Presidential Address: Practical Reason and Faith

by Germain Grisez

Can Christian faith affect practical reasoning in such a way that at least some moral judgments of those who think Christian faith true will differ from the moral judgments of nonbelievers who proceed equally rationally? If Christian faith can make such a difference, what is the logic of the practical reasoning in which it does so?

This question is a philosophical one insofar as it concerns the logical role of certain beliefs in the process of reasoning which leads to moral judgments. One need not decide whether Christian faith itself is true to investigate its possible role in the practical reasoning of those who think it true.

Obviously, from a sociological point of view, there is a specifically Christian morality, just as there is a Buddhist morality, an Old Testament morality, an Aristotelian morality, a Marxist morality, and so forth. This fact has been noted by Christian writers from the earliest times. St. Paul, for example, contrasts Christian morality, based on the foolishness of the cross, with Old Testament legalism and Greek wisdom.[1]

While moralities rooted in diverse faiths overlap in some respects, each has some norms peculiar to itself. However, this sociological fact does not settle the issue I wish to consider. All these differences could be diverse variations from and approximations to the body of moral truths ideally available to any reasonable person without any of the diverse faiths.

In recent years, in fact, many Catholic theologians have held that every moral truth is accessible to any reasonable person.[2] To understand what they maintain, one must consider three ways in which they think the moral reasoning of a Christian can differ from that of a nonbeliever without falsifying their thesis.

First, Christian teaching includes many moral norms. Some of these are not accepted by people without faith. Examples can be drawn from the Christian sexual ethic. In recent years, of course, some Catholic theologians have concluded that many of these specifically Christian norms are false.[3]

But even if they admit some peculiarly Christian norms correct, theologians can maintain that these are in principle available to every reasonable person. The fact that many reasonable people either do not think of these norms or do not accept them can be explained by the fallen human condi-

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tion, in which even truths naturally knowable are obscured by the consequences of human sin in earlier times, going back to the beginning of the human race.[4]

Second, Christian life involves some specific duties. Some of these, such as participation in eucharistic worship, can be considered common to all Christians. Others, such as faithfulness to vows taken by some Christians, bind only those individuals. Neither sort of duties has any place in the practical reasoning of nonbelievers.

Theologians can admit that Christians have specific duties without admitting that Christian faith entails them. Rather, the specific duties of Christian life belong to Christians as members of the Church. Just as membership in any other community entails some specific duties, so membership in the Christian community. Faith leads to these duties insofar as one adheres to the Christian community by faith. Thus, faith entails these duties only insofar as it shapes ecclesial life, not insofar as it teaches any moral truth inaccessible to nonbelievers.

Similarly, duties such as faithfulness to vows can have an important place in the practical reasoning of particular Christians even if there are no specific norms implied by Christian faith. If one can make a solemn promise to God, the duty of faithfulness will flow from moral norms accessible to any reasonable person concerning promise keeping and reverence toward God.

Third, certain specifically Christian dispositions—such as faith, hope, and charity—may be claimed not merely to entail ecclesial duties but to affect the entire lives of devout Christians. Moreover, these dispositions are an aspect of what Christians think is proper to Christian life, namely, a special relationship with Jesus and so with God. One way of articulating this view is that by the death and resurrection of Jesus, God has established a new community between himself and created persons, and that men and women who accept the invitation to become members of this community also become adopted members of God's own family, with the hope of rising from death and living forever in a fellowship mature in divine life and flourishing in all human goods.

Theologians can concede that faith, hope, and charity transform the entire lives of Christians, and yet deny that these dispositions entail any specifically Christian moral norms. Love of God demands love of neighbor, and hope for everlasting life demands moral purity in this life. Hence, the devout Christian will have a unique and strong motive for turning from moral evil, living conscientiously, and striving to fulfill in a pure and unselfish way the common ideal of human uprightness.

But do Christians' special friendship with God and hope for life hereafter change what is required for authentic human goodness in this world? Theo-

logians can say no, and conclude that faith, hope, and charity add nothing to the specific content of the moral norms which every upright person, Christian or not, seeks to discern and fulfill.

Theologians who hold that Christian faith entails no specific moral norms often invoke the authority of St. Thomas in support of their view.

Thomas teaches that Christian faith — the New Law — adequately regulates external actions. For the New Law needs to enjoin or prohibit in externals only those things which lead to grace or necessarily belong to grace's right use. Christians are led to grace by the sacraments. The right use of grace is in the works of charity which make up a morally good life. In virtuous works, Christians are guided by natural reason, the common standard of morality. Therefore, Thomas concludes, although Christian faith adds doctrinal elements, such as its teaching on the Trinity, no new moral precepts are necessary.[5]

Thus, Thomas seems to support the view that apart from the ecclesial actions involved in the sacraments, Christian faith demands nothing but what is also demanded by the correct moral judgments of nonbelievers. Yet other elements of Thomas' teaching suggest a different view.[6]

For example, he holds that there are specific responsibilities, such as love of enemies, which flow from the properly Christian virtue of charity.[7] He also holds that Christian life requires specifically Christian moral virtues which differ in kind from those which can be acquired through human acts formed by natural reason alone.[8] Let us first consider what Thomas thinks about specifically Christian moral virtues.

On his view, moral action is a means to an end: flourishing in personal goods in community. By the divine friendship accepted through faith, human persons enter into a more than human, supernatural community. By a second birth or by adoption as God's children, Christians become fellow citizens of the saints and members of God's household.[9] The moral virtues men and women can develop by their own actions, shaped by reason, equip them only for life in a purely human, civic society. Hence, Christians need moral virtues which they cannot acquire by their own efforts but receive as gifts from God.

While civic virtues will end with this life, specifically Christian virtues will continue to shape appropriate actions in the heavenly fellowship. Christian virtues bear on the same matters as the civic virtues they correspond to, but, according to Thomas, sometimes make specific demands different from those of unaided reason. For instance, the rule set by reason for eating is that one's diet be healthful and not block the use of reason. But the rule of divine law is that one chastise one's body and make it docile by abstinence from food, drink, and other satisfactions. Thomas expressly argues that something excessive according to the rational norm of civic virtue can be ap-

propriate according to the norm of specifically Christian virtue—for example, to willingly lay down one's life in defense of the faith.[10]

Thus, Thomas seems to hold two inconsistent positions relevant to the question at issue. On the one hand, he thinks that in virtuous works we are guided sufficiently by natural reason. On the other hand, he argues that Christian virtue sometimes demands something specifically different from the rule of unaided reason. One could try to resolve this paradox within the bounds of Thomas' own teaching. However, an adequate textual study would be too large an undertaking for this occasion. Therefore, I shall instead try to resolve the paradox without claiming that my account is that of St. Thomas.

I do not think that Christian faith adds any principles to those naturally knowable. Yet I hold that faith can lead to specific moral norms inaccessible to nonbelievers in at least two ways, which have been generally ignored.

The first way is that faith includes certain claims about the human situation. If accepted as true, these claims together with generally accepted moral principles have specific moral implications. The teaching on love of enemies attributed to Jesus in Luke's Gospel illustrates this point.

Jesus says: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who treat you badly."[11] In explaining the reason for this norm, Jesus appeals to a generally accepted moral principle: "Treat others as you would like them to treat you."[12] Everyone takes care of friends and deals fairly with others when that is advantageous. But Christians should do more. As God's children, they are called to act as he does: "Be compassionate as your Father is compassionate. Do not judge, and you will not be judged yourselves; do not condemn, and you will not be condemned yourselves; grant pardon, and you will be pardoned."[13]

The parable of the merciless official in Matthew's Gospel makes the same point. A king forgives a high official a huge debt, but the official refuses the same mercy to a subordinate who owes a small amount. The king thereupon insists on full payment, and Jesus draws the moral: "That is how my heavenly Father will deal with you unless you each forgive your brother from your heart."[14]

The moral principle underlying these arguments is the principle of universalizability, which is available to everyone. Christian faith makes a claim about the human situation: that although sinful men and women are God's enemies, he mercifully offers them fellowship with himself. One who believes this claim and accepts the offered fellowship therefore has a specific moral responsibility toward others, including enemies, to treat them with similar mercy.

Is this moral norm accessible to any nonbeliever who proceeds equally rationally? No. Nonbelievers can know that revenge is immoral, that kind-

ness to enemies is godlike, and even that such beneficence can at times be morally required.[15] But in many cases a nonbeliever will faultlessly follow the policy of keeping a distance from enemies in order to avoid both suffering and doing evil. However, faith in the divine initiative of reconciliation provides a reason for active love toward enemies—for example, for making repeated, risky, and seemingly fruitless approaches to them. Thus, the specific Christian norms of mercy are so tightly based on faith that only someone who accepts the truth of faith will consider them true.

But, then, are these norms of mercy anything more than duties of ecclesial life? Do they really differ from other duties of ecclesial life, such as appropriate participation in eucharistic worship? They do. The norms of Christian mercy bear upon all of a Christian's interpersonal relationships, including those with nonbelievers involving purely secular matters. Someone who considered the gospel true would have an obligation both to enter the Church and to act on the Christian norms of mercy. If such a person defied conscience and refused to make the baptismal commitment required for Church membership, he or she would have no duty to participate in eucharistic worship, but still could appreciate the force of the norms of Christian mercy.

The second way in which Christian faith can lead to specific moral norms is by requiring certain moral acts which organize a specifically Christian life. Various New Testament precepts call for specifically Christian acts. For example: "Your light must shine in the sight of men, so that, seeing your good works, they may give the praise to your Father in heaven."[16] Worship God "in a way that is worthy of thinking beings, by offering your living bodies as a holy sacrifice, truly pleasing to God."[17] "Never say or do anything except in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God the Father through him."[18]

These and similar texts can be understood by taking them as demands that one relate the whole of one's life to the sacramental acts which are characteristically Christian.[19] On this view, baptism is a gift of light which ought to shine in one's life. Eucharistic worship is a response to divine gifts, and the whole of one's life should be spent in preparing a suitable gift to offer in eucharistic worship. But this interpretation raises questions.

Is anything more at stake here than the duties of a Christian as a Church member? Yes and no. No, inasmuch as these norms bind only those who not only consider Christian faith true but make the baptismal commitment of faith. But yes, inasmuch as these norms are not mere social requirements affecting only a certain part of the Christian's life.

"Church membership" refers to a social status with juridical implications. But for the believer it also refers to the new life of those raised up with Christ and re-created in God's image to be companions with the saints in

God's own family.[20] In the first sense, as explained above, Church membership entails specific social duties but no specifically Christian moral norms. But in the second sense, Church membership, unlike membership in any other society, requires of believers a wholly distinctive way of life, and specifically Christian norms shape this life.

Still, it may be objected, Christians who wish to let their light shine before others or to thank God always can do so only by living a moral life which can be recognized as good by nonbelievers. Therefore, while Christian faith may give life a different transcendent significance, it entails no specific norms.

I grant the premise on which this objection is based: A good Christian life must be in accord with the moral truth accessible to nonbelievers. But I deny the conclusion. I maintain, on the contrary, that a distinctively Christian life is so not only by its transcendent significance but by its moral content. The human acts required by faith are more specified than morally good acts possible without faith. Specifically Christian norms are needed to shape these acts.

True, many of the external acts of a good Christian will not differ from those of a good nonbeliever. Thus, St. Thomas is not far wrong in saying that the New Law adequately regulates external action without laying down new moral norms.

However, the same external acts can be part of very different moral acts.[21] For example, drinking a glass of wine can be part of an ordinary meal, but it also can help celebrate a marriage. If a man drinks the glass of wine as a toast to his best friend, who has married the woman both courted, the external act can belong to a moral act of gracious concession that the more suitable man for that woman won her consent to marriage. Such differences in significance are not extrinsic to a human act, but belong to the object of the choice which specifies the moral act.

Thus, Christians who choose to let their light shine and to give thanks to God in all they do are actually engaged in human acts very different from those of nonbelievers even when they perform very similar external acts. Christian faith's norms shaping a life of witness and thanks are specific moral norms. To assume that the actions of the lives of faith and of nonbelief can be the same and only the transcendent significance of Christian life distinctive is to reduce human action to mere behavior, abstracted from the intelligible content of choice and thus stripped of all moral significance.

Furthermore, while a life according to Christian faith must conform to the moral truth the nonbeliever can know, for each believer faith excludes many options which would be available to an upright nonbeliever. For, according to faith, diverse personal talents and opportunities are so many different gifts which Christians must put to work in the cooperative effort

of building up the Church or preparing the material of Jesus' expected kingdom.[22]

Since Jesus' followers are to make their different personal contributions to the work he began, there is a specifically Christian norm which binds every Christian and no nonbeliever: One should discern one's personal vocation, accept it, and faithfully fulfill it: "If anyone wants to be a follower of mine, let him renounce himself and take up his cross every day and follow me."[23]

Of course, nonbelievers can know that self-sacrifice and dedication can be morally required. Individual nonbelievers also can make commitments which exclude from their lives choices which would be good for other individuals. But possible plans of life acceptable to Christians are limited by faith's conception of a plan of life: namely, personal vocation. This peculiarly Christian concept involves the idea of accepting a functional role as a member of the Church and living one's whole life to carry out apostolic work in that role.[24]

Another way in which Christian faith provides specific grounds for certain moral norms is by vindicating the reasonableness of adhering to the principle that one may not do evil that good might come of it. Because St. Paul provided the classic formulation of this principle, it has been called the "Pauline principle."[25]

The Pauline principle generates many absolute moral norms. Christian faith demands absolute reverence for all persons and all the goods which constitute their fulfillment: "Love is the one thing that cannot hurt your neighbour; that is why it is the answer to every one of the commandments."[26] For example, apart from exceptions believed to be divinely sanctioned, until quite recently Christians always regarded as immoral any choice intended to impede the coming to be or hasten the passing away of any person.[27]

I do not think that the Pauline principle and the moral absolutes it generates are specifically Christian in the same way as norms such as those requiring love of enemies and acceptance of one's personal vocation. Rather, I think that the Pauline principle can be deduced from the first principle of morality, if that is rightly understood and formulated.[28] But the fact remains that apart from the Christian tradition and a few thinkers influenced by it, the Pauline principle has not been accepted. Both pre-Christian and post-Christian thought rejects the moral absolutes which were constantly and very firmly held and handed on among all Christians — Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant — until the twentieth century.

Of course, some will say that the Pauline principle has not been accepted simply because it is not true. On this view, there are times when one may do evil that good might come of it — namely, when one cannot promote human flourishing without also harming persons. Facing such conflict situations, either one must act in ways which destroy, damage, and impede goods in-

trinsic to persons or one must forgo many benefits which might be realized and allow many harms which might be prevented. Many claim that in such situations it is reasonable to choose the alternative which all things considered promises the greater good or, at least, the lesser evil.[29]

But this apparently rational position is altogether unworkable, because no one can tell which alternative is more promising all things considered. Indeed, even in the simplest case, the goods and bads involved in possibilities between which one has a free choice are noncommensurable with one another; if they were not, one would need no free choice.[30] Thus, seemingly rational grounds for making exceptions to the Pauline principle are no more than rationalizations of choices to set aside moral absolutes for the sake of the concrete results which are felt, rather than rationally judged, to be more desirable.[31]

But if rational considerations concerning means cannot require the rejection of the Pauline principle, still consistent adherence to the moral absolutes the principle generates is likely to seem unreasonable to anyone without Christian faith. For, lacking faith, one is likely to invest one's civic society with practical ultimacy. That generally is true even for those who think the human spirit has a transcendent destiny, because such a destiny usually is thought to be altogether different from and discontinuous with one's moral life in this world. Hence, a moral framework of innerworldly life is needed, and decent people without faith usually look to their civic society to provide that framework.

The consequence is that when the very survival or essential well being of their society is at stake, most people are inclined to approve doing evil that good might come of it. People who would never condone the gross immoralities of selfish individuals easily judge, for example, that if the common good requires it the innocent may be killed. That was Caiphas' argument for killing Jesus: "You fail to see that it is better for one man to die for the people, than for the whole nation to be destroyed."[32]

Today, some think that an effective nuclear deterrent need not involve as a means the will to kill the innocent. But others think that a countervalue strategy holds noncombatants hostage, that such a strategy is an essential part of an effective deterrent, and that an effective deterrent requires readiness if necessary to carry out the threat. On this view, although the killing of the innocent is not the desired outcome, the will to kill the innocent is a necessary part of the deterrent as a means of avoiding that outcome. This means seems necessary to a good end: defending the Constitution of the United States, protecting liberty, and preventing the horrors of Soviet aggression and conquest.[33] Hence, those who hold this view justify a deterrent which they admit lacks discrimination between combatants and noncombatants, and deny the Pauline principle by saying: "The appropriate moral

principle is not the relation of means to ends but the choice of a moral act which prevents greater evil."[34]

Although I do not consider this attempt to justify the deterrent sound, I will not criticize it here. I only use this argument to illustrate the point that otherwise decent people tend to justify the will to kill the innocent when they think the common good requires it. Of course, if an exception to the Pauline principle is allowed when the common good seems to demand it, the way is opened for exceptions in other cases where it seems to individuals that what makes their life worth living is at stake. Thus, by vindicating the reasonableness of adhering to the Pauline principle even in extreme situations involving the common good, Christian faith confirms its characteristic moral absolutes.[35]

How does faith vindicate for believers who are mindful of it the reasonableness of excluding every choice to destroy, damage, or impede any intrinsic good of a person or persons? In three ways.

First, faith teaches that a perfect human community in which all persons might flourish together in respect to every dimension of their being is no mere ideal. It will be realized and every person who remains faithful will share in it. The holy city will come "down from God out of heaven."[36] "He will wipe away all tears from their eyes; there will be no more death, and no more mourning or sadness."[37] For those who believe in the reality of the coming kingdom, present sufferings are insignificant in comparison with hoped for glory.[38] Moreover, according to faith, this hoped for community is not exclusively future, but even now is more real than the visible world.[39]

Second, Christian faith teaches that a good human life in this world contributes to God's larger plan. As cooperators in God's work, men and women are required to try in this life to promote human good and to heal human misery. The example of Jesus teaches that their success will be limited.

Yet Christians can hold that their effort will yield some immediate fruit and that their absolute fidelity will not be pointless. For God will turn defeat and death into victory and life. Therefore, considering themselves subordinates helping to carry out the plan of divine providence, those who shape their lives according to Christian faith can assume that the plan of divine providence will show the ultimate realism of human lives which appear foolish according to worldly wisdom.

However, if one tries to combine (1) the principle that one may do evil that good might come of it with (2) the Christian doctrine of divine providence (God permits what is bad only to draw good from it), one must accept as a moral principle: If the situation becomes difficult, try anything. For if one accomplishes what one attempts, one can be certain that on the whole and in the long run it was for the best, since it must have fit into the plan of providence. And if one does not accomplish what one attempts, one learns that would have been wrong, but no harm is done.

This reductio ad absurdum highlights the sharp distinction Christian faith makes between human responsibility and God's responsibility. Faith teaches that human persons are not responsible for the overall greater good or lesser evil, for only God knows what they are. Human responsibility requires not success in effecting goods and preventing evils but faithful fulfillment of a particular personal vocation, according to which the Christian serves human persons when possible, refrains from choices to violate them, and hopes for God's re-creative act to complete the redemptive plan.

Third, Christian faith teaches bodily resurrection. Those who seek the kingdom first are promised a divine fulfillment beyond human conception.[40] But they are also promised all the human goods which nonbelievers seek and prize: "Set your hearts on his kingdom first, and on his righteousness, and all these other things will be given you as well."[41] Vatican II puts the point in a fresh and clear way: "After we have obeyed the Lord, and in his Spirit nurtured on earth the values of human dignity, brotherhood and freedom, and indeed all the good fruits of our nature and enterprise, we will find them again, but freed of stain, burnished and transfigured."[42]

This Christian vision gives those who believe it and keep it in mind reason enough to do their best to promote human fulfillment in this world. It also persuades them that steadfast refusal to do evil that good might come of it is in the long run the only way to ensure those benefits and prevent those harms whose prospect leads those without faith or forgetful of it to make exceptions to the principle of absolute reverence for human persons and the absolute moral norms which flow from it.

In sum, if the arguments proposed in this paper are sound, they show that Christian faith provides more than a fresh motivation for fulfilling moral norms accessible to any reasonable person. With respect to the kinds of norms exemplified by love of enemies and acceptance of personal vocation, faith generates specific norms by adding its distinctive view of reality to the facts and possibilities to which sound moral reflection otherwise would be limited. With respect to moral absolutes, faith confirms what in principle can be known without it.

But even if moral absolutes are in principle accessible to reason without faith, here too faith provides more than motivation. By putting human life into the context of God's larger plan and work, Christian faith delimits the moral responsibility of believers. If faithful fulfillment of this finite responsibility seemed about to lead to cosmic disaster, Christians mindful of their faith would not expect the heavens to fall but would rather expect Jesus to come again in glory. Faith's claims about the relationship of moral life in this world to the heavenly kingdom also give those who accept these claims a reason to look beyond the common good of civic society and every other innerworldly end for the moral framework of their lives. Thus, Christian faith provides a specific ground for abiding by the Pauline principle even

when doing so will have consequences which would seem unacceptable to upright people whose moral judgments are grounded exclusively in worldly wisdom.

NOTES

1. See S. Pinckaers, O.P., "Existe-t-il une morale chrétienne?" *Sources* (Fribourg), 1 (1975), 11-23, 49-59.

2. See Richard A. McCormick, S.J., *Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980* (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), 296-303, 428-31, 626-38, 757-59; Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., eds., *Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2: The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics* (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), which includes some attempts to develop both sides of the issue; Jean-Marie Aubert, "Debats autour de la Morale Fondamentale," *Studia Moralia*, 20 (1982), 195-221 (bibliographic references: 196). For an important and fully developed example of the view that every moral truth is accessible to any reasonable person, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., *Personal Responsibility and Christian Morality* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 53-111.

3. See, for example, McCormick, *Notes*, 668-79, for a summary of reactions, including numerous negative ones, to *Persona humana*, a declaration on sexual ethics issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.

4. See the teaching of Vatican I on the relationship between faith and reason: DS 3005/1786, 3019/1799. Cf. St. Thomas, *S.t.*, 1-2, q. 94, a. 6; McCormick, *Notes*, 638; Charles E. Curran, "Is There a Catholic and/or Christian Ethic?" in Curran and McCormick, eds., op. cit., 79.

5. *S.t.*, 1-2, q. 108, a. 2, c. and ad 1.

6. See S. Pinckaers, O.P., "La morale de saint Thomas: est-elle chrétienne?" *Nova et Vetera*, 51 (1976), 93-107.

7. See *S.t.*, 2-2, q. 25, a. 8; q. 83, a. 8; *De perfectione vitae spiritualis*, c. 14. Thomas limits the precept, as distinct from the counsel, of love of enemies to cases in which one is confronted with an enemy in dire need, or asking forgiveness, or the like. One might argue that even a non-believer could know the obligation where Thomas thinks it is of precept. However, I do not think the New Testament warrants limiting the norm as Thomas does. He bases the precept on charity considered in itself as a state of friendship; the New Testament precept, as I argue below, is based on the principle of universalizability applied to the new covenant community which depends on God's reconciling act in Jesus.

8. *S.t.*, 1-2, q. 63, aa. 3-4.

9. This sentence articulates the central meaning of "supernatural." The natural and supernatural differ as birth and rebirth (Jn 1.12, 3.5-6) or natural birth and adoption (Rom 8.14-17), which results in membership in God's own family (Eph 2.19).

10. See *In Sent.*, 4, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, qu'la 4, ad 2; *De virtutibus cardinalibus*, a. 4.

11. Lk 6.27-28. All Scripture quotations are taken from *The Jerusalem Bible*.

12. Lk 6.31. The examples (vv. 29-30), even if expressed with hyperbole, make it clear that the precept goes beyond what Thomas allows.

13. Lk 6.37-38. For an exegesis of Lk 6.27-38 supportive of my reading: Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., *The Gospel According to Luke (I-IX)*, Anchor Bible, 28 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), 630, 637-41.

14. Mt 18.35.

15. See Pheme Perkins, *Love Commands in the New Testament* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 27-40 and 89-95, for further background and exegesis of New Testament texts.

16. Mt 5.16.

17. Rom 12.1.

18. Col 3.17.

19. For an explanation of the sacrificial character of Christian life, by which the whole of it is to be rational worship: Raymond Corriveau, C.Ss.R., *The Liturgy of Life: A Study of the Ethical Thought of St. Paul in His Letters to the Early Christian Communities* (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970). For the organizing role of the acts of receiving sacraments, see Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus*, vol. 1, *Christian Moral Principles* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), chs. 30–33.

20. See Eph 2.19, 4.24; Col 3.1; Vatican II, *Lumen gentium*, 7–9.

21. See St. Thomas, *S.t.*, 1-2, q. 18, a. 5. Hence, *S.t.*, 1-2, q. 108, a. 2, which deals only with external acts, should not be thought to show that there are no specifically Christian moral norms. Theo G. Belmans, O.Praem., *Le sens objectif de l'agir humain: Pour relire la morale conjugale de Saint Thomas* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), 175–88, provides many references to texts of St. Thomas on the human act and attempts a synthesis.

22. See Vatican II, *Gaudium et spes*, 38–39; *Apostolicam actuositatem*, 3.

23. Lk 9.23. Cf. Fitzmyer, op. cit., 241–43 and 783–90.

24. Lk 9.57–62. See Fitzmyer, op. cit., 833–37. See John Paul II, *Redemptor hominis*, 21 (71 *AAS* [1979] 317): "For the whole of the community of the People of God and for each member of it what is in question is not just a specific 'social membership'; rather, for each and every one what is essential is a particular 'vocation.' Indeed, the Church as the People of God is also—according to the teaching of St. Paul mentioned above, of which Pius XII reminded us in wonderful terms—'Christ's Mystical Body.' Membership in that body has for its source a particular call united with the saving action of grace. Therefore, if we wish to keep in mind this community of the People of God, which is so vast and so extremely differentiated, we must see first and foremost Christ saying in a way to each member of the community: 'Follow Me.'"

25. See Rom 3.8. Theologians who hold that the end justifies the means deny that their position is at odds with this verse of St. Paul's. They claim that Paul only excludes the choice of a moral evil, not of the premoral evil they seek to justify. However, the preceding verse is raising precisely the question whether what otherwise would be a moral evil—a lie or refusal of truth—might not be justified (and considered to involve only a premoral evil) if it promotes God's glory. For a philosophical explication of this "Pauline principle": Alan Donagan, *The Theory of Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 149–57.

26. Rom 13.10.

27. See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, "Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium," *Theological Studies*, 39 (1978), 277–86, with respect to contraception. The point can be seen with respect to any choice to kill the unborn (direct abortion): John Connery, S.J., *Abortion: The Development of the Roman Catholic Perspective* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977), esp. 311.

28. See Grisez, *Christian Moral Principles*, ch. 7, qq. F–G; ch. 8, q. H.

29. See Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," *Louvain Studies*, 4 (1972), 115–56, for an influential development of this argument. Janssens tries to attribute his own position to St. Thomas. For a critique, see Belmans, op. cit., 360–76.

30. See Grisez, *Christian Moral Principles*, 151–54; also "Against Consequentialism," *American Journal of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy*, 23 (1978), 21–72; John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 111–24, 221–26; Donagan, op. cit., 172–209.

31. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., tried to face up to the argument based on noncommensurability of goods in *Doing Evil to Achieve Good*, ed. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), 227: "What do we do? *Somehow or other*, in fear and trembling, we commensurate. In a sense we *adopt* a hierarchy. We go to war to protect our freedom. That means we are willing to sacrifice life to protect this good. If 'give me liberty or give me death' does not involve *some kind* of commensuration, then I do not know what commensurating means" (italics his). And McCormick goes on to add several examples

like this one. McCormick also invokes Karl Rahner for "what he calls a 'moral instinct of faith.' This instinct can be called by any number of different names; but the point is that there is a component to moral judgment that cannot be adequately subject to analytic reflection. But it is this component that is chiefly responsible for one's ultimate judgments on concrete moral questions" (250–51). The reference is to Karl Rahner, S.J., "The Problem of Genetic Manipulation," *Theological Investigations*, vol. 9, *Writings of 1965–67, I*, trans. Graham Harrison (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 243. Rahner posits, not proves, that there are aspects of the essential morality of human acts which are nonconceptual, but belong to experienced reality and to practice which is in a "darkness" beyond theory. Apart from this metaphysics, Rahner supports his positing of this "instinct" only by pointing out that people (including moral theologians) have a hard time articulating good arguments for their moral convictions. Rahner's thinking on this "instinct" is somewhat confused, for he says it deals with the particular situation and yet is a judgment in principle (239). But, on the whole, it seems he intends to propose a version of prescriptivism or individual voluntarism, for in the summary he says that "this 'instinct' justifiably has the courage to say *Stat pro ratione voluntas* because such a confession need not necessarily be overcautious about making a decision" and that the whole theoretical argument is based on "we do not *want* to manipulate" (251). Rahner does not seem to notice that if one approves will's replacing reason, the will of some to manipulate also is approved.

32. Jn 11.50.

33. Michael Novak, *Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1983), 56–67; see list of co-signers, 75–77.

34. Ibid., 61. For evidence that an adequate deterrent must include a choice to destroy many persons, see Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 52–53; The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY* [fiscal year] *1983* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 19. For quotations from and references to other statements of the threat and a history of the evolution of American strategic doctrine, see Donald M. Snow, *Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1981), 48–85, with notes, 253–56. A clear statement of the moral issue by an author who accepts "necessity": Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 269–83.

35. Kant sets up the model of a kingdom of ends, which he does not intend as a plan for society but uses to generate norms: Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 56–59. Then, when he deals with specific normative matters, Kant introduces casuistical questions which make norms nonabsolute without providing any method of limiting exceptions: *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, introduction by Warner Wick (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1964), 71; examples: 84, 88, and so on. Some Protestants, influenced by Kant and the Reformation's pessimism, believe moral compromises necessary though sinful. See, for example, Helmut Thielicke, *Theological Ethics*, vol. 1, *Foundations*, ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 609–67. This sort of theology has influenced Catholics, for example: Charles E. Curran, *Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1972), 209–19.

36. Rv 21.2.

37. Rv 21.4.

38. Rom 8.18–25.

39. See 2 Cor 4.16–5.5

40. See 1 Cor 2.9; 1 Jn 3.2–3.

41. Mt 6.19–33.

42. *Gaudium et spes*, 39.