupted set of emotions. The distortion at the emotional level also has further consequences.

At the level of experience, we now perceive the world not in terms of the way in which objects really are in proportion to us, but as they are in proportion to our perverse desires and so on. Everything is seen through the screen of anxiety about dying. The world of experience, then, is not the same world it would have been. The categories are lined up somewhat differently, and objects will not be perceived with the same degrees of importance they would have if we did not have this anxiety and bias toward pleasure. Given the anxiety and the bias toward pleasure, we simply do not see things as they really are, but we see them in an abnormal emotional state, even when we are in a normal emotional state. This situation makes it impossible for us to begin even from a sound, common sense world. The world in relation to a really sound common sense would be very different from our world.

So we have as a result a darkening of the intellect. The scientific understanding of things as they are in themselves becomes more of an up-hill

fight than it would need to be, for the bias of common sense has to be got through, even before we can begin to get objects categorized according to their own internal relationships. Otherwise, being a thing in the world, knowing things in relation to ourselves would be knowing one aspect of their reality in themselves, and we could start from this to discover other aspects of their reality, without having all the problems we do have in trying to pierce through common sense to obtain scientific objectivity. An analogous account, of course, can be given of the grasp upon practical principles.

In this story, it is interesting to consider a couple of implications about dying. We now have an account in which one only puts death into the world and everything else follows automatically; the other consequences of original sin which are classically described do not need to be thought of as a set of arbitrary impositions or punishments, but are just the results of giving up the condition which made man immortal. So in sinning one loses all of this; there is no imposed punishment, no interference with the human condition, but it remains its natural self under these bad conditions.

Another implication is that in the case of Jesus and Mary, since they are not affected by original sin, it would make sense to assume that they were also immortal. If so, then it follows, first that Jesus' laying down his life and freely accepting death means rather more than what it has generally been considered to mean; it means that at a certain point he becomes aware that he is immune to death, and yet he gives up the privilege, so that when he gives up the ghost, he really does give it up, for otherwise he could not die. The willingness still is not a willing of his own death but is a willing release of the hold which he as a divine person has on his own human life.

In Mary's case, since death is not a good and is repugnant, she would not be able to do this unless there were some point in it, to which dying itself would only be a side effect. And it does not appear that Mary's death would have any such point. Therefore, even though it is said to be the stronger tradition that Mary died, it is significant that the Church has left this an open question, and we can take the less strong but nevertheless acceptable traditional view that she did not die, but went to sleep and rose to a glorified life without dying. This seems appropriate.

On this account, the givenness of sanctifying grace would carry with it in the case of sinless human nature immortality. This seems appropriate, inasmuch as death does not really have a point. It is simply a natural necessity but the purpose of creation is not to serve natural necessities. The fact that death is possible is only a side effect of the real purpose of materiality, and this side effect would in a better condition be adequately prevented by grace from

occurring. Now, however, although redeemed, we are not totally so, and since not totally redeemed, still subject to death and all the consequences of this subjection. At the same time, by suffering death in union with Jesus, the process of one's personal redemption is pushed forward to completion.

The effects of original and actual sins on the natural world are going to be along these lines. The fact that will can affect intellect, that intellect can affect imagination, and imagination emotions also means that there can be a direct influence of sin on sentient nature, which will continue to louse things up more and more, as actual sins are committed.

A further aspect is the fourth order. We also express ourselves by using matter as a medium, both for language and for products, tools, and the like. The expression of oneself in language is also affected by sin. The medium that we are using is one which, as language, is social. It happens to be usable both to communicate and to self-deceive and the like, to lie and so on. It is usable to do all sorts of performatives, some of which will be immoral. So language itself, to be a common medium, has to be able to do all the jobs, and still to be interchanged. This means it will be perverse through and through. Language is not totally corrupt; it is still usable, but no part of it is wholly pure. So language will be recalcitrant to redemptive uses; it will have ambiguities and potentialities for misunderstanding and for breakdown of communication built into it, which are results of stupidity, error, and so on--things themselves the result of sin.

When we look at products, it might seem more difficult to see how they are troubled by sin. The products seem to be o.k. in themselves. But if we consider that the whole economy is affected by sin; the production, distribution, and consumption of things is obviously distorted by injustice. The whole economic order would not be what it is if it were not for sin. Furthermore, many products obviously are not what they should be, in terms of the very uses to which they are intended to be put. In a better world there would not be H-bombs, condoms, and so on.

But there is more to the perversion of culture than one sees looking at it in these terms. In these terms we can see the point of the Marxist analysis of alienated labor and the corruption this spreads through the economy and the whole culture. But there is a further and even deeper dimension. Due to sin and the effects is has on our experience and emotions, we do not actually perceive the inherent goodness of materials and all their potentialities. We do not look at things as they really are. It is part of the training of an artist to come to look at materials more closely and to come to see what they really are more exactly. Also, to be able, for instance, to see a scene as it

is and to be able to put aside interpretation, and to be able to respect materials more fully than most people can.

But this training is needed to overcome a bias which we naturally have. So we do not appreciate the goodness of materials as such. In this regard, if we recognize the fact that all the rest of the material universe is matter for human activities of one sort or another, we can do things with it, at least it is matter for understanding, this aspect of the effect of sin does have a perverting effect on the universe as a whole, even if we do not suppose that things are intrinsically effected by sin. If nature is not perverted, nevertheless the world, which is nature for man, is perverted by human sin.

Not only are the goodness of the materials not seen but the possibilities which are really inherent in them are not perceived as they ought to be. This is because of the biases in experience and emotion, which prevents us from seeing the possibilities that would be there if the world were looked at in a more unbiased way. Purposes are not what they should be. There are all sorts of perverse needs and demands to be satisfied--the demand for things which will enable a person to show off, or to feel immediate satisfaction, or to make a success, or to provide false security--all these demands have to be satisfied by the economy. The result of this is that we do not have a morally good market, and we do not have materials which can be looked at morally, and furthermore the work itself tends to be bad to the extent that it is easier to do a poor job than a good one. And so the immorality of trying to obtain easy and quick results and to get satisfaction or benefits from the results interferes with the production of really good things. The result is that all tools and products are damaged by sin.

Everything which is wrong in the cultural order feeds back into experience. So things are not experienced as they should be. The medium of language keeps reorganizing experience in ways which are misleading and falsifying, rather than in ways which are helpful and accurate in reflecting reality. Products as we experience them keep causing more and other distortions in our emotions, fouling up things. And this all feeds back into more misunderstandings and proposing inappropriate objects for possible choice and so on. So we have a circulatory process, whereby sin flows round and round in the system. When one looks at the effects of sin in the cultural world, what it comes down to--to a considerable extent--is just that doing good work and using good products is inefficient and costly; what is easy and cheap and pleasant is always doing poor work and using rather poor things and having disposability, things one can get rid of.

There are some interesting speculative notes which might as well be included here. It would be interesting at some time to talk about some of these things with someone like John O'Keefe.

If we imagine the situation if Adam had not sinned, and if human individuals being born would have been born immortal by the fact that they were sharing in divine life and had no internal disruptive tendencies, we are going to have to imagine how things would have worked out. We can suppose that the universe was already at that time considerably expanded and that the outer edges of it--starting from the big bang had become a kind of huge sphere. We can suppose that far out it is expanding faster than the speed of light. This would put the farthest reaches permanently beyond our reach. We can imagine that Adam if he had not sinned when he had completed his earthly life and done his job, which was to make a morally good choice and had children and brought them up and done some work in the world to beautify and humanize it, come to a certain point where he would be transported into the part of the universe which is far out. That would be heaven. So we could locate heaven on this account in the physical universe but beyond our physical reach. We can suppose that Jesus and Mary are there but that it is inaccessible to us. We could assume a different physics to take care of their possibility of moving about, without making heaven be totally discontinuous with the universe we know. On this story, one can also suppose that when the part of the universe where we are is moving out at a rate which is beyond the speed of light, then this part of the universe would undergo the "end of the world," and it would be transformed into the beyond part of the universe. We can suppose that the process is one which continues until what is most near the center is moving out at the speed of light, and then the whole thing will be finished. So we can start from the big bang and end up in the endless reaches, with the universe a big hollow sphere.

One also might suppose a process of continuous creation, where the center is always being filled out, is expanding endlessly.

Another interesting supposition is that if Adam had not sinned, still descendants who did would then have been able to die. But those who did not sin would be immortals. This seems reasonable assuming that in the original state there really was a preternatural gift of immortality lost by original sin. We also can suppose that anyone who is able to die subsequently would not after their sin have any offspring. Or we can suppose they would, and on either assumption we will get a different picture of what the world would have been like.

Clearly, if Adam had not sinned, we would have a different human race genetically. Moreover, the effect of anxiety and fear and death-avoidance

behavior makes for a very different set of individuals in the world. We are in a universe where the good die young, and this makes for a genetically different family than would have been the case had Adam not sinned. So if he had not, we certainly would not have existed.

Other speculative implications of what we have been talking about have interesting effects on our view of the psychology of Mary and Jesus. Presumably if their natural condition is to be immortal, it also would be the case that they would not have the natural effects of fear of death, supposing that they know they are immortal. It seems difficult to suppose that they would not in some way know this. If they did somehow know it, they would not have the normal anxieties about dying. They would not, then, have the distortion of sensibility, and not having this, also would not have the biases which go with it internally. Nevertheless, the feed-in from objective culture and from the feelings of others, would still be what it was. And so they would experience sin as something they underwent but not as something they in any sense did or identified with. This would mean that they would have an experience of the evil and be sad about it; they would have an experience of suffering and react to it, with righteous indignation against evil, where they hated what really ought to be hated, and so on.

We can then further suppose that when Jesus is showing anxiety about dying this is because at the point he has given up the special title to be immortal. Then he is in a condition more like our usual one, except that he sees everything much more clearly than we ever do.

In addition to the wages of sin in each one of the orders considered straight on as we have been talking about them, there also are the effects of sin in each of the orders insofar as what is going on in a particular order is influenced by the presence of sin in the other ones. Considering this dynamically, we get some interesting things.

If we look at the order of the intentional, we have error or mistake as the natural breakdown, which need not in itself be the result of sin. But we also have crooked thinking, which is what happens to thinking when rationality norms are not functioning, and this is a result of sin. In the natural order, we may have illness which we can account for in terms of strictly natural causes, infection, accident, and so on. But we also have diseases which are involved in degeneracy, such as, VD or being overweight, or diseases which are caused by psychoneurosis which is caused from real guilt, and so on. These things, if not caused by one's own personal sin, might be caused by the sins of others. And similarly with crooked thinking; the individual may be thinking

cook-eyed, not because he himself is unwilling to think straight but because he is given a lot of cock-eyed opinions.

When we come to the fourth order, the name of the game is success and the lack of it is failure. But there is a kind of failure to use things well and for their purposes which is peculiarly the result of sin--slipshodness considered from the point of view of action, or shoddiness when you look at the product itself.

In all of the three preceding cases, the results of sin can be at work in the three orders, with the result that things are not less bad but worse. This is understandable. The paradoxical case is when we look in the moral order itself, and consider human action, insofar as it is influenced by the consequences of previous sin, coming in from the others orders, insofar as they are affected by sin, so that the effects flow back into human action, the paradox is that in the moral order we get something which for this very reason, in the particular action, for the one doing it here and now, is less rather than more sinful, because it is less a matter of freedom and more a matter of other kinds of causality which limit one's freedom and make the act be less one's personal act and less a matter of one's own self-determination. This phenomenon is what we call "sinning through weakness."

Sinning through weakness, whichever its various kinds are, really involves a kind of input into the moral order of defects from the others, operating dynamically. Of course, we can think of sin of ignorance as being this too, but sins of ignorance are either really inculpable--in which case they are not sins --or they are results of bad conscience, which we have analyzed above, and that really is not so much a matter of the diminution of the sinfulness of what one is doing. But we have something which properly does involve diminution of sinfulness, and this is the sin of weakness. This is the last thing to be discussed in this part as an obstacle to be overcome by redemption.

The very idea of weakness of will is paradoxical in itself, because it seems as though the will is not the sort of thing which can be weak and what can be weak is not going to be a matter of will, especially when we think of will as a capacity to act by free choice. The next difficulty is when we think of "sin of weakness." Here it is clear that we think that one had done something wrong. On the other hand, it seems as if it is not a doing so much as it is a falling, if we use the language metaphorically. But if one falls, you do not say they did anything; you say that they tripped or something of the sort, and the situation brought them down. So the problem is: Is there a doing or is there not a doing--no act at all? If we look at sin of weakness, again, there is a tendency to try to give some account of it by saying that under some

conditions the alternatives become overpowering, or become too attractive, or something of the sort. As long as there are alternatives, however, and one is acting in a morally significant way, making a free choice, then it does not seem to make sense to talk about one alternative becoming overpowering or terribly attractive, because one chooses freely between alternatives just to the extent that they are incommensurable, and their incommensurability means that one cannot be more attractive than another to the will. If there is greater attractiveness, this cannot be to the will, but to emotion; we are talking about greater intensity at this level. But then the problem is how the intensification of emotion can possibly affect the will unless it can be a cause of the willing. But if it is a cause of willing, just to that extent we do not have free choice.

A beginning of a solution is to suggest that there are conditions under which one does act intelligently and voluntarily, but without making any free choice. The problem then is whether we would call this a sin of weakness. One way to account for this is by saying that it can be the kind of thing which would be a sin if one did choose it and we say it is done through weakness to the extent that something has happened so that one is not now choosing at all, but acting without choice. We can imagine as an example the person who runs under fire from the enemy, who normally is resolute, who is doing the best he can, but who at a certain point becomes so frightened that he can no longer think of anything except escaping from the danger of death. At this point he begins to flee. We say at this point that this soldier ran through weakness, meaning that in general he is a responsible soldier and so on. He is just moved by fear to the point where he cannot choose at all. It would make sense to say that he ran away through weakness. But it would not make sense to say he sinned through weakness, for in this case, as described, there is no indication that there is any responsibility on the soldier's part at all.

A person sins through weakness if five conditions are simultaneously met. First, the person does something in an abnormal state of mind. Second, the doing is voluntary, whether or not it is free. Third, that person in a normal state of mind would have a choice about whether or not to execute that sort of behavior, and would not adopt a proposal which would be executed by that sort of behavior. Fourth, the person regards anyone who makes that choice as doing something immoral, or regards himself as being immoral if he makes this choice, in a normal state of mind. Fifth, he recognizes that he has a responsibility, and so has not merely regret but some sort of moral remorse for having done it when the normal state of mind returns.

When it is the case that if in a normal state of mind an individual would consider an act to be gravely wrong, and the individual decides not to struggle against doing this, not to resist, or chooses when in a normal state of mind not to do things he sees to be necessary if he is going to resist effectively, then we have a mortal sin of weakness. If, however, the individual when in a normal frame of mind chooses to resist and when presented with options about doing things which will enable him to resist, does choose to accept the options which are required if he is to resist, then it is not clear that the individual is ever sinning mortally. But if the individual is, it is very difficult to see what the conditions for the mortal sin are.

There are various kinds of cases in which someone might be said to be sinning through weakness. One example was put under the heading of insufficient reflection. Let us suppose a youngster who normally recognizes that stealing is wrong and considers it to be against a commandment of God, and ordinarily would not for this reason steal something, on a certain occasion with a group of friends, is dared to do something which involves stealing something he would normally consider to be wrong; but under the influence of the mob psychology and the pressure of the group, he does it. Subsequently, let us say that the next day, he begins to think about it, and recognizes that it was wrong and is sorry for having done it. Or perhaps the youngster lands up in jail and thinking about it says: "I was very stupid to have done that, it was wrong, and I <u>should not</u> have done it." And is genuinely repentant, as soon as the conditions are changed. In a case like this, we might say he sinned through weakness. The case would be one in which we would suppose that responsibility was diminished, yet there is some fault. The responsibility is not the same as it would have been had the situation been more normal. The fault is present because a choice is made, we are assuming. The responsibility is lessened because the aspects of the evil which is done which would normally have been considered were not fully taken into account at the time the wrongful choice was made.

The sin will be nonmortal when done through weakness, although otherwise it would be, if the sin is chosen without a consideration of the relationship between what is being done and the principle which ties it in with the redemptive commitment. How exactly to parse this out is not easy, but it could be, for instance, that he recognizes it is wrong and that he should not do it, but is not now thinking of it, as he normally would, as being as sin, and is not paying attention to this aspect of the matter.

A second kind of case in which we would talk about someone sinning through weakness is fairly clear: there is a series of acts or omissions in various stages. As one goes from one stage to another, changes occur, either

because of choices which do not bear on the act itself but which bear on some incidental matter, so that there is an entering into occasions without a clear choice to do the sin, or more likely, or very often, it is a matter of not making certain choices which would prevent one from entering into the occasion. The omission to make the choices is going to be a responsible act in virtue of some antecedent responsibility, due to some antecedent free choice or freely chosen omission to do something one should have done, which would have prevented one from winding up in this situation.

One possible example of this is a case in which someone gets angry at another, frequently under certain circumstances is caused to become angry at them, and begins to realize that the anger is increasing and is going to lead to serious trouble. The individual can choose at any stage of the development not to continue to get involved with the person who is making him angry. If he nevertheless does not choose to avoid such involvement, then gets to the position where he becomes very angry and does something he would not have done normally--say, takes a poke at him or shoots him--and perhaps does this spontaneously as a kind of reaction, it comes to mind to take a swing, and nothing comes to mind as an alternative, so there is no choice although there is willingness, then we have a case where there is no choice, there is behavior, and we might say there is a sin of weakness. The responsibility is at the various stages where the individual could and should have chosen to avoid continuing to get into the aggravating situation.

Another similar case, could be a case where the act done in anger was chosen. It is not precisely the act which initially was thought of, for there is a change in the object of the act as the development goes on. A possible case like this is where someone is angered by another and thinks of killing him. He says: "I would not want to do this; it would be wrong. But if the son of a bitch really provokes me, I'll take a good swing at him." The next stage is to continue to get into an aggravating situation, and thinking in terms of taking a good swing, comes to the point where in anger he chooses to swing, but does exactly what he had initially thought of, which would be deadly, and in fact it is deadly. In this case there is a killing with provocation, done in anger. The sin is one of weakness, because of all the circumstances, but in fact the sin would be chosen formally, if not to kill at least to hurt, and yet there is moral responsibility for the killing to the extent that the individual, having considered killing, then lessened the intent to hurting, continued to be willing to hurt, and in fact continued to enter into an aggravating situation until he was aggravated enough to hurt, by a means which in actuality is sufficient to kill.

Another kind of case which we discussed at some length was that of an Eskimo who is in a very tough situation. They have fair rules for dividing up seals when there is a catch so that everyone gets something to see them through. An Eskimo follows the rules but as the winter gets longer and harder is more and more strongly tempted to break the rules and take care of his own family first, to the neglect of the rest. At some point where things get very bad, various people one after another do break the rules. But we can imagine someone who holds out for a long time, but finally under the pressure of the situation does give in and breaks the rules. We could say that this individual, who is by no means the first to cheat, sins through weakness. In this case, we are assuming that the Eskimo's normal state of mind is no longer present in the circumstances. Yet we are not assuming that he is necessarily going to feel remorse immediately afterward. However, when the normal condition returns, that is, when there is an adequate supply of food again, then the person who was the last to cheat is likely to be the first to recognize that what we did under those bad circumstances was wrong, and we should get back to our good old ways, and not violate them anymore. The person who was the first to cheat is the least likely to be ready to say that what he did was wrong.

In <u>American Ecclesiastical Review,</u> volume 100, 1939, there is an article by Rudolf Allers which is relevant to this discussion. End of part V.

Part 6: Our Life: Human and Divine Life in Jesus and His Spirit

This part is concerned with living the Christian life and overcoming the obstacles to the fullness of redemption.

The first section of this part will be concerned with basic conversion and baptism. The basic conversion is being transformed into the condition of being an adopted member of the divine family, from the condition of sinful humanity. We can talk about this transformation using the traditional language of sanctifying grace, the grace of holiness. The redemptive work of Christ both heals the wounds of sin and elevates. This is because God's purpose is to make humankind into members of his own family and share his own goods with his adopted children. This has to take the form of redemptive sanctification only because of the state of fallen humanity which must be overcome.

The idea of grace should be developed as sharing divine life and sharing in the love of God which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit. Grace is to be looked at as something not caused, but rather as something infused and conferred by the sacrament. This is because essentially we are thinking of grace as the uncreated reality, and whatever effects this has on the person on whom it is conferred, these created effects are not nearly so essential as the uncreated grace.

The Council of Trent was careful not to talk about grace being created, but to talk about it as being infused. In connection with the sacraments it was careful to talk about grace being conferred and not about it being caused by the sacraments. However, it was careful not necessarily for the reasons we have in view in the latter case, but still it was careful not to say something which would have caused trouble here.

According to the conception of grace as conferred, it is important to keep in mind that what is conferred is not merely a transient quality but that it really does inhere in the one upon whom it is conferred. It gives being an adopted member of the divine family as a status and not merely as an event. The one on whom grace is conferred does then act in a way such that his action is according to participation in the divine nature which he has by virtue of the grace which is conferred. In this sense we talk about the grace as inherent.

Basic conversion, thus understood, is not an act of the one who is converted. It is a transformation which the person undergoes, and this transformation can occur without any action whatsoever upon the person who is transformed, who is adopted. This is normally the case, since usually it is small children or infants who are converted. The occurrence of basic conversion could be accomplished by divine causality without any visible activity at all, in a totally hidden way. However, if this were the case,

then nobody would have any possibility of helping to accomplish it, cooperating with it, or knowing about it. According to the divine plan of redemption, it is not done in this hidden way; it is done by means of a sacrament--baptism. To discuss baptism as a sacrament, it is necessary to talk to some extent here about the sacraments in general.

Traditionally, we have said that a sacrament is an outward sign, instituted by Christ, to give grace. We will keep this definition, but notice that it is necessary to understand it with some degree of accuracy for the purposes of moral theology. This is what we will now explain here. So we are not really trying to define "sacrament" in a new way but simply to give an explanation of the traditional definition which will be useful for our purposes.

For our purposes we begin by regarding a sacrament, in the first place, as an action. Primarily, the sacrament is the redeeming act of Christ, the redeeming act of Christ applied here and now to a particular person or persons, effecting some aspect of the redemption and sanctification. The sacrament is the redeeming act by outwardly performing it. The redeeming act is essentially one third-level act in Christ himself, and this act is outwardly performed or expressed as such third-level acts normally are, by various expressions. A sacrament is a particular outward performance or expression of the redeeming act of Christ. It is expressed in a sacrament in a set of words and deeds which are suited to it. The appropriateness is partly in the character of the words and deeds themselves which have been providentially set up to be appropriate. But it is partly in the fact that Christ simply chooses to use these particular words and deeds to express what he has to express.

The sacramental words and deeds are done by one who is appointed and authorized by Christ with power to act in his behalf, in his name--that is, as his agent. We can talk about analogous cases of agency such as the ambassador who has the authorization to declare war or make peace. When he says, "I declare war," he is declaring war and his country is doing so in his act. His country's declaration need not be anything other than his own statement, which does the job. The concept of agency can also be developed in other ways. The important point is that on the one hand the agent cannot do anything except in line with his authorization and appointment, and on the other hand, the principal does not act in some sort of mysterious and shadowy way completely independent of the activity of the agent but precisely acts openly in and through the activity of the agent.

The words and deeds of the sacrament are a unified whole. They are not simply a sequence or a collection of things. They are like the words and deeds of Christ when he was living visibly on earth in being revelatory of the

redemptive, revelatory both of what it is in him and revelatory also of what the redemptive act is in the ones redeemed. From this point of view sacraments are outward signs, because they do reveal the redemptive act; they show Christ in action. So far as sacraments are signs of the redemptive act in the redeemed, they also confer what they signify--as the traditional definition says.

The valid performance of the sacrament establishes in the one on whom it is conferred a potentiality to be redeemed, a potentiality which involves a real relationship to the redemptive act which lasts. It is necessary to recognize that a valid performance of a sacrament only necessarily establishes this potentiality because it is possible to validly receive a sacrament unworthily, in which case grace is not conferred and the person is not sanctified by the sacrament, but this is no defect in the sacrament or in the act of Christ.

The potentiality is actualized in the one who is redeemed by the power of the Holy Spirit. This power works, at least partly, by moving the nonresisting recipient to accept the redemptive act and thus enjoy its redeeming and sanctifying effect. From this point of view, the cooperation of the recipient is essential, and it is the act of the one who receives which is redeeming but this not as a human act but as an act of the Holy Spirit--an act which can occur without any human act at all, as in the case of the infant who is baptized.

One can imagine the redemptive act being effective, as we said earlier, without sacraments, but if this were the case, three things would follow. First, the minister of the sacrament would not be ennobled by being allowed to share in this way in redeeming others. Secondly, the recipient would have nothing specific to do by way of cooperating, and thus would not have the principle which the sacrament gives for organizing the rest of life in accord with this human act--in other words, there would not be a homogenous principle for other human acts to integrate with. Third, those concerned in the sacrament--both the minister, the recipient, and others--would not be able to experience the redemptive work going on, and so would not be able to know that it has in fact happened. Whereas, given the sacramental method, it is possible, for example, for the person who has been baptized, to be able to locate the point at which adoption occurred as a historical occurrence, and to know his own identity as a child of God in terms of this fact.

The sacramental acts on the part of participants are human acts, with which their other human acts can be integrated, thus redeeming and sanctifying the whole of life. So our account of Christian moral life will essentially be an account of ways in which other human acts are integrated with, or formed and organized by, those acts which are involved in participating in the sacraments.

The sacraments are Church-forming acts. Essentially, baptism, for instance, makes people members of the Church; the Eucharist integrates the people who are members of the Church into a whole with various roles and functions. As it were, baptism makes them citizens of the divine family, and the Eucharist gives them a proper relationship in a dynamic way to others in their particular constitutional slot in the Church.

As well as being Church-forming, the sacraments also are acts of the Church. The Church initially was personally formed by Christ in the calling and acceptance of the apostles and the disciples, in the Last Supper, and Pentecost and so on. On this account, it would not have been necessary or appropriate for those who were in immediate contact with Christ to be baptized; it was appropriate for them to go, preach the Gospel, and baptize others. On the other hand, given that they were his intimates, it was appropriate for them, given that they believed, to share in the Eucharist which knit them into unity with Him and gave them their particular relationships in the Church, establishing them dynamically in those relationships and nurturing the unity of the Church. It also was appropriate for them, including Mary, to receive confirmation, which they did on Pentecost.

Baptism in particular is an act in which the Church functions as an adoption agency for the divine family, adopting new members into it. The rite of baptism, which involves the words and the washing, indicates washing away sin, indicates dying and being born again. It symbolizes the basic conversion which it brings about. The minister of baptism is allowed to be anyone at all, even a nonbeliever, so long as they mean to do what the Church does. The point of this just is that entry into the divine family and membership in the Church is not restricted, but is the sort of thing which anyone can effect for anyone, so long as this is what they are trying to do.

The outward act of baptism is important precisely insofar as it fulfills the intention to baptize the person and insofar as this allows the individual themselves and the Church at large to know that this person is adopted into the family and to act according to this knowledge. If the Church in someone has begun to take steps toward the baptism of anyone, then the baptism of that individual has already begun and the redemptive and sanctifying effect of divine family membership is accomplished even at the initiation of the process--as I tried to clarify in the article, "Do We Work in Vain for Human Life?" Still, the carrying through of the process, if completed by the rite, is important, for the reasons which have been indicated already.

In a normal case of baptism, the individual who is being baptized is an infant or a very small child and is simply given the status and the love of God

is poured forth in its heart, and there need not be and cannot be any act, especially no free act, on the recipient's part which would be responsive to this. But such a response is not at all necessary. Essentially, basic conversion is a being transformed and it is not a matter of any sort of acting on the part of the individual who is transformed. This is most clearly the case in the baptism of infants.

If we have a case in which an adult is baptized, then there must be a sufficient evangelization, a sufficient presentation of what the Church is, and of what the redemptive act of Christ is and of what sharing in it means, so that the individual can become a disciple of Christ (cf. Mt. last chapter), one who can give informed consent to becoming a member of the Church ready to learn from Christ. This does not mean necessarily that the individual to be baptized has to be fully instructed or have a long catechesis--teaching them everything He commanded comes <u>after</u> baptism--but they have to have as much instruction as they demand and minimally they must have enough evangelization so they know what they are consenting to, because to get someone to agree to be baptized without their being informed would be not to have consent at all, and in this case they would not be able to receive the sacrament.

The act of faith which responds to the initial evangelization need not, I think, be a supernatural act of faith. But the act of faith which responds to the baptismal gift--that is, to the divine life being given--is of course going to be a supernatural act of faith. This act of faith will be an adhering of the mind to the divine truth which is revealed and which is already present in its reality in the soul of the person who has received baptismal grace and has not lost it by sin.

In the case of an adult, it also will be necessary for the person to turn away from actual sins. This will require a choice on their part. It nevertheless is important to notice that also in this case the conversion is a being converted by divine causality, by grace, rather than its primarily being any sort of initiative on their part to turn themselves around. So the demand that we repent and be baptized does not mean that the repentance can be initiated by the sinner, but rather is a call not to resist the activity of the Holy Spirit which is doing the converting, and thus to allow oneself to be converted: Convert us, 0 Lord, and we shall be converted.

Beyond evangelization, the preparation for adult baptism is simply a turning away from sin or a letting go of it by the person who is actually in it.

Following baptism, however, and for the child who has been baptized as an infant and who is growing in the Christian life, there must be an instruction in the faith which is sufficient to communicate the truths of faith sufficiently

for each person given their ability and state of development, so that they can actively and consciously live the Christian life according to the mode of their ability. So the level of instruction ought to be sufficient for conscious participation in Christian life, and this should be the principle of catechesis. Faith, then, will have more articulated content, but no different reality, than it has in the simplest believer.

The nurturing of the faith of Christian life in a child is largely by the activity and the work of others and by the child's own natural responses. The child need not and, before six years or so, cannot make free choices. But the baptized child will respond appropriately in ways which involve intelligent and voluntary responses in line with the Christian life which the child has.

We also need here to consider the reality of hell as the alternative to conversion--this is what one is going to have if one refuses to allow oneself to be converted (or reconverted). This refusal is not necessarily a matter of life-long resistance; it can take the form of committing any mortal sin and staying in it. The enduring refusal means that one remains a nonmember of the divine family and remains alienated from it. In the case of one who has already been baptized and who then commits mortal sin, the refusal is a matter of making ineffective one's being an adopted member of the divine family although one still has the status of being a child of God. Thus the mortal sinner who has already been baptized is in the better position of having been adopted and therefore having some leverage to call upon divine mercy, as the bad child has who was a natural member of the family.

The permanence of hell essentially arises from the fact there is a perduring resistance or a perduring refusal to accept the life of grace. This resistance or refusal is built into the case in which the free choice is made, because free choices of themselves tend to last. It is only accidental to our present condition that we can change our minds, since we are not completely integrated. The Catholic doctrine that hell is eternal just means that free choices are really effective in determining oneself, at some point permanently--that is, after death--which inherently free choices tend to do. To make hell not be eternal would mean that one cannot effectively determine oneself to anything at all.

Under basic conversion, we have to consider here as one of the activities which is appropriate to living life in accord with this condition prayer, in its most fundamental form. Essentially, prayer is conversation with God. All of Christian life can be regarded as a two-way process of communication, in which God communicates his own life, one receives it, and responds to him on the basis of what one has received, and so on. In this two-way process of

communication, one can distinguish especially those aspects which involve conscious activity on man's part. Conscious activities on the part of the human person will involve acts of intellect and will, and to some extent of sense cognition and emotion. These acts, as receptive of what God communicates, will be one aspect of prayer--listening to God, hearing his word, receiving it. The other aspect will be responding to it, talking back to God, answering him, and the answering is not only a matter of verbal replies, or even of thinking, but also of emotions and will acts.

The natural response in the case of the child is to take for granted the massive reality of the family situation and of the parent. It cannot see that this is an alternative to anything else; the massive reality as it were fills the whole horizon. So the child does not feel especially grateful for or to the parent; but takes the parents for granted. The child does not especially respect or honor its parents, at first, because it does not see the parent as anything else than what it is. There is a kind of natural awe in looking up to parents, which will have its counterpart here in a natural and spontaneous attitude of adoration toward God and gratefulness to him, without this being any particular, specifiable act at all.

However, there is something in the way of response which one finds even in children. This response is to demand what it needs. The child does have the differentiated situation of a rising and falling curve of needs and satisfactions. And the child makes these known to the parent! Similarly, the child in the divine life has as basic response to God the prayer of petition--asking for those things which its life, and the maintenance and flourishing of it will require. Anything else the child of God happens to want will be sought from him too.

Moreover, even if the child at first is not especially likely to admire or to honor its parents or to be grateful to them in any explicit way, still it has this attitude basic to gratitude, that it recognizes that everything it has comes from the parents. And so the basic Christian attitude in prayer should be recognizing that everything good, without any exceptions, comes from God, and that one should ask everything good without any exception from him.

Basic conversion overcomes obstacles to the fullness of the <u>pleroma</u> in this sense, that the <u>pleroma</u> is to be made up among other things of human persons, and there would not be any human persons in it unless they were redeemed, unless their condition of being alienated from God by original sin is overcome. Basic conversion overcomes this condition. In overcoming it, basic conversion also overcomes the fundamental ignorance concerning what things are all about by giving faith. It also in principle overcomes the obstacle of the

seeming impossibility of sharing in the pleroma by giving hope. So to the extent that the theological virtues are already given in basic conversion, the principles of overcoming all the obstacles are already given, and the initial obstacle of original sin itself is in fact overcome.

Also, if we are going to say something briefly in the previous part about the devil as an obstacle, we should in this section talk about basic conversion and the life of the adopted member of the divine family as a member of it and as a member of the Church, as essentially overcoming the devil, so that from here on this question will not need to be mentioned again. The treatment of the devil here will go with the point that in baptism we have the exorcisms. This goes with the idea that Satan's kingdom is the world insofar as it is constituted of what is unredeemed.

In this volume, we are not going to treat two of the sacraments--namely, matrimony and orders, which properly belong to later volumes of the work. Both of them, insofar as they are sacramental principles, will be treated in volume four. But the other four sacraments--reconciliation, confirmation, Holy Communion, and anointing of the sick--will be treated here. First we treat them in general.

These sacraments, unlike baptism, do require an act on the part of the recipient, which is necessary. This act is done and effective by the work of the Holy Spirit. But given grace, it is possible and necessary for the individual to prepare themselves for these four sacraments, and it also is possible and necessary for the Church to help its members prepare themselves for these four sacraments. In this respect, the situation differs from what happens in the case of baptism, where one baptizes infants and there is no preparation as far as they are concerned, and instruction in the faith is more a consequence than an antecedent of baptism.

We also must think of these four sacraments as involving, in their preparation, the reading of the Scriptures. This reading will be important for instructing faith, which belongs to catechesis. But it also belongs to the sacramental activity involved in these sacraments and proper preparation for them. Reading of Scripture ought to be discussed as formative of Christian life and as part of the sacraments here to the extent that this will be discussed at all in this part.

Also here we should introduce the idea of liturgy as the public prayer of the Church or official worship by the Church of the Father, through Christ, moved by the Holy Spirit. So we should take up liturgy as a form of prayer. Then we will be looking at the sacraments as liturgical acts, and so as acts of the prayer of the Church. But they are prayer essentially inasmuch as they are

the Church listening to and responding to God, not prayer so much as asking for things, although there are petitions which are appropriately connected with the sacraments. But the sacraments themselves are a kind of prayer, a prayer which is already effective because of the authorization to do them.

The aspect of prayer as adoration and thanksgiving can also best be developed here, for here we are becoming self-conscious in doing acts of the Christian life, unlike the situation in baptism, where the appropriate kind of prayer there presupposes the family, and has largely the aspect of asking for things. The aspect of asking still remains; the recognition that one is receiving everything from God, as well as the explicit adoration and thanksgiving, is going to be part of the story.

The distinction between the four sacraments we are concerned with can be related to the different areas of obstacles which we talked about in part five.

The sacrament of reconciliation is concerned with the reconciling of the sinner to* the Church and to God, by way of being reconciled to the Church, and if we think of the complexity of the existential order, also of reconciling the sinner to himself--the process of the integration of the sinner.

If we consider confirmation, it will bear especially on faith and revealed truth. Baptism is concerned with faith already, and the act of faith is an appropriate response to baptism. But there is another dimension of faith not covered by baptism--faith not simply as received but as something to be lived and handed on. So we have the life of the believer not only as believing but also as proclaiming, expressing the divine truth, not only in a verbal way, but in the whole of life. The baptized is authorized to proclaim faith, and this is done in confirmation, which thus is considered a kind of complement of baptism.

Holy Communion--here the sacrament is a making of community among the various members of the Church, knitting them together so that they are not just a collection of adopted children, but are actually a functioning family, an actually living Church.

Finally, we have the sacrament of anointing, in which the Christian is disposed with respect to those aspects of his natural being which need to be reintegrated, and this primarily hangs upon death, as something to be feared; the sacrament thus has to do with dying in Christ and the elimination of the terror of death from Christian life.

So we have four sacraments: reconciliation corresponding to sin, confirmation corresponding to ignorance and error, holy communion corresponding to disorder in social and cultural reality, and anointing corresponding to the sentient nature insofar as it is subject to death.

This brings us to the sacrament of reconciliation or of forgiveness. The treatment of this as reconciliation has a firm basis in the new liturgy and in the preaching of the Church and so the expression cannot be avoided. But it is necessary to make clear that the reconciliation is not that of two parties both of whom are at fault. The individual who is the sinner is reconciled with the Church and thereby with Christ and with God through the sacrament; this is like the reconciliation of the prodigal son with his sinless father. Second, the idea of reconciliation seems to fit mortal sin better than venial sin. In order to apply the notion to venial sin, we must think of the aspects of the personality of the venial sinner which are cut off from his own basic redemptive commitment, as needing to be reconciled with it. So it is a reconciliation of the Christian to himself, rather than between the sinner and the Church. Still, we can have a consideration of the seriousness of venial sin in connection with this sacrament.

In addition to looking at this sacrament as a kind of second baptism for the person who has committed serious sin and knows it, or as a process of Christian integration for the person who commits venial sin, and this is clear, it is important to recognize that sin which is materially grave and may be and in many cases probably is venially sinful, may as it occurs in Christian life be a special and important problem. This kind of sin has a place in Christian life leading to the need for the sinner to work out his salvation in fear and trembling. The process of the working out depends partly on recognizing and understanding the place of sin in Christian life--that is, its being there gives the Church and the sinner an opportunity to participate in the redemptive work, an opportunity which otherwise would not be given. The activity of the sinner in overcoming these obstacles is integral to the redemption, and so is itself a particular and special kind of gift.

In the case of those acts which are materially grave, the sinner cannot be absolutely certain that it is not formally grave. Consequently, these kinds of sins provide very common, important matter for confession, whether in fact they are grave sins or not. Typically, they demand of the sinner a special effort to make a good confession and to repent of the sins and to seek to avoid them in the future.

Preparation for the sacrament of confession on the sinner's part involves an examination of conscience to try to turn up everything which really has to be confessed--that is, all mortal sins. And everything which would be appropriate to confess--that is, venial sins with some degree of specificity. The sinner should try to get to the root of the problem, the causes and the motives, but should not simply confess motives but rather specific things. To say something

which would be true of everybody is not to confess a sin. In examining conscience the sinner should make an act of contrition, be disposed to seek and accept forgiveness, and to seek it in mental prayer, first of all, and secondly to make the determination to avoid committing the same sins, including the same venial sins, again in the future. We must make clear here the distinction between a purpose of amendment and a prediction about one's future; predictions are not in order, for we are dealing with free choices if with sin at all.

We also must look at the sacrament itself, in which we have the acts of the penitent--contrition, confession of sins, and the doing of the penance--all of which are on the part of the penitent. On the part of the minister, the act of absolving. This latter act, it must be noted, carries the authority of an agent who is fully authorized to make the judgment and to absolve. So it carries with it certitude of the effectiveness of the absolution.

We can next move on to what is excluded by a genuine purpose of amendment. This means that one is going to try to avoid so far as possible the conditions which lead to sin. This is going to be particularly significant when it comes to sins of weakness. The purpose of amendment must be to not make those choices or do those things which are part of the normal slide toward sin, or on the other hand to prepare oneself to and to try to make the choices which are needed in order not to proceed--in other words, not to omit to make the choices which will prevent the transformation which ends in sin. Whatever is needed to get oneself into the attitude so that the things which lead to the sin of weakness will not occur has to be considered.

We next consider penitential prayer, prayer of contrition, which involves both contrition itself, and prayer which is said on the motive of being contrite, to fulfill and extend this. We also have to consider penitential acts, both those which are specified in the penance and those which continue the activity of the sacrament by other means--almsgiving, fasting, and so on. We also have to consider the notion of the punishment which is due to sin. The punishment due to sin insofar as it is mortal is hell, but this is not an arbitrary punishment; it is what follows naturally from the fact that one is a mortal sinner. There also is a punishment, in the sense of an evening up to the Church, of the wound which one has imposed on it by sin. This punishment, since it is a matter of damage to the Church, is appropriately one which can be foregone by the act of the Church. The Church can do this by treating the merits of Christ and the saints as sufficient, applying them to heal the wound, apart from the undergoing of the punishment by the person themselves who is guilty. This is done by the process of indulgences. So this is where they come in.

In discussing the whole sacrament of reconciliation, it is important to be clear that what is going on here is not simply an undoing of the immorality. Essentially this happens by the choice of the person who has chosen immorally, by their choice not to continue in that immoral choice, if it is something which is a state, for example, by making restitution, breaking off a relationship one should not have entered into, and the like, or determining to do an act one has been omitting to do. But we also have the choice not to do again an act which one did before. This kind of choice reverses the immorality of the situation, but the sacrament is concerned with something more than this. It is concerned with the transformation into Christian sanctity of the reversal of immorality. So the matter of the sacrament is the act of repentance and the confession of wrongdoing and the penance. From this point of view we are not looking at the sacrament of reconciliation as being primarily a matter of getting morally straightened out. Rather it is more essentially a matter of transforming one's getting morally straightened out into something which itself is an aspect of Christian holiness. On this view we must look at the acts of the recipient, insofar as they are a reception of the sacrament, as the acts of the Holy Spirit moving the recipient, so that the sacrament is an acceptance of the redemptive love, rather than primarily moral determination with respect to the specific issue of the sin. That is presupposed and included but is not properly the act of receiving the sacrament.

One has something analogous to the situation in criminal law in which someone is sentenced to so many years in prison, but then the sentence is suspended, the person is put on probation, or something like that.

This brings us to the sacrament of confirmation. Confirmation is especially concerned with faith and so it bears especially on divine truth and on those obstacles which are obstacles to truth, whether they be errors about faith or unsound reasoning or false or unformed conscience or whatever. Faith is an appropriate response to baptismal grace, as is an act of hope. However, we have the fact that faith is not only for oneself but also to communicate. And we have the fact that faith must be developed, unfolded in the recipient. And so, given the baptismal grace, it is appropriate that there is a thorough-going catechesis. Catechesis should not be thought of as being a kind of theoretical formation in the faith but it ought to be also and especially a formation of the Christian conscience, because the truth of faith is normative, and the normativity of it should never be set aside. On the other hand, the formation of a Christian conscience is not simply moral indoctrination, but is essentially a formation of a conscience by the truth of faith. If we have all of this being developed, the person in whom it is

developed becomes able and suited and quite naturally tends to communicate what they believe to others. In fact, they either will communicate it or they will communicate something else, since it is impossible not to communicate one's deepest convictions to others, one way or another.

Communication to others, then, is a form of handing on the tradition of faith or of proclamation. Since faith is a social thing and one will be acting in and for the Church in doing it, one needs as it were to be appointed and authorized to do what one does. This is where the sacrament of confirmation comes in, applying one to an office, giving a character, giving one the duty to proclaim the faith, not only in words, but also in everything in one's life which is formed by faith. In proclaiming the faith of the Church by teaching what the Church teaches, one is operating as part of the Church teaching, and to that extent one's proclamation of the faith is going to carry the infallibility which divine truth always carries with it.

The act of the person who is confirming, because of the nature of the office, and because of its participation in the handing on of the faith, is reserved traditionally and appropriately to the bishop or to someone who is specially authorized by him to confirm for a particular occasion when the bishop cannot do it. So it is the bishop or an agent of the bishop. Of course, the bishop operates as an agent of Christ, but we can see why the ordinary minister of confirmation is a bishop.

As to receiving the sacrament, we have someone receiving whose act will be a baptismal type act, in the sense that it is an act of someone who is already a Christian. Still, this act of receiving the office involves not simply willingness on the part of the recipient, but an acceptance of this sort of role, to which insofar as it is redemptive and sanctifying, the recipient is moved by the Holy Spirit. One of the peculiarities of this sacrament is that the act of receiving it is directly continuous with the act to which it authorizes one. To receive an office and to exercise it are continuous with each other, and so the grace of the Holy Spirit which moves one to accept the office of being a confirmed Christian also carries with it those gifts by which one will be moved by the grace of the Holy Spirit in the exercise of the office. This is where the gifts of the Holy Spirit come into play; traditionally they have been treated especially in connection with confirmation.

It also will be the case that since the proclamation of faith is not limited to verbal acts, but will be throughout one's whole life, that one's whole life will only be in accord with the office of a confirmed Christian to the extent that it is viewed as a Christian function. In this respect

confirmation embraces the problem of vocation. So we will treat here of the finding of and commitment to one's vocation as pertaining to this sacrament.

Finally, we have a kind of prayer which is especially relevant to the sacrament of confirmation. That prayer is meditation, where mysteries of faith are considered, consideration leads to an understanding of what they imply for one's life, and some application of the insight into divine truth to one's life and activity is made, some way of communicating it is seen.

If we look at the gifts of the Holy Spirit in relation to confirmation--wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge obviously have to do with various aspects of getting ahold of the faith and its application to life, and communicating it properly. The gift of fortitude is required because the proclamation of faith to nonbelievers is going to lead to more or less seriously hostile reaction and persecution. Fear of the lord is required because that is the beginning of wisdom and will undergird fortitude by making one fear the right thing in the right way, and piety comes into play to the extent that it involves a kind of respect for the conditions under which one is operating here--that is, as a member of the Church piously presenting the reality of the Church, and not something else which one would like to present, and so presenting Christian truth in subordination to one's bishop, and to the college of bishops rather than (for a bishop) autonomously.

The next sacrament to be considered is Holy Communion. This sacrament presupposes the activity of Christian life in its richness and its diversity. The appropriate preparation for the sacrament is simply the living of a Christian life, which has a morally good character, and by that having one's life and works to offer, to be given for transformation into the unity of the redemptive act. The presentation of the gifts in the offertory of the Mass is symbolic of this, is expressive of it. The custom of offering money in the modern world, given our economy, is about as adequate a symbol of this as one could easily carry out, since money is a reflection of what one has done; in this sense, one's money is one's life in token and in effect.

The priestly act in this ease is especially closely united with the redemptive act of Christ--with his redeeming activity--inasmuch as the priest is shaping the act with the very words of Christ which he does not use but rather quotes: "Take you all of this and eat of it" is in quotation marks. The sacramental form on our account of it includes the whole formula, for the sacrament is in the feeding of the faithful, which expresses the unity and in fact unifies the Church.

Of course, from another point of view we can regard the sacrament as completed in the consecrated species, since Jesus himself is personally and

really present in them, even before communion. Yet the fullness of the sacrament is not simply in the consecration but in the actual feeding. "Take and eat, drink" is part of the form of the sacrament according to our account in terms of words and deeds.

The peculiarity of the Eucharist in comparison with baptism is that in baptism everyone is brought into the redemptive act in community passively. But in the Eucharist one freely brings oneself to the redemptive act, brings one's actual life to it, and offers one's life to be transformed and united into the make-up of the Church as a ordered whole, as a unified whole, made up of diverse parts and members. The transformation occurring at the consecration --one has Christ present in the sacrament of the altar and then this is dispersed in the feeding of the faithful who in receiving receive all one and the same Jesus back again, and thus receive in themselves the unity which unifies them. The reception of the sacrament by the one who thus participates fully in the Mass, receiving communion, involves accepting one's own role, one's own share in the redemptive act. This acceptance is distinct from the offering of the sacrifice, which is Christ, to the Father in union with Jesus. Everyone who is baptized can do this even prior to the Communion. That is, the offering after the consecration pertains to all insofar as they are baptized. To the extent that everyone shares in this offering, the baptismal character is a kind of priesthood of all the believers. But in receiving communion, one is doing the specific act of receiving this sacrament, and one is accepting one's share in the redemptive act as peculiarly one's share in executing and carrying it out by living one's life redemptively to share in it.

The acceptance of this is the acceptance of one's role and activities as being part of the Christian drama of redemption and sanctification and involves then living in a Christian lifestyle. Living in a Christian lifestyle involves one's words and deeds to have the character of Christian life, and will therefore be transforming with respect to the culture. So the sacrament actually forms up the Church as a cultural reality and transforms the culture by the way in which words and objects are used in the sacrament. It is important from this point of view to notice that as a matter of historical fact, the Holy Eucharist has led to the building of the cathedrals, the work of Christian art and music, and so on, and literature, with an effect, a real effect on secular culture. And, on the other hand, what goes on in secular culture, has to be selectively considered and utilized and transformed in order to be of a quality to take its place in the Eucharist. The living of the Christian life looked at as Eucharistic involves living as a member of the community--of the communion of saints and of the Mystical Body, and in this

respect, one has a relationship to the saints in heaven, to the souls in purgatory, and so on.

An important part of this is the special responsibility which the members of the Church on earth have toward one another. And here we have the idea of mutual help and of bearing one another's burdens among the faithful, and of the priority of charity for one's fellow Christians over charity towards outsiders in equal need.

Also, we have the appropriate kind of prayer which is connected with the Eucharist, which is going to be prayer of praise, thanksgiving, and adoration. Rather than prayer of contrition and meditation. The adoration-thanksgiving-praise type prayer predominates in the Office, which is a kind of extension of the Eucharistic act throughout the day, and to the extent that the prayer of the Office is this, for this reason it is particularly appropriate that the clergy carry on the Office for and on behalf of the whole Church.

This brings us to the sacrament of anointing. A primary point about this is that in baptism the Christian dies with Christ and rises again with him, but the dying and the rising is essentially a matter of dying to the old man and putting on the new man. The sacrament of anointing involves a dying with Christ in the literal sense of undergoing and accepting one's actual, physical death in unity with Christ. The thing which is especially important about this sacrament is that there is a Christian acceptance of death which is itself a morally significant act.

On the part of the Christian the preparation of the sacrament is a properly Christian life which looks forward to death as to something which is to be accepted as another one of the givens which must be accepted from the hands of God, with submissiveness. And the life of mortification is an appropriate preparation for dying. Here we are looking at life as a preparation for death. Given this kind of attitude, anyone who has faith and hope, even if they are in mortal sin, having hope wants to die in Christ--they certainly do not wish to die apart from him. And to this extent a person who has hope also has the willingness to receive the grace of the sacrament, which is absolutely essential.

This being the case, it is not necessary that there be any express act on the part of the recipient at the time the sacrament is received, although obviously if the recipient is capable of acting and does not wish to receive the sacrament, this is a bar to its being received worthily. But if the recipient is incapable of acting at the time because of unconsciousness or being demented, then the sacrament can be validly administered and worthily received, so long as the disposition of at least faith and hope is still given.

The minister of the sacrament operates not always or not so much by a performative statement--as in "I baptize thee" and so on--but rather by a prayer, because the Church is extending itself, in this sacrament, at least in part, beyond the life of the recipient. And therefore beyond the area in which the Church can exercise definite jurisdiction--what you bind on earth. The prayer of the Church, however, to the extent that it pertains to this sacrament, is efficacious beyond life, not altogether by virtue of the sacrament, but because the prayer itself as part of the sacrament can take the Church, as it were, beyond where its jurisdiction lies.

In terms of the effect of the sacrament, the overcoming of sin and its consequences in terms of bodily life and health, implies also a release from the terror of death. Given the sacrament the Christian need not be terrorized by death, and not having to be terrorized by death should be able to integrate the emotions and be able to live with a certain tranquility in the face of death, a tranquility which others would not have. This sort of tranquility, then, would be important for straightening out all of the effects of original sin in the natural order.

The kind of prayer life which particularly fits this sacrament is prayers of acceptance and submission, of seeing the will and the providence of God in everything, and being prepared to accept whatever happens as coming from the hand of God, so that even evil will be suffered patiently because it falls somehow within providence, even though the way in which it does so is not understood, since there is no apparent point in it.

The aspect of the last things which appropriately is connected with the last anointing is the discussion of death and judgment. One need not be terrorized by death, and the certitude of judgment. If judgment is going to be essentially merciful, and it is only by persisting in mortal sin that the Christian could lose hope and faith and by losing faith lose the grounds for receiving the sacrament of last anointing worthily.

The night prayer of compline which includes the <u>Nunc dimittis</u> is a kind of sacramental of this sacrament, to the extent that it is a kind of letting go of one's waking life and activities, and a rounding out of one's day, which is analogous to rounding out of one's life--as one finishes one's life's work, one finishes one's day's work, you are ready to go to sleep and want to go to sleep. This attitude of having had enough of a day and being willing to sleep and be released with a confidence that letting go does not terrorize one because you know you will wake up in a new day, should form the Christian's attitude toward death itself, and so the saying of the night prayer and going to sleep is a kind of practice exercise for dying.

The next section of this part is concerned with Christian asceticism.

The idea of asceticism is the notion of practice or exercise or drill or training, as in training for an athletic contest. Christian asceticism is the aspect in which Christian life is an effort at self-redemption to the extent that one is not already redeemed. The specific problem, however, of overcoming personal sin does not really pertain to the ascetic so much, for this is something which would be required even of non-Christians, although it is obviously a necessary condition for Christian life. One has not yet got into the proper area of Christian asceticism when one only thinks of avoiding sin, mortal or venial sin. Particularly, the avoidance of mortal sin is not yet an ascetic practice.

Traditionally practices such as prayer, fasting, and works of mercy are regarded as ascetical works, when they are done precisely as a kind of practicing or exercising of oneself in the Christian life. The notion of asceticism is connected with the fact that sanctification for us must be a redemptive process. Otherwise, there would not have to be an ascetical element in Christian life. The focus of asceticism as properly Christian will be on the cultivation of those specifically Christian virtues. This is the aspect in which Christian asceticism goes beyond simply being morally good in the way that is required of everyone.

The aspects of asceticism can be looked at in four different ways. In one sense, there is a kind of moral training and penance--moral training with a view to conditioning oneself so as to act in a Christian way and penance in the sense of living the penitential life, something which goes beyond the minimal demands of morality. In a second sense, there is the training which is required to fulfill one's vocation, equipping oneself to satisfy its special conditions, and the demands it makes as against what one might otherwise want. In a third sense, connected with the Eucharist, there is the training which is involved in accepting one's role in the Church, accepting the conditions and limits of playing as a member of the Church and fulfilling one's own role in the Church merely, and being satisfied with it. Fourthly, there is the living of the Christian life as a preparation for death, with a constant readiness to die in Christ, and an attempt to get oneself into a proper frame of mind for this.

There will be some need to make clear why prayer and fasting are thought of as being especially appropriate. Obviously, not all prayer is an ascetical work, and the kinds of prayer which we are interested in will be any sort of prayer insofar as it is done with ascetical intent. Why fasting should be considered an especially appropriate practice will be something to be looked at closely; it is also important to try to clarify what analogs there are of it.

The idea of works of mercy, or charitable acts, especially insofar as they involve giving up some of one's money and time--giving something of one's own up which one would not have to give up--must be explained as ascetical practices. The various kinds of devotions, pilgrimages, and so forth also often have an aspect of Christian asceticism. They are undertaken as a kind of exercise or practice in Christian living. So these also must be considered here.

The ascetical aspect of Christian life is what the Christian does as someone who is redeemed but insofar as he is not already redeemed. It is the action of one who is in potentiality to the extent that they are still in potentiality--it is the movement of Christian life. We now move on to the life of Christian perfection, which involves the action of Christians who are redeemed insofar as they are already redeemed. Here action will largely bear on Christian life as a communication of redemption to others, as realization of it in goods which also are realized in others. Here we have the activity of Christians as the activity of those already in act with respect to sanctity although still in potentiality to heaven. So this is more properly the more religious, less secular aspect common to all Christians, and it is properly the life of Christian holiness or perfection.

Christian holiness is not a life without human content. It is impossible to act as a human person without acting to realize and participate in some human goods, which need not be to realize them in oneself; it also can be to realize them in others. The human goods in question may be the good of religion but might equally be other goods regarded as human. The pursuit of any human good is, to begin with, compatible with the love of God, since loving God one loves all goods as participations in his goodness. And not to love him would be inappropriate.

But more than this, in Christian life the human goods which are loved and participated in are loved for the sake of one's participation in them, for one's own act, because by this act and its participation in a good, one makes the good real in a way which can be contributed to the filling out of the pleroma. In other words, here the pursuit of human goods terminates in charity; it is done for the sake of God and one's neighbor and oneself whom one loves. The pursuit of goods here always will need to be as an expression and an extension of the sacramental life.

One's lived life, looked at from this point of view, will have in its every act the fourfold significance: It will be done as an act which is redemptive and sanctifying, which is overcoming evil and reconciling things with God; it will be done as an expression of one's faith and as part of one's Christian vocation; it will be done as a filling out of one's role in the church

and as part of the work of the Church; and it will be done according to the Christian style of life, and as a way of sanctifying the culture; and it also will at the same time be done in a spirit of detachment from temporal goods and done for the sake of the eternal reality of the pleroma, which does not require one's continued natural life to be realized, but rather is going to be realized and enjoyed only through death. So the Christian life looked at from this point of view will be in its every act a unity of living in realization and in solidarity with all four of these sacraments, which are all rooted in baptism.

The carrying out of Christian life will be an overflowing of the redemption which one already has within oneself, an overflowing into a kind of fruitfulness where the results will be more realized in others than in oneself--more a passing on of human goods and realizing them in others. But the essential goodness of the acts by which the good is realized remains rooted in the one who does it. In this sense he becomes a vehicle of this good, its presence and its contribution to the pleroma. All good acts, looked at in themselves as human acts, are in essence permanent and lasting. The negative side of this is the eternity of hell. But the positive side of it is the unlosability of whatever good one does. It does not go away; it is not merely an event or process, but a permanent reality.

The discussion of this part also needs to go into the conception of charity increasing as obstacles to it diminish and the individual becomes more fully redeemed in himself. As this happens, he becomes more fully united to Christ and more close to him, not only in his passion and death but also in his resurrection and glory. This closeness will result, according to the mode of reality of one's life, according to the particular form of one's life, in one or another experience of the unity which is coming about.

The classic type of this experience is that of the mystic. But the experience of the mystic, I think, is only one peculiar species of the life of Christian perfection. The mystic is a pure contemplative, specializing in the good of religion. When greater unity with God is achieved, and religion is the focus of one's life and activity, then there is a natural limiting of attention and focusing in on a kind of prayer life which is going more and more to exclude everything else except the very act of love of God, which finally can be experienced in itself. And this experience--this contact with God by way of one's direct awareness of one's own act of loving him--is the experience of mystical unity, as I currently understand it.

On the other hand, someone else who was equally close to God, equally holy, but living in a different lifestyle, as a mother of a family, for example, would never have mystical experience, an experience of divine intimacy, but

might nevertheless have another experience of divine closeness and reality, perceiving it, for instance, in the signs of holiness in her children. There would be in such an experience an analogue of mystical experience, and the mother might get the same sort of confirmation, joy, and fulfillment from it. And she would also get the same encouragement to try to do good more generously and to live a Christian life more fully and more freely.

The life of Christian perfection will involve the exercise of all the specifically Christian virtues which will be seen less negatively and more in their positive aspects, as a ground of perfection and joy rather than of self-renunciation.

This part ought also to treat again of the sacramentals in which, as it were, sanctification is spread. I think there are at least two kinds of sacramentals. There are those which are as it were devotions and activities and blessings and so on, which are accepted by the Church, which extend the sacraments, as it were, by means of an additional performance. They are not necessary, in the way the sacraments are, for the sacraments in fact remain. But they give the sacraments a kind of presence for our experience which it would not otherwise have. This is obviously the case with the blessings with holy water of people, which make baptism experientially present. Many others can be reduced to one or another of the sacraments. The anointing of a king would pertain to confirmation.

There are other sacramentals which are not so much concerned with the extension of the sacraments, with their continuation, as with the sanctification of objects themselves--times, places, seasons, objects, and so on. For example, in blessing a field or a fishing fleet, sanctity is being extended to the subpersonal world. This is where the Christian redemptive process takes over the whole material world and incorporates or gathers it in. The sacramentals are a sign of the way in which the life of the Christian, which deals with the world, does take over and sanctify the things which are dealt with. This is a positive thing, for it is not really a case of undoing sin in subpersonal things, which are only involved in sin to the extent that they are related to human beings, who are in sin. The sacramentals simply reclaim subpersonal things for Christian perfection and humanize them in Christian life.

Finally, this section should conclude with the resurrection of the body, and considering the full reality of heaven, in which the saints are present, sharing with one another in a common, human bodily life, as well as sharing in divine life.

Here is a last note which does not fit into this part but is relevant to what we have been discussing, and it needs to be taken into account in some of

the earlier sections of the book, some of the earlier parts of the work, as well as toward the end. There is a distinction to be made between loving goods for someone, loving the bond of friendship which one has with another person when one loves goods with others in a morally upright way, and finally loving another person. According to a natural consideration of things, apart from charity, one can love other persons, but the love of another person is basically and essentially an emotional thing. This emotive love becomes as it were moral only in virtue of the fact that one is loving goods with and for others and loving the bond of friendship which one has with others. But directly, the will does not bear upon the other person, for the other person is not in their personal reality an intelligible good. Humanistic love of others, universal love, becomes a love of humanity, which, however, does not mean loving anyone in particular at all. This is because humanity is simply a potentiality or an abstraction, and not anyone's concrete reality. And so it is easy to love everybody but not love anyone.

From the Christian point of view, however, loving human goods properly is going to be loving them insofar as they are participations in divine goodness. And one cannot love them in this way without loving divine goodness. In loving divine goodness one loves God himself, who is his own goodness. So here we have a case where personal reality of the divine persons can be an object of one's love. Even naturally, according to Aquinas, one loves God above all things. But, in the first place, one does not naturally know God to be a personal reality, and one cannot love God any otherwise than one knows him. In the second place, loving God naturally does not lead one to be able to move from loving God to loving others as persons, volitionally. However, once one knows that God is personal and tri-personal, then loving God as a reality in himself means loving the divine persons as realities.

It also will be the case that to the extent that one knows the divine nature is participated by human persons, one is in a position to love other human persons who do or can participate in divinity by way of this participation. Loving the goodness of God, then, becomes a matter of loving the persons who share in the divine nature, for here the nature is not simply a potentiality or an abstraction. The person who shares in it has a kind of identity with the nature which they share in. From this point of view, then, the Christian is able to love others volitionally, love others with the love of charity, where the love as an act of the will bears upon the person directly.

This love can and should, obviously, be a perfection of the love of others by way of loving goods with them, loving the friendship one has with them, and a

proper emotional attachment to them. So one can put the three levels of love together in proper love of neighbor in a Christian context.

End of notes